


'SI ADAM ET EVA PECCAVERUNT, QUID NOS MISERI
FECIMUS?'

THE RECEPTION OF AUGUSTINE'S ONTOLOGICAL DISCOURSE ON THE SOUL IN
LATE ANTIQUITY AND THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

Simon Leonard Hendrik Haverkamp

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



2013

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
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**‘Si Adam et Eva peccaverunt, quid nos miseri
fecimus?’**

**The Reception of Augustine’s Ontological Discourse on the Soul in
Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages.**

SIMON LEONARD HENDRIK HAVERKAMP



This thesis is submitted for the degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews

February 2013

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For Margje
magnificent sister, childhood soul-mate, loving mother of three

(even if she doesn't believe in dedications)

Soul of a Man

Won't somebody tell me, answer if you can!
Want somebody tell me, what is the soul of a man
I'm going to ask the question, answer if you can

If anybody here can tell me, what is the soul of a man?
I've traveled in different countries, I've traveled foreign lands
I've found nobody to tell me, what is the soul of a man

I saw a crowd stand talking, I came up right on time
Were hearing the doctor and the lawyer, say a man ain't nothing but his mind
I read the bible often, I tries to read it right

As far as I can understand, a man is more than his mind
When Christ stood in the temple, the people stood amazed
Was showing the doctors and the lawyers, how to raise a body from the grave

“Blind” Willie Johnson (1897-1945)

Abstract

This thesis analyses the reception of Augustine of Hippo's (354-430) ontological discourse on the soul in late antiquity and the early middle ages, more specifically in the sixth and the ninth centuries. Since Augustine never wrote a *De anima*, nor always presented his readers with definite answers to questions, there was room for later authors to interpret and improvise. This thesis focuses on 4 texts: Cassiodorus Senator's *De anima*, Eugippius of Lucculanum's massive *florilegium* the *Excerpta ex operibus Sancti Augustini*, both from the sixth century, Gottschalk of Orbais' letter *Quaestiones de anima*, and John Scottus Eriugena's apologetic *De divina praedestinatione liber*, both from the ninth century. This thesis establishes that, apart from Cassiodorus, the author's main interest in Augustine's ideas on the ontology of the soul rests on the way it impinges on their contemporary predestination debates. Cassiodorus consciously wanted to produce a Christian *De anima* in a classical vein. Especially the question of the origin of the soul takes the interest of Eugippius and Gottschalk. This is an important question for predestination debates, since it is supposed to explain technically how original sin came to be universal. Augustine never found a satisfactory answer to this thorny question. Eriugena's genius lies in building an original ontology of the soul on Augustine's own foundations which sidesteps this problem of the origin of the soul entirely.

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my warm gratitude to Karla Pollmann, who has helped me shape this thesis and through her acute questions and conversations lead me to the insights in Augustine insofar as I have gained them. My examiners Willemien Otten and Mark Elliot have given me useful pointers for the improvement of this thesis.

This thesis has been written in the context of the project 'After Augustine', and has received gracious funding from the Leverhulme Trust. Other fundgivers are the Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds, the Hendrik Muller Vaderlandsch' fonds, Radboud Wetenschappelijk Onderwijsfonds and the Ketel 1 Studiefonds, and I thank them all.

The School of Classics, its staff and pg community have given me shelter in St. Andrews for the duration of the PhD. and made the experience more enjoyable.

I am grateful for the support my family has given me, and for Gerja's and Felicitas' support. And of course for the true friends who stood by me in the process (especially Els, Marko, Hanneke, Lot, Thijs, Yann and Graeme)!

Abbreviations

The abbreviations used in this thesis for the works of Augustine are based on those of the *Corpus Augustinianum Gissense*.

<i>Acad.</i>	<i>De Academicis libri tres</i>
<i>c. adv. leg.</i>	<i>Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum libri duo</i>
<i>agon.</i>	<i>De agone christiano liber unus</i>
<i>an. et or.</i>	<i>De anima et eius origine libri quattuor</i>
<i>an. quant.</i>	<i>De animae quantitate liber unus</i>
<i>bapt.</i>	<i>De baptismo libri septem</i>
<i>civ.</i>	<i>De civitate dei libri viginti duo</i>
<i>conf.</i>	<i>Confessionum libri tredecim</i>
<i>corrept.</i>	<i>De correptione et gratia liber unus</i>
<i>dial.</i>	<i>De dialectica</i>
<i>div. qu.</i>	<i>De diversis questionibus octoginta tribus liber unus</i>
<i>doctr. chr.</i>	<i>De doctrina christiana libri quattuor</i>
<i>en. Ps.</i>	<i>Enarrationes in Psalmos</i>
<i>ench.</i>	<i>De fide spe et caritate liber unus</i>
<i>ep.</i>	<i>Epistulae</i>
<i>c. ep. Man.</i>	<i>Contra epistula Manicaei quam vocant fundamenti liber unus</i>
<i>c. Faust.</i>	<i>Contra Faustum Manicheum libri triginta tres</i>
<i>Gn. litt.</i>	<i>De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim</i>
<i>Gn. litt. inp.</i>	<i>De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus</i>
<i>Gn. adv. Man.</i>	<i>De Genesi adversus Manicheos libri duo</i>
<i>imm. an.</i>	<i>De immortalitate animae liber unus</i>
<i>c. Iul.</i>	<i>Contra Iulianum libri sex</i>
<i>c. Iul. imp.</i>	<i>Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum</i>
<i>lib. arb.</i>	<i>De libero arbitrio libri tres</i>
<i>mag.</i>	<i>De magistro liber unus</i>
<i>mor.</i>	<i>De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manicheorum libri duo</i>

<i>mus.</i>	<i>De musica libri sex</i>
<i>ord.</i>	<i>De ordine libri duo</i>
<i>pecc. mer.</i>	<i>De peccatorum meritis</i>
<i>persev.</i>	<i>De dono perseverantiae liber ad Prosperum et Hilarium secundus</i>
<i>qu.</i>	<i>Quaestiones libri septem</i>
<i>qu. eu.</i>	<i>Quaestiones evangeliorum libri duo</i>
<i>retr.</i>	<i>Retractationum libri duo</i>
<i>s.</i>	<i>sermo</i>
<i>Simpl.</i>	<i>Ad Simplicianum libri duo = ep. 37</i>
<i>sol.</i>	<i>Soliloquiorum libri duo</i>
<i>trin.</i>	<i>De trinitate libri quindecim</i>

The following abbreviations are used for series (except for the *AL* all series of editions).

<i>AL</i>	<i>Augustinus Lexikon</i>
<i>BA</i>	<i>Bibliothèque Augustinienne</i>
<i>CCCM</i>	<i>Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis</i>
<i>CCL</i>	<i>Corpus Christianorum series Latina</i>
<i>CSEL</i>	<i>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</i>
<i>PL</i>	<i>Patrologia Latina</i>

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Introduction

Who would not want to know the secret of life?¹ The secret of life, of what makes something a moving, self-propagating, perhaps sentient and maybe even rational being, has been long delved into. Since the twentieth century and Watson and Crick's discovery of DNA in 1953, the discipline of biochemistry has solved a number of significant problems. Yet many important questions have not been answered, and it is questionable whether biochemistry, or neuroscience for that matter, will ever solve them. Why is there life in the first place? What is the meaning of life? What is the mind? If it thinks these questions have relevance at all, the natural sciences in its paradigm will have much difficulty answering these questions. But there are different ways of thinking or paradigms which have their forte not so much in the 'technical' aspects of life, as the natural sciences have, but in answering the questions pertaining to the meaning of life. Why do we have life and what should we do with it? And what is our life? The paradigm which has been dominant in the West since late antiquity, and still is very influential today, is the Christian paradigm. This paradigm ascribes life to the soul and it has ideas why we have one, what we (or it) should do and why, and where it is going. However, the soul is not a Christian invention, nor are Christians the only ones to think in terms of 'soul'. And even though the humanities and philosophy have tried to supplant the notion with concepts such as 'mind', 'identity', and 'self', the soul seems to enjoy a renewed popularity.

But this thesis is not about to make a case for the soul or to judge its validity as a concept or the Christian paradigm we have it from. This thesis purports to describe a small part of the long intellectual tradition which has shaped our ideas concerning the soul and as such is part of the discipline of history of ideas and reception studies. Finding out not only how concepts change over time, but also how people look upon and use their (intellectual) past, are questions pertaining to this field. This may be followed up by questioning what constitutes authority and how people try to learn from authority, and how to use it to bolster their own position. Reception history will show how our ancestors formed a tradition by reiterating but also (subtly) changing part of their intellectual heritage. Some of the biggest fruits from this enterprise come

¹ Augustine in the *lib. arb.* 1.25.12 agrees that an act of the will precedes the quest for knowledge.

in eventually realizing how it was the interplay between an already given intellectual tradition and an author's own contemporary concerns which shaped his interests and use of his past, and how this changed this same tradition (gradually or not). Occupying our own position later in history, this earlier process in turn partly shapes our own concerns. Heidegger, so important for the field of intellectual history and perception studies, gave a sort of programmatic statement for the questions raised above in *Sein und Zeit*, at least that is how I understand him:

‘Das Dasein ist in seiner jeweiligen Weise zu sein und sonach auch mit dem ihm zugehörigen Seinsverständnis in eine überkommene Daseinsauslegung hinein- und in ihr aufgewachsen. Aus dieser her versteht es sich zunächst und in gewissem Umkreis ständig. Dieses Verständnis erschließt die Möglichkeiten seines Seins und regelt sie. Seine eigene Vergangenheit - und das besagt immer die seiner ‘Generation’ - *folgt* dem Dasein nicht *nach*, sondern geht ihm je schon vorweg.

Diese elementare Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins kann diesem selbst verborgen bleiben. Sie kann aber auch in gewisser Weise entdeckt werden und eigene Pflege erfahren. Dasein kann Tradition entdecken, bewahren und ihr ausdrücklich nachgehen. Die Entdeckung von Tradition und die Erschließung dessen, was sie ‘übergibt’ and wie sie übergibt, kann als eigenständige Aufgabe ergriffen werden.’²

The point of entry in this thesis shall be Augustine of Hippo (354-430). For the intellectual history of the West, Augustine serves as a pivotal point between Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Having received a classical education himself and undergone a conversion to the Christian religion, Augustine would determine the face of the classical heritage into the Christian Middle Ages to no small extent. Certainly not an isolated figure, other important representatives of his age include in the West Ambrose and Jerome, who did their part in the transformation. But through his long writing career, there was hardly a topic that Augustine did not write about. Already famous during his lifetime, his stature would change in a few centuries hence from the first and foremost peer to an almost unassailable authority. This was helped by the fact that Augustine went through a long intellectual development, changing his opinions on, for example, free will, so that many people with different intellectual outlooks could read Augustine, be

² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (11th, unchanged ed., Tübingen 1967), 2.6, 20.

formed in different ways, and find in Augustine what they needed. This thesis will look at the way a few authors read, understood, and used Augustine for their own purposes. As such, it has been written in the context of the Leverhulme-funded project *After Augustine*, which took place at the University of St Andrews under the leadership of prof. dr. Karla Pollmann. Other awards to support this thesis have been given by the Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds, the Ketel 1 Studiefonds, the Hendrik Muller Vaderlandsch fonds, and the Radboud Wetenschappelijk fonds.

As the first chapter on Augustine will explain, the soul has been a major topic of investigation for Augustine. In fact, realizing that God and the soul both have immaterial substances instead of materialistic substances (as was the default position in the fourth century) was an important step in Augustine's conversion. The writings of Augustine concerning the soul can roughly be divided into two different discourses. There is an ontological discourse, in which Augustine writes about questions such as 'What is the soul?', 'What is the primary function of the soul?', 'What is the soul made of?', 'Is the soul divine?', and 'Is the soul changeable?'. These questions were answered in many of his early dialogues, such as the *an. quant.* (387-388), but also during some of his mature works, most notably book 7 of his great exegetical enterprise *Gn. litt.* (published ca. 416). Then there is a dynamical discourse on the soul, which focuses on questions about the capacities and powers of the soul. Augustine stated that there is a trinitarian structure in the soul, consisting of remembering, knowing and willing, which makes up for these powers. The most important work in which Augustine expounded this theory is the *trin.* (written roughly between 400-420). These two discourses hardly come together in Augustine's oeuvre, and in order to make for a more coherent field of research, I have chosen to focus on Augustine's ontological discourse of the soul, not on his dynamical discourse. The authors in this thesis who have been studied with an eye to their reception of Augustine provided enough material for that. The exception to this is Eriugena (chapter 5), but his specific text was chosen somewhat later.

This brings us to the criteria of choice for the authors other than Augustine which are to be researched in this thesis. As I had gained some knowledge and insight in how the Carolingian era is a(nother) very formative period in the intellectual history of the West through my study of Fredegisus of Tours' *De substantia nihili et tenebrarum*,³ it seemed clear that the authors had to be selected from the ninth century. In this century, the foundations have been laid for the tradition of medieval scholasticism and a living, unbroken tradition of philosophy has been established in

³ out of which so far have come 'Wat te doen met 'niets' en 'duister'?', *Millennium, tijdschrift voor middeleeuwse studies* 20.2 (2006), 95-114 (with an English abstract).

the West.⁴ However, in order to gain more of a feeling for the way in which ninth century authors would not encounter just Augustine, but also Augustine as read through the lens of a by then already existing tradition of reception of Augustine, some sixth century ‘stepping stones’ were taken into account. Most prominently, Eugippius’ massive *Excerpta ex operibus Sancti Augustini* came to be considered for this reason (chapter 2). Eventually the investigations into the sixth century authors merited an equal part in the whole thesis. And rightly so, for this period is important for its transformations of classical traditions into medieval ones. Even though this thesis has not pointed this out explicitly, the differences in motivations and selection criteria between Cassiodorus (chapter 3) and Eugippius (chapter 2) might bring this out.

Another criterion of choice has been the existence of critical editions. I have chosen in this research to cut to the core of the reception of Augustine’s ontological discourse on the soul, and in order to establish fairly quickly how much of Augustine is present in a text in an identifiable way, the availability of a good critical edition is a necessary condition. Hrabanus Maurus’ *De anima*, for example, in this way came to fall from the ‘shortlist’ of eligible texts, even though it seems that at least some Augustine made its way into this treatise. Another author whose texts eventually did not come to be included is Alcuin, even though he has been thoroughly formed by Augustine and Augustine seems to seep through in all of his writings, e.g. his *De animae ratione liber ad Eulaliam virginem*. This may be something to be done in the future. An exception to this rule is Claudianus Mamertus’ *De statu animae* which received a critical edition in 1885 by Engelbrecht. But the sheer size combined with a relative scarcity of secondary literature made me sidestep this text. It could be another future project, and this thesis has intentionally not been designed to offer an exhaustive treatment of these two centuries.

This also means that this thesis is also almost devoid of considerations concerning the manuscript tradition of the texts which did end up being included. Eugippius’ *Excerpta* are the exception, since Pius Knöll’s critical edition of 1885 has some problems with the manuscript tradition which may impact on the findings on Eugippius. These problems have been addressed in appendix 3.3 (‘Comparison of editions of Eugippius’ *Excerpta* in the *PL* and Knöll’).

The texts which have been chosen as sources are the sixth century’s *Excerpta ex operibus Sancti Augustini* by Eugippius of Lucullanum (chapter 2) and the *De anima* by Cassiodorus Senator (chapter 3), and the ninth century’s *Quaestiones de anima* by Gottschalk of Orbais (chapter 4) and the *De divina praedestinatione liber* by John Scottus Eriugena (chapter 5). This last work did not initially figure in the texts under consideration, since it does not boast a lot of reception of

⁴ John Marenbon (1981), 4.

Augustine's specifically ontological discourse on the soul. There are, however, a few overriding reasons to consider the work none the less. Over the course of the research of both Eugippius' and Gottschalk's text, it became clear that the predestination debates of the fifth, sixth and ninth centuries had their impact on the reception of Augustine's ideas on the ontology of the soul in their texts. It is interesting then to see how the soul is treated ontologically in a work which does not start out from the perspective of the soul, but from the predestination debates. Eriugena's text is magnificently suited for this, as he wrote much on the soul in this work, and he directly reacted against Gottschalk's ideas on predestination (which probably in turn had their influence on his ideas of the ontology of the soul, as chapter 4 will elucidate), although not on the text under consideration in this thesis. Moreover, in the predestination debates of the ninth century specifically the mastery of Augustine as an authority was one of the points at stake. Gottschalk's, but especially Eriugena's longer text is bristling with Augustine, even if they both draw their very own and opposite conclusions from Augustine. This merited the inclusion of Eriugena in this text in this thesis. Moreover it would be a shame to ignore this monumental thinker of the ninth century entirely.⁵

The texts have also been chosen with an eye to the genre to which they belong. Eugippius compiled a florilegium, Cassiodorus wrote a classical *De anima*, Gottschalk a letter and Eriugena an apology against Gottschalk. The form which the respective writings took was a factor in the material included. Eugippius' work consists of copy pasting texts written by others, and apart from a prefatory letter, he is only indirectly present. His first and very visible editorial choice consists of limiting his compiling to Augustine's texts. The genre of the *De anima* determined what kind of questions and topics Cassiodorus had to treat to conform to the expectations of his readership, such as the substance, quality, quantity and the seat of the soul in the human body. Eriugena's polemic was determined by opposing Gottschalk's opinions and arguments, and using as much Augustine in the process as he was capable of. Gottschalk's own text is a letter, and therefore has not that many requirements as to its contents. However, the contents seem to show that it was composed as the kernel of a *De anima*. But even if the letter could be expanded into a *De anima*, the real and relevant topic was Gottschalk's solution to the problem of the origin of the soul. It would be interesting to see if the requirements of the genres have their influence on the reception of Augustine by the respective authors as well. However,

⁵ Eriugena's *Liber de egressu et regressu animae ad deum* (PL 122) seemed too fragmentary, and the content of Augustine too questionable to receive a chapter of its own, and it would amount to *hubris* to casually include Eriugena's magisterial *De divisione naturae* in a mere chapter.

this influence has been treated rather implicitly in this thesis, given that I eventually have been able to give only one text per genre the scrutiny it deserved.

The texts have been researched through ‘close reading’. Understanding what the author meant with his text and with his borrowings from Augustine (in the form of quotations, paraphrases or otherwise), comparing these borrowings with Augustine’s own text and context, then identifying similarities and differences, and finally using these similarities and differences to explain and elucidate the author’s intellectual commitments and choices, seemed for me the only way of going about this thesis. This thesis aims therefore not only to be part of ‘reception history’, but also of the history of ideas. This method leads to a rather detailed view of the texts which have been researched. A chapter typically has a first paragraph on the structure of the text itself, followed by paragraph with an overview of the use of Augustine in the text, before a more abstract conceptual analysis takes place. There are many historians of ideas who deliver commendable work, but I would like to point out three articles which have served as a model for my enterprises in this thesis. These are Brian Stock’s magnificent ‘In search of Eriugena’s Augustine’, Goulven Madec’s ‘L’Augustinisme de Jean Scot dans le *De Praedestinatione*’ and Charles Brittain’s ‘No place for a Platonist soul in 5th Century Provence? The case of Claudianus Mamertus’.⁶ The downside of this intensive method of reading is that I have not been able to research many more texts. The reader is therefore warned not to expect a large overview of a historical intellectual development through many texts, or an exhaustive treatment of the reception of Augustine’s ideas on the soul in the two designated centuries.

This does not mean, however, that this thesis consists only of a collection of loose chapters. The red line and main finding in this thesis is that there is a definite connection in the minds of my authors (excluding Cassiodorus) between the ontology of the soul and predestination. This may be obvious from an abstract Christian theological perspective. It stands to reason that God, as the creator of the soul may determine its later course. But through the predestination debates it took a more technical form. That has to do with the dogma of the universality of original sin. This idea that humanity in its entirety shares in Adam’s original sin (to which the title of this thesis refers) became orthodox in the predestination debates in the fifth century. It serves as the foundation for Augustine’s theodicy and subsequently for his idea that God dispenses grace gratuitously. But the question then becomes how this process of sharing

⁶ the first two are listed in the bibliography, the last one is published in Ralph Mathisen and Danuta Shanzer (eds.), *Society and Culture in Late Antique Gaul. Revisiting the sources* (Aldershot etc. 2001), 237-60.

technically takes place, and what -if any- the consequences are of original sin and the Fall for the ontology of the soul.

The question of how humanity shares in Adam's sin has been framed, under Augustine's lead, under the heading 'the origin of the soul'. The problem of the origin of the soul (i.e. how the soul came into being and -perhaps even more important- how it came to occupy the human body) had traditionally formed part of any (complete) classical theory on the soul. It had already been connected with a Fall of the soul by e.g. Plotinus and Origen. Even though Augustine came to reject both their ideas on the origin and the Fall of the soul, and even if the problem of the origin of the soul also is a general intellectual topos, Augustine would always connect it with the way in which original sin was universalized. Consequently the authors which were concerned with predestination followed suit. But Augustine thought long and hard on the topic, yet never came to a satisfactory answer. This gave room for later interpretation and 'improvisation'. Eugippius tried to keep the peace between parties by stressing Augustine's agnosticism on the topic, but implicitly proposing his own solution to the problem. Gottschalk chose a solution proposed by Augustine which was very congenial with the rest of his ideas on predestination. However it was only one of the possible solutions Augustine proposed, so that Gottschalk had to proverbially twist Augustine's arm to get his support. And Augustine would not have withheld his consent for nothing, for Gottschalk's solution was far from perfect. Eriugena, in reaction to Gottschalk's ideas on predestination, came with a very original solution to the problem. He broke through the problem by considering it on his own terms and not on the terms that Augustine had set in his writings. And the admirable aspect of it is that he did it all on the basis of Augustine's own ideas.

The authors in this thesis therefore have different interests in Augustine's ontological discourse on the soul. Cassiodorus tried to take it all in, but did not care so much about predestination in his *De anima*. In opposition to this Eugippius and Gottschalk actually did not care all that much for Augustine's ontological questions on the soul, in as far as they did not impinge on the predestination debates in their respective ages. Eriugena in his *div. praed.* finally did take a keen interest in the ontology of the soul, even if starting from the perspective of the predestination debates, but his genius lay in sidestepping Augustine's ontological discourse on the soul altogether.

In this way my hope is that this thesis shows different examples of the reception of Augustine's ontological discourse on the soul, how this ontological discourse has a relevance in

the predestination debates, and finally how the authors of the texts are formed by and recreate the intellectual tradition they stand in.

Chapter 1. Augustine's ontological discourse on the soul

With the field of anthropology, one comes to one of the core of Augustine's thought. To characterize in a nutshell, one is frequently referred to a few lines of the *Soliloquia*, one of Augustine's early dialogues (386/387).⁷ In this dialogue between Augustine and Reason, Augustine states that his interests are God and the soul:

Augustine: 'So, I have prayed to God
Reason: What then do you want to know?
A: All these things which I have prayed for.
R: Sum them up briefly.
A: I want to know God and the soul.
R: Nothing more?
A: Nothing at all'.⁸
(trans. Gerard Watson)

Arguably this can be considered a programmatic statement for the rest of Augustine's intellectual career. Whether it be in the works he produced in the great debates against the Manichees, Donatists and Pelagians, in other major texts such as the *conf.*, the *trin.* and the *civ.*, or the textbooks on the arts such as the *mus.*, the human being and his relation to God were always prime topics of Augustine's attention.⁹ However, Augustine's ontological discourse on the soul

⁷ e.g. Gerard O'Daly starts his book *Augustine's philosophy of mind* (London 1987) invoking the following few lines from *sol* 1.2.7, 1 and it is no shame to follow him in this.

⁸ *sol.* 1.2.7: *A. ecce oravi deum. R. quid ergo scire vis? A. haec ipsa omnia quae oravi. R. breviter ea conlige. A. deum et animam scire cupio. R. nihilne plus? A. nihil omnino.*

⁹ The debate with the Manicheans evolved around the (in)corporality of God and the soul, with the Donatists around the possible human influence on the sacraments and with the Pelagianists around the measure of dependence on God's grace of the human will to do good. The *conf.* can (at least partly) be described as the road of

was mainly developed in his early career, from the Cassiciacum dialogues onwards, through his reading of (neo)platonist materials, and in his debates with the Manicheans. He came to realise that substance did not necessarily need to be corporeal, and that divine substance was indeed incorporeal and immutable and that the rest of the cosmos depended on it.¹⁰ These views would congeal and last his entire career, with one exception. The problem of the origin of the soul would continue to haunt Augustine, and, even though he never solved the problem, he still made important contributions to the problem in book 10 of the *Gn. litt.*, which was written as late as 416. This last problem also was to provide an explicit link, by way of the universality of original sin, between his philosophical ontological discourse on the soul, and the more theological problem of grace versus free will in the debate against the Pelagians. But before we come to that, the ontology of the soul will be built from the ground up.

1.1 The function of the soul

1.1.1 Participation in species and being

The tie that binds the soul to God can best be described by the concept of *participatio*. ‘Participation’ is the term with which Plato described the relation between forms and particulars.¹¹ Augustine espoused this concept, yet also converted it by placing the forms as Ideas in God’s mind.¹² The impact of placing the Ideas in God’s intellect is that the goal of the concept is no longer only to describe the relation between exemplar and instance, or between the stable model and the universe as Plato would have it in the *Timaueus*,¹³ but is broadened to describe the relation between creator and creature. Since every particular participates in some form or another, every particular is modeled on the Ideas in God’s mind. For Augustine this means that

one specific individual to God, the *trin.* seeks insight in the holy trinity via trinitarian structures in the human soul and the *civ.* treats the history and eschatology of the human race, the *mus.* at least makes remarks on the workings and unity of human perception.

¹⁰ *conf.* 7.10.16; *conf.* 7.20.26. cf. John Rist, ‘Plotinus and Christian philosophy’ in *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus* (Cambridge 1996), 403. **The default position in fourth century natural philosophy, to which the Manicheans also adhered, was that being entailed matter.** Other insights Augustine reached were that the divine cannot be mutable, and that evil is a privation and not a substance. These insights were augmented with a method of intellectual movement which turns inwards from the perceptions of changing bodies, to the rational soul that judges these perceptions and measures them against eternal truths, and upward from these truths to the divine which is the cause of these eternal truths and the soul’s insight in them, which Augustine acquired through is neoplatonic reading. cf. *conf.* 7.17.23.

¹¹ For a description and problematization of the concept, e.g. Gosling, (1973), 187-193.

¹² *div. qu.* 46.2.

¹³ E.g. *Timaueus*, 28a-29a.

it is not just the human soul which participates in God, but that the whole of creation is related to God. Yet at the same time the human soul has a participation in God which is special, due to the creation of the human being in God's image and likeness in *Gen.* 1.26. There are thus two ways in which the human being participates in God: in the ways that are common to every created being and in a way that is privy to the human soul. In this paragraph the primary focus is on the normal relation of the (human) soul to God. Augustine would describe the special tie of the human soul to God through its trinitarian structure of memory, will and understanding. This special tie, however, is not the focus of this thesis.

The general way in which both the soul and the rest of creation participate in God is of two types. First, as afore mentioned, creatures participate in forms in God's mind, and with the participation in the forms, the creatures participate in God. An example would be the form 'likeness'. Every creature participates in this form, since it resembles creatures of the same sort and contains within itself elements that resemble each other (e.g. particles of earth).¹⁴ Very important, for a reason soon to follow, are the forms which define a creature as what it is, such as stone, human or horse. Since not all the creatures are of the same sort, only some creatures participate in a specific form in order to be a stone, human being or a horse. Augustine names these forms through which objects become what they are the *forma*, *species* or *rationes*.¹⁵ Thus all stones participate in the *species* 'stoneness' and all horses in the *species* 'horseness'. So the species gives the answer to the question what a specific thing is.¹⁶ The second way in which any creature participates in God is by the very fact of its existence. Augustine used a neologism to express the fact that in his view every creature is utterly dependant on God, as he is the only real being. God alone has *esse*, the creatures he bestows existence upon must participate in that *esse*, so that they have their '*essentia*' (essence).¹⁷

¹⁴ *Gn. litt. inq.*, 16.59.

¹⁵ *div. qu.* 46.2. On the 'terrible mobility' of Augustine's technical terms *species* and *forma* in the *vera rel.* cf. Pegon, BA 8 (1982), 487.

¹⁶ *div. qu.* 46.2.

¹⁷ In the *civ.* 12.2 Augustine explicitly indicated his use of this neologism. 'He gave being to the things which he created from nothing, but not the highest being, as He himself is; and to some He gave more being, to others less, and thus He ordered the natures of things with grades of being (for as 'knowledge' is named from what knowing is, so from that which is being, 'essence' is called, yet with a new name, which the old authors of the Latin tongue did not use, but which has already been used in our times, so that our language should not lack, what the Greeks call οὐσία; this word is thus expressed with that word, so that 'essence' can be said).' *Rebus, quas ex nihilo creavit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut est ipse; et aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus, atque ita naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit (sicut enim ab eo, quod est sapere, vocatur sapientia, sic ab eo, quod est esse, vocatur essentia, novo quidem nomine, quo usi veteres non sunt Latini sermonis auctores, sed iam nostris temporibus usitato, ne deesset etiam linguae nostrae, quod Graeci appellant οὐσίαν; hoc enim verbum a verbo expressum est, ut diceretur essentia).* For an earlier use of the term in Augustine e.g. *imm. an.* 11.18. The *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford 1982) reports that the term *essentia* is ascribed by Seneca to Cicero (ep. 58.6), but by Quintilian to Plautus (*Inst.* 2.14.2; 3.6.23) or to the rhetorician Verginius Flavus (*Inst.* 8.3.33), 621. Thus the term did already exist among the *latini*. Tertullian may have used the term twice (*De oratione* cap. 3 [PL 1, 1155d]; *De carne Christi* cap. 2 [PL 2, 755a]) but both are variant readings and may therefore well be later interpolations. Marius

The reason why the form of the *species* is so important is because there exists a very close bond between the participation in a certain *species* and the participation in *esse*. For it is the *species* which determines in what measure an object is able to participate in *esse*. In Augustine's universe, being is not a 'binary' or discrete state, in which an object either exists, or does not exist (as would be the case in an Aristotelian universe). It is rather the case that an object can have a 'measure' (*gradus*) of being, say between 0 and 1, if 0 is defined as absence of being and 1 as the *esse* which God has.¹⁸ It is the *esse inquantum est* ('being insofar as it is') which Augustine speaks about in the *vera rel.*, indicating that there are differentiations in being.¹⁹ The things are created in a proper order of being, a hierarchy ranging from the highest spiritual being of the 'heaven of heavens' who participates most in *esse* to the stuff from which everything else is formed. This is the base 'prime matter', the almost nothing, which barely exists precisely because it lacks *species*. What the thing is determines where it is located in this hierarchy of being. In another formulation: the species is closely related to the degree of *esse*, the *essentia* of an object. Yet this thesis is not concerned with any created being, but especially with the human being. Therefore the focus will narrow itself from created beings to living beings, and from living beings to the human being.

1.1.2 Transmission of the species

When we regard living beings in this context of species and *essentia*, the soul becomes most relevant. For it is the soul which transmits the species to the living being.²⁰ When reading an early work such as the *imm. an.*, it becomes clear that the young Augustine thought the soul itself to be a being too. The reason is that the soul does not only convey the *species* to the body, so that it can be the living thing it is, but that –at least the human rational- the soul itself is in possession of a species too.²¹ The human being is thus a composite of soul and body, the first having given the latter life and form. As mentioned earlier, Augustine came to the insight that in

Victorinus uses the term (*De generatione divini verbi, ad Candidum arianum* 9 [PL 8, 1024b] and 28 [1034a]; *Adversus Arium* 3.7 [PL 8,1104a] and 4.6 [1117a]). In *Ad Candidum arianum* 28 he gives this description: 'In this way do we ascribe substance, existence, and other such terms to God, and on the one hand we say οὐσίαν of His essence, on the other hand there is 'created substance' to what is in Him, and [what is] to His being.' *Isto etiam modo substantiam, existentiam, et caetera huiusmodi apponimus Deo, et ejus essentiae οὐσίαν aliter dicimus, aliter se habente substantia creata ad quod inest sibi, et ad suum etiam esse.*

¹⁸ *civ.* 12.2, cf. previous note.

¹⁹ *vera rel.* 7.13; also *imm. an.* 15.24.

²⁰ *imm. an.* 15.24.

²¹ *ibid.*

order to exist, an object need not necessarily be corporeal. Corporeal being is certainly a mode of being, but in this creation another mode of being is possible as well. This mode of being is spiritual being.²² Augustine is thus a substance dualist, stating that there are two modes of being: corporeal and spiritual. We will see shortly that Augustine believed the soul –at least the rational soul- to be such a spiritual being. However, there is only a substance dualism in Creation. When it comes to *esse* per se, there is only one type of being on which the rest of the beings are utterly dependant: divine nature. The divine nature thus unifies in itself the plurality of substances in Creation. And from the divine being each being receives its proper measure of being, mediated through the species. The soul is of primary importance for Augustine, since the soul is what makes the living thing what it is by transmitting the species. In other words, without the soul the living being would be unable to participate and have an *essentia*.

1.2 Structure of the soul

1.2.1 Three assumptions on the soul

When developing his views on the soul, Augustine starts out from three assumptions.²³ The first assumption is that the soul is that what gives life of the body.²⁴ The soul gives life through its participation in the form 'Life'. The implication of this assumption is that the soul itself cannot die, since it is life itself.²⁵ Augustine frequently uses the verbs *vivificare* and *animare* in order to express this fundamental function of the being of the soul.²⁶ The second assumption is that the soul provides the living body with proper movement, or action (there may be movement of the body through the causal agency of another body, as the collision of one billiard ball with another causes the movement of the latter, but this does not constitute action).²⁷ Everything that lives, moves. Thus also the growth of plants and trees and their drawing of saps is considered to

²² *Gn. litt.* 1.1.2-3. These paragraphs are quite obscure though, because of the many questions Augustine poses. This is an effect of his conviction, stated earlier in the *Gn. litt. inp.* 1.1, that when investigating Scripture on the nature of creation one should go about asking instead of claiming. Yet it seems clear that his preferred interpretation of the word 'heaven' in *Genesis* 1.1 is that it is a spiritual creation, whether unfinished or not. cf. Agaesse's and Solignac's notes in *BA* 48, 586-8.

²³ In researching this paragraph, I have made extensive use of the useful references that Gerard O'Daly gives in the lemma 'Anima, Animus' in the *AL*, 315-340.

²⁴ E.g. *Gn. litt.* 7.18.24.

²⁵ *imm. an.* 9.16.

²⁶ *vivificare*: e.g. *Gn. litt.* 7.18.24; *div. qu.* 54; *animare*: e.g. *imm. an.* 15.24; *agon.* 22.

²⁷ *imm. an.* 3.3.

be vegetative *internus motus* (internal motion).²⁸ The third assumption which Augustine entertains is that ‘like is known by like’. Corporeal objects can only interact with other corporeal objects, incorporeal objects, such as the intelligibles and the rational soul, can only interact with other incorporeal objects.²⁹ This assumption of course directly calls into question how the human soul is able to govern the body. Augustine never found a satisfactory answer to this perennial problem of substance dualism.

1.2.2 Vegetative and animal soul

With these three assumptions in mind, we can now start to get an overview of his ideas on the soul. Augustine held that there are three types of soul; the vegetative soul, the irrational or animal soul and the rational soul. These three types of soul are ordered hierarchically.³⁰ The vegetative soul is inferior to the animal and the rational soul, and is therefore rather called ‘life’ than soul.³¹ As stated earlier its action is the *internus motus* of growth. One step higher on the ladder of life stands the animal, or ‘irrational’ soul. This soul provides the body with the *vita sentiens*, the power of sense perception.³² Next to sensation also *appetitus* (desire) and *memoria* are found in the animal soul.³³ The irrational soul has an interesting mixture of corporeal and incorporeal elements. In book seven of the *Gn. litt.* 5.7-21.31 Augustine argues that the rational soul in no way is made out of material. One of the arguments is that the rational soul contemplates incorporeal objects, such as truth or God.³⁴ Since the assumption that ‘like goes by like’ holds, this means that the rational soul is incorporeal. Vice versa, this entails that irrational soul should be in some way corporeal, since sense perception deals with bodily objects. However, it is hard to catch Augustine on positively affirming this point. Possibly the refined particles of fire which, according to the medical knowledge Augustine used, run through the

²⁸ Although I am inclined to think that Augustine would not apply the term *actio* to this vegetative movement, since the *imm. an.*, from which the term stems, is specifically about the human soul. cf. *Gn. litt.* 17.16.22.

²⁹ e.g. *sol.* 1.3.8, *imm. an.* 10.17.

³⁰ *civ.* 7.23.

³¹ *Gn. litt. imp.* 5.24.

³² *Gn. litt.* 7.16.22; *Gn. litt. imp.* 5.24.

³³ *civ.* 5.11. Although memory and desire are not exclusively in the irrational soul. If will, understanding and memory are one, as Augustine states in the *trin.* then memory cannot only be found in the irrational soul. *Appetitus* is found in every part of the soul. *div. qu.* 35.2; Cf. Gerard O’Daly, ‘Appetitus’ in *AL*, 421. According to O’Daly ‘Anima, animus’, 323 Augustine was aware of the Platonist division of the soul in three parts: sensual life, love (including pleasure and pain), and anger or ‘spiritedness’. Yet O’Daly also remarks that Augustine did not use this division often, and certainly in the works of the younger Augustine, I have so far not come across this division. Therefore I consider it warranted to leave it out of the account of the irrational soul.

³⁴ *Gn. litt.* 7.14.20.

‘pipes’ (*fistulae*) to establish perception in the animal soul can be seen as a remnant of the pneumatic theory of soul.³⁵ Yet the animal soul also houses memory, as birds for example are able to find their nests again after having flown off.³⁶ Animals are thus able to retain images in their memory of places where they have been or found foodstuffs. These images are incorporeal, following the argument that forming the image of a stone in one’s memory does not involve turning one’s mind into rock. From this it follows by the assumption that ‘like goes by like’, that the animal soul must also in some way be incorporeal. Moreover, the argument for the incorporeality of the soul from the fact that it cannot be divided in parts presumably works for the irrational soul as well. Since the irrational soul is eventually of much less interest for Augustine than the rational soul, Augustine does not care to elaborate his statements on this topic. It is clear, however, that the irrational soul does possess the power of judgement. It belongs to the *vita sentiens* to judge white from black and hot from cold, and presumably danger from safety.³⁷ The irrational soul gives the body a *spontaneus motus*, translated by Edmund Hill into English as ‘deliberate movement’.³⁸ This translation rings true, as long as it is understood that the deliberation is the judgment whether or not food is edible, circumstances are dangerous and mates are sexually attractive. The deliberations which take place over intelligibles are reserved to the rational soul. In my opinion it is this distinction that underlies *conf.* 10.6.10, where Augustine explicitly denies the power of judgment to animals. Yet, it is in the context of the reviewing of forms and the search for their Creator, so that it should not be construed as a denial of judgement *per se*.

1.2.3 Rational soul

With the rational soul we come to that which gives the human being a status apart from the other created living bodies, vegetative or animal. Because of the possession of the rational soul the human being has an extra way of contact with the divine. It can gain self-knowledge, realize that as a creature it is dependent on God and recover the Truth it holds in itself. The human being therefore holds a middle position in Creation: it stands on top in the hierarchy of

³⁵ *Gn. litt.* 7.13.20. Augustine of course proceeds in the next paragraph to discount the possibility of being particles of the soul of even the most refined kind of fire that is used by the senses (the rays of fire which proceed from the eyes in order to establish vision). Yet Augustine is here specifically treating the rational soul, for the possibility of ‘the soul’ being merely animal or irrational soul is discounted in 7.6.10-7.8.11.

³⁶ *Gn. litt.* 7.21.29.

³⁷ *Gn. litt. inp.* 5.24.

³⁸ *Gn. litt.* 7.16.22; Edmund Hill’s translation (2002), 334.

bodily life (because of its rational soul), but on the bottom of spiritual life (because of the body). When Augustine treats the soul, it is this part of the soul which receives the bulk of attention and about which he develops his original ideas. Augustine uses the words *anima*, *animus* and *mens* to refer to the rational soul.³⁹ The rational soul has a few special characteristics, which need to be treated in turn.

1.3 Properties of the rational soul

1.3.1 Incorporeal

The first major point about the rational soul is that it is immaterial; because of its importance this has come up already several times. A long treatment of this point is given in the *gen. litt.* book 7. Augustine argues, against the Manichees and other materialists, that the idea of a spiritual corporeal matter is erroneous. If the rational soul would have been made from some spiritual material, this material would have been leading a blessed life (and an undeserved one too for no action would have merited this life) prior to its incorporation in the human body, since this spiritual material would have lived (this was the definition of soul) and lived totally rationally. After all, the sensual life of corporeal creation would then not be in a position to hamper the understanding. But then the consequence would be that the formation of the human soul out of this material would mean a deterioration for this material, since it would fall from its blessed life into an inferior human life. This would mean to claim that God, when shaping the human soul, actually turned something into a worse condition than it was before, which would violate God's goodness. At best, the human soul could be a 'discharge' or 'emanation' (*defluxio*) from this material, which would then itself stay unchanged and unincorporated in the body.⁴⁰ Augustine dismisses this option without argument, yet it is easily understandable that this option would seriously degrade the human soul, stating that it is not really rational soul at all. In *Gn. litt.* 7.28.43 Augustine will therefore say that the soul is thus not from God's substance, but created from nothing.⁴¹

Other arguments against the corporeality of the soul are that the soul has no extension and is indivisible. The idea that the soul has no extension is argued by the idea that the soul

³⁹ O'Daly (1986), 315-316.

⁴⁰ *Gn. litt.* 7.8.11-7.9.11. Cf. O'Daly, col. 319. Cf. Agaësse and Solignac, *notes complémentaires* in the *BA* 48, 699-700.

⁴¹ cf. O'Daly (1978), 17.

transmits the species to the body. The soul is the agent in forming the body, and as cause must therefore be something better, higher and more real than the effect.⁴² It is thus not forced to keep itself to the presupposed extension of bodily existence, even though on this earth it is bound to the physical human body. At the same time, however, it is necessary that the soul exists ‘somewhere’ or ‘in a place’ since only that which does not exist, is nowhere.⁴³ This location cannot be expressed spatially. Hereby Augustine broadens the Aristotelian category of space (‘an object exists in a place’) with the Neoplatonic idea of a hierarchy in hypostaseis (‘soul is better than body’). The third argument for the incorporeality of the soul is that the soul has a simultaneous awareness of all the body parts. This falsifies the idea that the soul is divisible, since the soul would then need ‘messengers’ to inform the other more remote parts of the soul of what happened elsewhere.⁴⁴

A final argument for the soul’s incorporeality in the *sol.* rests on the principle that like is known by like. The soul can contain immaterial truths, for example logical tautologies, and intelligibles like geometrical forms which cannot be realized in physical bodies in their pure shapes.⁴⁵ The soul can therefore not be a body. Granted that the argument is rather devised to prove the immortality of the soul, the fact that soul contains incorporeal things implicates the soul to be incorporeal as well.

1.3.2 Immortal

This last argument for the incorporeality of the soul brings the next property of the soul: its immortality. Truths are in the soul as in a subject thus the demise of the subject, in this case soul, would mean the demise of the truth. However, the truths themselves never perish (if the world ceases to exist, it will be true that ‘the world ceased to exist’). Therefore soul must exist forever. The soul is life, so the ever existing soul is the immortal soul.⁴⁶ The important step in this argument is that truth is in the soul ‘as in a subject’. As safeguard against the perishing of truth only God is necessary, since the truth of the ideas is in his mind. In order to extend that

⁴² *imm. an.* 15.24.

⁴³ *sol.* 2.17.31.

⁴⁴ *imm. an.* 16.25. One wonders again how this works for the animal soul, which deals with the sensual perceptions of bodies. Does it have a strict divide between its messengers of particles of light and itself? How would it then interact with these messengers?

⁴⁵ *sol.* 2.18.32. Cf. *Gn. litt.* 7.21.27. Plato states that bodies in the world of becoming are only ‘...imitations of those things that always are...’. *Tim.* 50c, trans. Donald Zeyl.

⁴⁶ *sol.* 1.15.29; 2.2.2; 2.13.24.

safeguard to the human soul, Augustine needs to argue that truth is in the human soul too. He does this by stating that there is truth in the arts or *disciplinae*, especially in the discipline of ‘disputing’, involving discursive reasoning.⁴⁷ The human soul in general is in possession of these arts, and the arts cannot meaningfully be separated from the understanding of them in the human soul. Augustine’s idea is thus that if a human soul would be mortal, the discipline in that soul would perish. But that is impossible, given that there is truth in the disciplines.⁴⁸ Yet, one might claim that this would only make some human souls immortal, granted that some, or even many, people have never understood a truth in the first place. Augustine thus needs to state that there is actual truth in every single rational soul, not only potentially, but that most (or even all?) people lack accurate self-knowledge of those truths. He first entertains the idea of the Platonic reminiscence of truth, but later espouses the idea that truths are impressed on the soul in its creation. Yet for Augustine it is above doubt that if there is knowledge of truth, the soul must be immortal, and thus exist eternally. Augustine thus employs a triad from knowledge of truth, life and existence in order to argue for the immortality of the soul.⁴⁹ In the *Cambridge Companion*, Teske states that after the early dialogues, Augustine mainly refers to the immortality of the soul in the context of the resurrection of the body.⁵⁰

1.3.3 The soul divine?

If the soul is incorporeal, immortal and contains stable truth, one could claim that the soul itself must share its essence with God, since all these characteristics of the ontology of the soul are marks of divinity too. The rational soul was considered divine in most of Hellenic philosophy (whether material as with the Stoics or immaterial as with the Platonists). According to Teske, Augustine seemed to entertain the idea of the divinity of the soul very early on in his career, in the late eighties of the fourth century.⁵¹ Teske expresses himself cautiously since his evidence only consists of two adjectives in one of the first of Augustine’s extant works. It is in the *Acad.*, written in 386, that Augustine calls the mind (*animus*) ‘divine’ in 1.1 and ‘reason’, which is the action of the human soul, the ‘divine part of the soul’ in 1.11.⁵² The first mention of the

⁴⁷ *sol.* 2.11.21.

⁴⁸ *sol.* 2.11.20.

⁴⁹ *sol.* 2.1.1.

⁵⁰ Teske (2001), 122 gives as example *en. Ps.* 88,2,5.

⁵¹ *ibid.*, 117-118.

⁵² *Acad.*, 1.4.11: based on Mary Garvey’s translation ‘For we lived in great peace of mind, preserving the soul from every corporeal stain and very far removed from passionate desires, devoting ourselves, in so far as a human being

divine mind is the less conspicuous of the two, and in any case it needs to be noted that Augustine does object to his use of the adjective *divinus*, although he quotes this very same sentence in the *retr.*⁵³ The second mention catches the eye somewhat more, since reason is explicitly identified not just with any part of the soul, but specifically the ‘divine’ part. This sentence, however, does not return in the *retr.* at all. Yet from the *retr.* it is clear that he did reread his *Acad.* quite thoroughly, since he quotes extensively from the text itself. Reading the *Acad.* later on in his career, Augustine apparently took no offense at these two adjectives, or at least did not perceive the need to defend himself against people who might think he described the soul as divine. Teske’s caution is therefore warranted, since the mature Augustine would certainly disagree with the divinity of the rational soul.

Striking is therefore Phillip Cary’s fairly recent enthusiastic insistence on Augustine’s belief in the divinity of the soul during the Cassiciacum period, going back on Robert O’Connell.⁵⁴ In his readable and sweeping description of the invention of the inner space in the self by Augustine, he has a project of ‘locating God within the soul’, which led him to this firm belief.⁵⁵ In my opinion, for the young Augustine to believe in the divinity of the human soul, he has to accept two assumptions: 1) the idea that reason is divine and 2) the identification of reason with the soul. The first claim is established through Augustine’s ‘exploration of the identity of [the character] Reason in *Soliloquies*’ which ‘is an attempt to work out a concept of divine presence in the soul...’.⁵⁶ It is in the reflexive research of reason into its own nature in the *sol.* where the main force of Cary’s interesting argument lies. The first assumption is guaranteed

can, to the workings of reason, that is, living in accordance with that divine part of the soul, which suits a happy life, according to our definition yesterday.’ *viximus enim magna mentis tranquillitate ab omni corporis labe animum vindicantes et a cupiditatum facibus longissime remoti, dantes, quantum homini licet, operam rationi, hoc est secundum divinam illam partem animi viventes, quam beatam esse vitam besterna inter nos definitione convenit.*

In the *Augustine through the ages* encyclopedia Teske also uses a statement from the *ord.* 2.17.46 There Augustine says: ‘For they believe that the suffering here weighs down the soul, because they do not want to distinguish at all between its substance and the substance of God.’ *Namque animam poenas hic pendere fatentur, cum inter eius et dei substantiam nihil velint omnino distare.* Teske identifies this belief here as Neoplatonic, and it therefore seems to serve as an underpinning of Teske’s explanation in the lemma. I am not convinced, however. This paragraph from the *ord.* treats questions about God and the existence of evil. At that point in the text the discussion turns on the question whether evil can harm God, and whether this evil nature could have been the cause of the world. The quotation above is given as an explanation by Augustine why these people would believe such a thing. For me this sooner signals a position the Manichees would take, since they believe that God is susceptible to corruption by evil and explain thereby the bad volitions in the soul, which is –at least partly– made up from exactly the same substance as God. I do not believe a Neoplatonist would think God is corruptible, and even though Plotinus believes individual souls might suffer in this life, the hypostasis ‘Soul’ is incorruptible. I will therefore not use this quotation in my text.

⁵³ *retr.* 1.1.2.

⁵⁴ Cary (2000), e.g. xi; 86–7.

⁵⁵ Cary (2000), 114; xi.

⁵⁶ Cary (2000), 87.

by the fact that dialectics ('its [reason's] very own tricks and trades'⁵⁷) ensures the truth of all learning, thereby being stable, divine Truth itself.

But the second assumption is doubtful. What disconcerts me is that reason in these dialogues is not identified as the mind itself, but with a 'movement' (*motio mentis/interioris*) of it or with a 'power' (*vis*) or 'vision' (*aspectus*).⁵⁸ It makes no sense for Augustine to describe reason in such a way, if he thought that reason was identical with the mind. In *imm. an.* 10 Augustine summed up the separate meanings that 'reason' (*ratio*) has for him: reason is a) the 'capacity of seeing' of the mind (*aspectus*), b) the very contemplation of the truth (*ipsa veri contemplatio*) or c) the truth itself (*ipsum verum*). According to the separation of these meanings, Augustine is prepared to make a distinction between reason as the action of the mind (*aspectus* and *contemplatio*), and the fruits of reason (*ipsum verum*). There is thus a distinction between reason as movement, and reason as stable and divine truth. In my view Augustine wanted to make this distinction in order to differentiate the actions of reason of individual souls and the fully-fledged truth itself, say between reason in the individual soul and objective Reason. For if Reason were wholly realized in every individual, Augustine would not be able to explain how souls can change from ignorant to wise (*imm. an.* 7). Yet in order to show that for the young Augustine the human soul is divine, it has to be shown not that he identified the rational soul with the action of reason, but with objective reason.

In the *imm. an.* 2 and 11 Augustine does not choose whether (objective) reason is in the soul, or is the soul itself: what matters for the argument, as Cary notes, is that reason and soul are not two different substances. They are inseparable, so that the immutability of reason rubs off on the soul, and ensures its immortality.⁵⁹ But in *imm. an.* 10 Augustine explicitly raises this very question: 'In regard to the third sense [*ratio* as *ipsum verum*], the big question arises whether that true reality which the soul sees without the instrument of the body exists of itself and is not in the soul, or whether it can exist without the soul.'⁶⁰ (trans. Gerard Watson) Thus Augustine is exactly unsure about this and I see no reason to doubt him—even though he will later say that it is of the same substance as the soul. And Cary himself analyses very well why: if the truth exists outside the soul, then the project of arguing for the immortality of the soul is put in danger. But if truth is in the soul, then the existence of truth would depend on the existence of the soul,

⁵⁷ *ord.* 2.13.38.

⁵⁸ *ord.* 2.11.30, 2.48; *sol.* 1.6.13.

⁵⁹ Cary (2000), 107.

⁶⁰ *imm. an.* 6.10: *de tertio magna quaestio est, utrum verum illud, quod sine instrumento corporis animus intuetur, sit per seipsum et non sit in animo aut possitne esse sine animo.*

thereby making the better or prior (truth) dependant on the inferior or posterior (soul).⁶¹ Although Augustine thus needed to ensure that there was a tie between objective Reason and the soul, he apparently did not want to make this tie too strong. This means he just was not clear on whether the soul is objective Reason or not, notwithstanding that Reason may unconsciously be present in the soul.⁶² My conclusion is therefore that Augustine was not sure whether the soul was divine or not.⁶³ I suspect that Augustine always kept in mind that the power of reason is but one of the powers and one of the parts of the soul, next to the vegetative and the animal soul. There still is a life of the senses in which the soul of the human being is involved, even if the young Augustine thought one had to turn oneself from it towards reason. And the life of the senses, although it may not be the human part of the soul, is still part of the soul of the human being. The further understanding of the whole interplay between emotions, desires, will and reason was something for Augustine's future.

1.3.4 Mutability of the soul

Not long after the Cassiciacum period –as Cary points out-, from the *mor.* and the *an. quant.* onwards (387-389), Augustine would exactly reject the divinity of the soul and posit its creation by God.⁶⁴ This fits in with the anti-Manichean polemic, since the Manicheans claim that God and the soul are of the same substance.⁶⁵ Augustine rejects this, pointing out that, although the soul is not mutable in space, it is mutable over time.⁶⁶ The soul is after all mutable since it is now stupid, then wise.⁶⁷ Yet this mutability of the soul is not only intellectual, but at the same time moral.⁶⁸ The change of the soul has a definite direction for Augustine: it improves or deteriorates, it turns itself towards the life of reason or towards the life of the senses. The soul thereby undergoes a change over time, with which it takes a middle position between the divine, which is immutable per se, and corporeal nature, which is mutable in place and time.⁶⁹

In explaining how the soul is mutable, Augustine needed to steer clear from positing a change that affected the soul too much, since the soul has a definite position in the order of

⁶¹ Cary (2000), 102; 106.

⁶² *imm. an.* 4.6, cf. Cary (2000), 100.

⁶³ Although it always remains the question what Augustine has read of Plotinus, it is worth noting that according to Plotinus an individual soul both resides with his pure part in the intelligible realm and has the intelligibles present in itself for contemplation. Kalligas (1997), 223-225.

⁶⁴ Cary (2000), 111.

⁶⁵ e.g. *c. Fort.*, 11; cf. O'Daly (1978), 32.

⁶⁶ *div. qu.* 19.

⁶⁷ e.g. *div. qu.* 54.

⁶⁸ cf. O'Daly (1978), 32.

⁶⁹ *ep.* 18.2; cf. *div. qu.* 19.

creation from which it cannot verge. But at the same time Augustine was of the opinion that the change that the soul undergoes is of crucial importance for the human being. In his early period, especially the *imm. an.*, Augustine tried to clarify the mutability of the soul using a model of Plotinian origin.⁷⁰ This model of change is given by Augustine in e.g. 7.12 and 8.13 of the *imm. an.* when he discusses the dangers for the immortality of the soul. If reason ensures the immortality of the soul, does this not mean that turning from reason towards the senses undermines this immortality? Augustine tells us that the soul which turns to reason and wisdom exists more fully, while the soul that turns from reason and truth to foolishness does so at its own cost of a lessened being (*esse minus*). Through the defect of turning from reason, the soul tends towards nothingness since all defect ‘tends towards nothingness’ (*tendit ad nibilum*). This lessening of the being has to be understood as becoming ‘more deformed’ (*deformius*), thus a lessening of the species of the being, and thereby the soul becomes ‘uglier’ (*foedius*). However this privation of form can never be said to be so great that the soul totally ceases to exist. Augustine finds it hard to explain why, but compares this lessening with the cutting in half of a body. As a body can be cut into half infinitely, yet never reach nothing, so the soul will never cease to exist totally.

In the ontological description of the soul according to Augustine so far, the bond of the human soul with God has been mentioned often already, but mostly in terms of participation in species. But Scripture reveals a different, and perhaps more historical way in which God created the human being and the human soul in *Gen.* 1.26-7 and *Gen.* 2.7. This enables questions about the technicalities of creation of the soul, in other words, about the ‘origin of the soul’.

1.4 The origin of the soul

The last question which needs to be addressed when regarding the soul from an ontological perspective, is the origin of the soul. On the face of it, this may seem a mere technical question. For Augustine’s anthropology, most important is after all that the human being is composed of two different entities: an immaterial immortal soul and a material mortal body. This difference between soul and body means that the soul has to be joined to the body in some way and in turn this implies that one can question where the soul is coming from, if it is

⁷⁰ In the *imm. an.* Augustine also tried out the Aristotelian model of change, which ascribes the change to accidental or substantial properties, resulting in respectively a change with persistence of the subject and a change without persistence of the subject. Augustine would not adhere to this explanation, cf. the appendices 1.

not essentially bound to the body. One has to try to answer this question if one wants to have an exhaustive theory of soul, but –without further information- it does not seem to have much importance for the conduct of the soul once in the body. As Augustine himself would affirm, as long as there is no confusion about our knowledge about the Creator, unclarity about a creature is less important.⁷¹

However, Augustine deemed it necessary to return to this question often, during most of his career, from the *Gn. adv. Man.* (finished 388) up unto the *retr.* (426/427). There are several reasons for this. Augustine has not found Scripture or prior exegesis to give a conclusive answer to the question of the origin of the soul. Precisely this inconclusiveness of scripture allows for several different philosophical analyses on this question, so that the origin of the soul has served as a focal point for Augustine's polemic against both the Manicheans and the Pelagians.⁷² The fact that this question is relevant for these two major polemics of Augustine's career, signals that this question is far from a mere technicality. If the Manicheans and the Pelagians are involved, it means that at least the big questions of the divinity of the soul, the origin of evil –the points of contest with the Manicheans- and individual responsibility –a point of contest with the Pelagians- are involved. Through this last debate, the question of the origin of souls came to have practical implications for a question such as child or adult baptism.⁷³ Moreover, the theories of the soul by Origen and Tertullian were still in the air and needed to be combated. These 'complications' all ask for a more intricate treatment than at first sight may seem necessary. In secondary scholarship, this question thus has received much attention, leading to heated debates, the last one most notably between O'Connell and Gerard O'Daly. But before diving into the different analyses of the question, it is illuminating first to take a look at the relevance of the question in the anti-Manichean polemic.

1.4.1 The origin of the soul in the anti-Manichean polemic: original sin and theodicy

The first two works in which Augustine speaks about the origin of the soul are the *Gn. adv. Man.* and the *lib. arb.*, finished in 395. These two works are written in the anti-Manichean polemic. The goal of the first work was to provide an allegorical exegesis of Genesis against the

⁷¹ *lib. arb.* 3.21.59.

⁷² *lib. arb.* 3.21.59. O'Daly (1983), 184.

⁷³ e.g. *Gn. litt.* 10.11.18-16.29.

derogatory literal exegesis that the Manicheans provided, who denounced the Old Testament. One of the Manichean ideas that Augustine attacked in this exegesis was that the soul is of divine origin, thus of a divine nature. The main anti-Manichean import of the *lib. arb.* was to show that evil does not originate in God but in the human being, more specifically in the will. I will first treat these two works in order to see what treatment of the origin of the soul by the young Augustine emerges, in order to compare it with his later treatment of the question. In the *Gn. adv. Man.*, when it comes to the creation of the soul, Augustine interprets the two creation accounts of the human being in *Gen.* 1:26 and *Gen.* 2:7. As O'Daly has observed, Augustine interprets *Gen.* 2:7 as a further explanation of *Gen.* 1:26. In *Gen.* 1:26 the idea is that the image of God in which the human being is created is a spiritual image and has nothing to do with human body and limbs.⁷⁴ In his exegesis of *Gen.* 2:7 Augustine expands on this, stating that God's breathing of the spirit does not entail that the soul is divine. That would mean that God's nature is mutable, which is a blasphemy.⁷⁵ It is thus in this anti-Manichean context that the origin of the soul is relevant in the *Gen. adv. Man.* Another point which is relevant here (which will soon become clear) is that Augustine treats the two verses as describing the same moment in creation, so that there is no differentiation between the creation of the human soul and the creation of Adam.⁷⁶ *Gen.* 1:26 and *Gen.* 2:7 run parallel in Augustine's mind here.

In the *lib. arb.* Augustine's occupation becomes clear with Evodius' first question: 'Please tell me: isn't God the cause of evil?'⁷⁷ The work is dedicated to showing that God is in no way the author of the evil we experience in this world. Augustine's alternative explanation is that there is not one cause of all evil, but that every instance evil is caused by the human will, thus that every evil starts in the soul.⁷⁸ The trouble is that 'We believe that everything that exists comes from the one God, and yet we believe that God is not the cause of sins. What is troubling is that if you admit that sins come from the souls that God created, and those souls come from God, pretty soon you'll be tracing those sins back to God.'⁷⁹ Augustine is thus concerned that God is absolved from any responsibility for sin, even though he foreknows the sins and could

⁷⁴ *Gn. adv. Man.* 2.1.7 O'Daly (1983), 185.

⁷⁵ *Gn. adv. Man.* 2.8.11.

⁷⁶ *Gn. adv. Man.* 2.7.9. *ut non alicuius novi operis inchoatio, sed superius breviter insinuati diligentior retractatio isto sermone explicetur.* O'Daly (1983), 185

⁷⁷ trans. Thomas Williams, *lib. arb.* 1.1.1 *E: dic mihi, quaeso te, utrum deus non sit auctor mali.*

⁷⁸ *lib. arb.* 1.1.1; 1.11.21. This is also in accordance with the change that we have noticed between the *virtus* of the soul, that what moves the soul, i.e. from external causation through the ratio to the 'internal' causation of the will.

⁷⁹ *lib. arb.* 1.2.4. trans. Thomas Williams. *Credimus autem ex uno deo esse omnia quae sunt et tamen non esse peccatorum auctorem deum. movet autem animum si peccata ex his animabus sunt quas deus creavit, illae autem animae ex deo, quomodo non paruo intervallo peccata referantur in deum.*

have created the soul without free will.⁸⁰ Yet this leads of course to the following question. If all the trouble starts in the will, then how can it be understood that there is evil in the first place? For everybody wants to have a good and happy life, so how could anyone come to want evil?⁸¹ This happens according to Augustine whenever we judge some good to be intrinsically desirable, which is mutable and temporal and which we therefore fear to lose. In other words: evil starts when we value and want something more than we should (*cupiditas/libido*).⁸² But no one wants to experience evil, so how do we get to have this defective will?

The answer comes in 3.18.51-52, along with a quotation from Psalms 25.7 ('Remember not the sins of my youth and of my ignorance') and the famous quotation from Romans 7.18-19 ('I do not do the good that I will; but the evil that I hate, that I do.') These bible verses show the two problems with which our soul is confronted when wanting the good: *ignorantia* (ignorance) and *difficultas* (difficulty). The human being often experiences ignorance about the consequences or the moral values of his actions, or when he has knowledge about the morally desirable action, lacks the willpower to see these actions through.⁸³ Thereby the human being succumbs to the *cupiditas* (desire) for goods which are lower, or at best equal to himself in the hierarchy of creation, whereas he should aim for the highest good, God, who of is the font of all creation. Thus the human comes to have an *inproba voluntas* (perverted will).⁸⁴

Following on this is of course the question how then the human being came to be in such a state of ignorance and difficulty. It is Adam's original sin which brought us in this position, placing us under the laws of death of the devil (himself a 'victim' of the first sin of the will on a cosmic scale, through pride).⁸⁵ Our whole experience of evil therefore is tied up with the original sin, since without it we would have dominance over our will and not give in to the desire for lower goods. O'Connell thus rightly observes that Augustine's theodicy in this line of argument works through upholding Gods justice.⁸⁶ The more we are confronted in our human condition with evil, the more we ourselves are to blame through original sin. The evil in our lives is thus the fulfillment of God's justice. The human race after the original sin lives in a penal

⁸⁰ Evodius raises the problem of contingency of sin and prescience of God in *lib. arb.* 3.4.2.

⁸¹ *lib. arb.* 1.14.30.

⁸² *lib. arb.* 1.4.9; *ibid.* 1.4.10.

⁸³ Hereby Augustine thus gives another explanation to the problem of *akrasia*. We have seen earlier that Augustine later in the *Conf.* would use the problem of the weakness of will -albeit in a different way- to ridicule the Manicheans' idea that we have two wills, indicating that we have two souls.

⁸⁴ *lib. arb.* 3.17.48.

⁸⁵ *lib. arb.* 3.10.31. O'Connell would point to the *persev.* for an explicit statement that we live in a penal state. But it seems to me that the locus in the text given here already settles the matter.

⁸⁶ O'Connell (1987), 27-28.

state.⁸⁷ This explication of Augustine's anti-Manichean theodicy still serves to show the relevance of the question of the origin of the soul. The reason for this is the emergence of the importance of the original sin, which serves as the pivotal point in the explanation. Without original sin, no theodicy.

1.4.2 The universality of original sin in the young Augustine

The question is then how the original sin of Adam is universalized over the entire human race. Does the creation of Adam's soul and his Fall have to be treated metaphorically, as an archetype for humanity in total, or should they be treated historically? And if so, how is it then technically possible for original sin to affect us all? It is specifically on this last question that later authors which are treated in this thesis would latch onto. The juxtaposition of the *Gn. adv. Man* and the *lib. arb.* with which we are engaged at the moment, leads to an answer the young Augustine would give. For –recapitulating– the fact that it was Adam and Eve who sinned, sets us up for the following:

‘Here we come across the slanderous question that is so often asked by those who are ready to blame their sins on anything but themselves: “If it was Adam and Eve who sinned, what did we poor wretches do?”’.⁸⁸ This question reveals an unclarity in Augustine's thinking about the Fall up to that point.⁸⁹ For it is through this question that an important distinction will be made, which Augustine hitherto in the *lib. arb.* does not treat. For the importance of the original sin shows that the question to the origin of the soul can be analyzed into two separate questions. What is the origin of the first soul, thus of the soul of Adam? And what is the origin of the consecutive souls? For it is our relationship with Adam that explains in which way we share in Adam's sin. What it eventually boils down to, thus the real relevance in the question of the origin of the soul is encompassed in this question: What do we have to do with Adam?

⁸⁷ *lib. arb.* 3.18.51. cf. O'Connell (1987), 27.

⁸⁸ *lib. arb.* 3.19.53. (trans. Thomas Williams) Here we come across the slanderous question that is so often asked by those who are ready to blame their sins on anything but themselves: “If it was Adam and Eve who sinned, what did we poor wretches do? How do we deserve to be born in the blindness of ignorance and the torture of difficulty? Why do we first err in ignorance of what we ought to do, and then, when the precepts of justice begin to be open to us and we will to do them, we are powerless, held back by some sort of necessity of carnal desire?”

Hic occurrit illa quaestio quam inter se murmurantes homines rodere consuerunt qui quodlibet aliud in peccando quam se accusare parati sunt. dicunt enim: si Adam et Eva peccaverunt, quid nos miseri fecimus, ut cum ignorantiae caecitate et difficultatis cruciatibus nasceremur et primo erraremus nescientes quid nobis esset faciendum, deinde ubi nobis inciperent aperiri praecepta iustitiae, vellemus ea facere et retinente carnalis concupiscentiae nescio qua necessitate non valeremus?

⁸⁹ According to O'Connell, this question and the four options of the origin of the soul in the *lib. arb.* are even a later insertion. O'Connell (1987), 140-141.

To interpret the relevance of the origin of the soul in such a way is to take up a position in the debate between O'Connell and O'Daly. There is a clash between the O'Connell's 'maximalist' and O'Daly's 'minimalist' interpretation of the relevance of the question of the origin of the soul. For O'Connell this question serves as the key towards understanding Augustine, and the differences between the younger and the older Augustine. The way that Augustine has perceived preferences for specific views on the origin of the soul, which alter over time, gives O'Connell the key for unlocking the whole of Augustine's anthropology. For O'Daly this question is 'just' a technical question about the origin of the soul in a very specific exegetical and polemical context. With seeing the relevance of the question in terms of the other question, I position myself at least initially on the side of O'Connell. For me it seems the treatment of the four options of the *lib. arb.* 3 need to be seen in the whole context of the *lib. arb.* to see the relevance of this question, and then it is hard to evade significant elements of O'Connells argument, which I shall later indicate.

In any case, it is this question that prompts Augustine to come with his famous four options of the origin of the soul. These four options Augustine gives are actually different answers to a more technical question about the origin of the soul. This more technical question is how the soul comes to be embodied. The soul can be inherited from the parents: traducianism (1), the soul can be created at some moment after the conception: creationism (2), the soul pre-existed before the body and was sent to the body by God (3) and the soul pre-existed before the body but sinned, and consequently fell into the body (4).⁹⁰ Augustine does not pick an option, since in the *lib. arb.* his concern is to show –with mixed success– that none of the options detract from the justice of God. And, taken in the overall scheme of the argument, the treatment of the question of the origin of the soul with these four options is to defuse a counter argument ('god is unjust since we do not deserve to live in a penal state since we are not to blame for the primal sin'). The overriding argument of the *lib. arb.* –the context in which the four options in this work have to be seen– is that if we live in a condition of ignorance and difficulty, we ourselves are to blame for it.

Comparing the two treatments of origin of the soul in the *Gn. adv. man.* and the *lib. arb.*, the following line of thinking emerges. There is not a real difference between Adam and us. *Gen.* 1:26, the creation of the human being in general in God's image and *Gen.* 2:7, the breathing of the spirit of life into the first man are different expressions for the same act of creation. These two text loci in *Genesis* do not represent different historical moments. Adam stands as a paradigm

⁹⁰ *lib. arb.* 3.21.59.

for the human being, from which the other human beings cannot easily be distinguished. Although Augustine would probably resist the idea that every human is identical with Adam, I think it is possible to regard Adam as the type, from which the other human beings are the tokens. Thus Augustine, at least up to the last part of the last book of the *lib. arb.* sees no problem in directing the blame of the first sin directly unto all human beings. Adam's first sin is our first sin. This conforms with his exegesis of the Fall in the *Gn. adv. man* 2.14.21-15.22 In explaining the Fall and the interactions of Adam and Eve leading up to the Fall, Augustine elucidates the dynamics of all human sin, also after the Fall, that takes place. Every human sin involves an outside suggestion (the serpent), an aroused desire (Eve, or the animal part of the soul) and assent (Adam, the rational part of soul). Adam and Eve's relationship is thus not interpreted as inter-human interaction, but as an intra-human psychological dynamic of sin, with the motivation eventually being to sort things out for yourself independent of your Creator. At least up to 395, the year of completion of the *lib. arb.*, the technical question of the embodiment of the soul did not loom large upon Augustine's mind. For him it was important to show that all humans souls in general were not of divine origin and that they all had defected from their perfect beginning. In this view original sin was equally committed and therefore equally distributed over all human souls.

1.4.3 The universality of original sin in the mature Augustine

This view of the human soul was to change radically however. In the *Gn. litt.* (404-416) Augustine would denounce all three elements of the above account: *Gen.* 1:26 and 2:7 do not describe the same moment in creation (1); Adam's soul is not the paradigm for our souls (2); Even though we live in a penal state, this is not because our souls are in some fallen condition (3). To start with the first element. The six days of creation that *Gen.* 1 describes are simultaneously, since the days in which God created the world are taken to be in the spiritual light created on the first day. They are not part of our history. *Gen.* 2 on the other hand describes events one after the other in a more mundane way. The planting of paradise with trees, the placing of Adam in paradise, Adam's naming of the animals and the formation of Eve from Adam's rib all are temporal.⁹¹ They occur one after the other in our history. This entails that the breathing of life into man in *Gen.* 2:7 also is an event in history, and not in the simultaneous

⁹¹ *Gn. litt.* 6.3.4.

creation. The fact that these two creation accounts are not parallel, leads to an interesting tension inside books 6 and 7 of the *Gn. litt.* For the question then becomes what the relationship is between the creation of the human being, man and woman, in *Gen.* 1:26-7 and the historical account of formation of man out of mud, the breathing of life and the shaping of the woman from the man in *Gen.* 2. It is no solution to say that *Gen.* 1:26 only deals with the human soul and *Gen.* 2:7 in juxtaposition only with the body, since Augustine is of the opinion in the *Gn. litt.* that the sex of the human being is only in the body.⁹² But already in *Gen.* 1:27 it is stated that God created the human being male and female. Augustine's solution in book 6 is to explain the creation of the human being in *Gen.* 1:26 potentially, as a seminal reason.⁹³ For Augustine divides the process of creation in two parts. There is the creation of the, so to say, 'framework', which is in full completion from the start of the Creation, such as the stellar spheres. And there is the creation of everything which at some time or another is going to take place within this framework, such as the different species of plants, animals and indeed in book 6 the human species.⁹⁴ It 'was already otherwise created in some secret room of nature' (*cum iam esset in secreto quodam naturae aliter factus*). Yet in book 7 this notion of the creation of the human being as a *ratio seminalis* will come under pressure. Book 7, which deals only with the creation of the human soul, the creation of the soul as a *ratio seminalis* will be denied by Augustine. The problem is that if the soul is a *ratio seminalis*, then there must be a proximate cause for its coming into being. In other words, if the soul is not created directly, then there must be something which contains the semen prior to the coming into being of the soul. But the idea of such a container of a seminal reason for the soul runs into great difficulties. The only valid candidate for such a container would be the spiritual creature, the 'heavens' of *Gen.* 1:1. But if that would be the container for the seminal reason, it would mean that the angelic nature would be the parent for the human soul, something that Augustine cannot imagine.⁹⁵ The conclusion is thus that the soul cannot be created as a seminal reason in *Gen.* 1:26 even though the body can be created as such.⁹⁶ The solution to the tension between book 6 and 7, between stating that the human is created as a seminal reason in *Gen.* 1:26, but that the soul is not, is that book 6 deals with the body and book 7 with the soul. This might overall be a good solution, but I see two difficulties with this. First of all book 6 speaks about the human being in general, and only in 6.12.20 switches specifically to the body. That is thus after stating that the human being as a whole is created as a seminal reason in *Gen.*

⁹² *Gn. litt.* 6.7.12.

⁹³ *Gn. litt.* 6.5.8.

⁹⁴ *Gn. litt.* 6.1.1-2.

⁹⁵ *Gn. litt.* 7.23.34.

⁹⁶ O'Daly (1983), 188, comes to a similar conclusion.

1:26. Secondly I personally find it hard to imagine that Augustine would think that God created the human being in such a fractured way from the beginning: complete soul, but only incipient body. I find this hard, since Augustine, as shown above, specifically states that *Gen.* 1:26 deals with the whole human being, body and soul. Yet, strange though this solution may seem, it is the best one available.

The second element in the line of thinking of the *Gen. adv. man.* and the *lib. arb.* was that there is no fundamental difference between our souls and Adam's soul. It may be observed that book 7 of the *Gen. litt.* has the same conflation between Adam's soul and other souls. Augustine speaks about the human soul in general in this book, not about the first human soul. A counter argument against this is that Augustine treats this specifically in the context of the breathing of life into the first soul. This first soul is specifically Adam's soul. Especially, since it has already been shown that *Gen.* 2:7 and *Gen.* 1:26 do not refer to the same moment. *Gen.* 2:7 only treats Adam. But above all, the short technical speculations from the *lib. arb.* about the origin or embodiment of the soul or the consecutive souls have grown into a full blown book, i.e. book 10. Thus, even though the argument of book 7 has an impact on all human souls, this is only because with Adam's soul the 'technique of creation' has to be described for the first time. So let's take a short look at book 10. The problem from which Augustine sets out is the origin of the first consecutive soul, namely Eve's. Scripture is silent on the point of Eve's soul, stating only useful information about Eve's body, being made from the bone from Adam's bones and the flesh of Adam's flesh.⁹⁷ The same technical problems of book 7 are rehearsed, but now specifically with a view to the consecutive souls, indicating the differentiation between Adam's soul and ours.⁹⁸ Augustine for example considers whether our souls were constituted as a seminal reason and if so, in what vehicle, with the same result.⁹⁹ Apart from the question to the genesis of Eve's soul, the transmittance of the original sin to the offspring, baptism, and the question how Christ's soul could remain free from sin are important questions.¹⁰⁰ Thus it is all the while clear that Augustine's focus is on all the souls but the very first.

Otherwise it is very interesting to compare the options for the origin of the soul which are given in book 10 with the options for the origin of the soul from book 3 of the *lib. arb.* In book 10 the options for the origin of the soul (which would more aptly be called the 'embodiment of the soul' since the relevant question seems to be how the soul came to occupy the human body) are that 1) the soul is in some manner pre-existent (as a finished created thing

⁹⁷ *Gn. litt.* 10.1.2.

⁹⁸ e.g. *Gn. litt.* 7.3.4-5.

⁹⁹ *Gn. litt.* 10.3.4.

¹⁰⁰ *Gn. litt.* 10.11.18-21.37.

or as a seminal reason) and sent by God to govern the body, 2) creationism and 3) traducianism.¹⁰¹ In the course of the book the pros and cons of each specific option are discussed at length against statements of Scripture. But there are two options against which Augustine specifically turns itself. One is that the soul is embodied since it is already itself a material substance. Augustine turns himself specifically against Tertullian's thinking in this respect, discussing these arguments of Tertullian which are nonsensical for Augustine, such as that the soul as substance will grow or occupy a larger place along with the growth of the body.¹⁰² The other option which is denounced is the last option from the *lib. arb.* which has not yet been addressed: the idea that the soul exists before the body, errs and consequently falls into the body. Augustine now sees this option in a Origenist context, which becomes clear from his description of child death. Origen believed that souls were thrust over and over again into the bodies as punishment, but that a virtuous life could free the soul from the cycle of bodily life. Augustine, when speaking about infant death, would reject the idea that God 'saves' children whom He foreknows that they will lead an upright life, by cutting their bodily life (very) short.¹⁰³ This would rationalize the mystery of death and force God to act, taking away from his total freedom.¹⁰⁴ The last element of the line of thought of the *Gn. adv. man* and the *lib. arb.*, that the human soul is a fallen soul, is here rejected.

But what arguments does Augustine give in the *Gn. litt.* against the idea that any (Adam's or ours) human soul is a fallen soul? There are two places in the *Gn. litt.* where Augustine provides his arguments against this thought, book 7 -in the case of Adam's soul- and book 10 -in the case of all the other souls-. In this last context (the origin of all the other souls) Augustine, as shown above, tries to determine which of the options is preferable in the light of Scripture. It thus is Scripture which he uses to argue against the idea that the soul can fall into the body. This would especially contradict that very important bible text for Augustine, Romans 9:11.¹⁰⁵ In this text God is free to choose whom He will from children who have committed neither crime nor provided good deeds. Consequently, it is impossible for the soul to act before he leads his earthly life for good or bad, and therefore it is impossible for the soul to fall into the body because of a

¹⁰¹ *Gn. litt.* 10.3.4.

¹⁰² Even though Augustine will always state that the soul is everywhere in the body, and thus also is committed to the idea that the soul is somehow local, he would always deny that the Aristotelian category of place can be adduced to such an immaterial substance. e.g. *imm. an.* 25. In this way Tertullian's idea that the soul will have to stretch out in the body as gold or silver is hammered out to provide a larger surface as gold or silver leaf is absurd for Augustine. *Gn. litt.* 10.26.44.

¹⁰³ *Gn. litt.* 10.15.27.

¹⁰⁴ O'Daly (1983), 189.

¹⁰⁵ *Gn. litt.* 10.7.12. The importance of Romans 9:11 for Augustine can hardly be overestimated. However, this is not the place to go deep into a discussion of Augustine's 'discovery' of the text in the *Simpl.* in 396.

sin. The idea here, and above, is thus that God cannot be forced to act on the basis of merit or deficit of the human soul. Other than in the previous line of thinking His freedom goes before His justice. Later we will see that Augustine will solve this problem of priority of divine freedom or divine justice with the idea that God's justice cannot be understood by the limited human being.

In book 7 of the *Gn. litt.* Augustine is likewise concerned to guard against the idea that Adam's soul is fallen. Although, since the focus is here solely on Adam, he understandably does not come with a discussion to settle the matter between the options of the *lib. arb.* His concern here is the technique of the creation of Adam's soul. This is set into the context of the exegesis of *Gen. 2:7* where God breathed life into Adam. Returning to the idea that *Gen. 1:26* and *2:7* do not describe the same moment in creation, there has to be sought a solution for the double creation account, the one in the simultaneous creation of the six days, the other in history. If God created some material from which later the soul would be formed, Augustine's trouble could be solved. Moreover, the mutability of the soul suggests such a material.¹⁰⁶ He therefore searches for a possible spiritual material (*materies*), or alternatively –as shown above– for a carrier of a possible seminal reason. We have already seen that the soul as a seminal reason is problematic, and a spiritual material would be a good option, for the reasons given above.¹⁰⁷ Augustine thus has a vested interest in giving such a material. However, the idea of such a material leads to a lot of obscurities.¹⁰⁸ Augustine finds it most plausible if the material would be alive and rational. It is hard to see how dead material can give rise to life and the idea that non rational material could change into rational material could have the abject consequence that animal souls could change into human rational souls.¹⁰⁹ Therefore this material must have rational life before it is a soul. But then it must also have a happy life (*beata vita*). But if it has a happy life as material, it loses this life once in the body, since the human being does not have such a happy life. God's breathing of life into man would thus diminish this material, it would be a downwards effluence (*defluxio*), which is *nefas* to say.¹¹⁰ But the soul also cannot act before it is embodied, thus it cannot deserve such a diminution. The idea of a spiritual material thus is very problematic. And the reason for this is that Augustine is now opposed to seeing the soul as a fallen soul. Herewith all three elements of the line of thinking of the *Gn. adv. Man.* and the *lib. arb.* have been abandoned in the *Gn. litt.* and the mature Augustine.

¹⁰⁶ *Gn. litt.* 7.6.9.; cf. O'Daly (1983), 188.

¹⁰⁷ Although in the *Gn. litt.* the argument actually runs the other way. First the spiritual material is researched and problematized, then a seminal reason of the soul.

¹⁰⁸ *Gn. litt.* 7.10.7.

¹⁰⁹ *Gn. litt.* 7.9.13.

¹¹⁰ *Gn. litt.* 7.8.11.

Out of the original four options of the origin of the soul of the *lib. arb.* there are therefore only two viable options left, i.e. traducianism and creationism, even if Augustine is not officially prepared to entirely drop the option of pre-existence of the soul, as we have seen from *Gn. litt.* book 10. However, with regard to the transmission of original sin these two options both have their problems. For if one takes the traducianist position, it is easy to see how the original sin is transmitted: given that Adam and Eve are everybody's ancestors, their original sin taints all our souls. But this advantage is offset by difficulties in imagining how the soul of the child is present in the parents, as Augustine would explain in *ep.* 190 to Optatus (418). Is the soul to be compared to the flame of candle, which can light another flame without diminishing? But how does this work if there are two parents? If one takes the creationist position, this problem is solved: it is easy to see that the souls are coming directly from god. But this advantage is offset by the difficulty in imagining how the original sin is transmitted from Adam to the rest of humanity. No matter how hard Augustine tried to decide between the options or whom he asked (Jerome in 415 *ep.* 166), he resigned to an agnostic position time and again, from the *lib. arb.* In 395, through the *Gn. litt.* (401-415), through *ep.* 166, 190, 202a up to the *retr.* (427) at the end of his life. But this was not a passive resignation: he defended agnosticism in 418 in *ep.* 202a (15-7) when bishop Optatus tried to press him hard for an answer. Augustine was not sure whether this knowledge was ever to be obtained by human beings, but he was sure that as long as no overriding Scriptural or conceptual reasons were found it was safer to remain agnostic than to jump to conclusions.

1.4.4 The origin of the soul as the fall of the soul: Augustine's reception of Plotinus.¹¹¹

The question of the origin of the soul can more aptly be described as the question of the embodiment of the soul, i.e. how the immaterial soul came to be intimately connected with our material body. This question has received a great deal of attention in scholarly literature, although rather under the term 'Fall of the Soul'. There is debate over whether Augustine ever believed that the soul sinned before its embodiment and that the embodiment was its resulting punishment. And if so, in which period of his life Augustine took these positions.

¹¹¹ This paragraph has been based upon Rombs' helpful *Saint Augustine and the Fall of the Soul. Beyond O'Connell and His Critics* (2006).

The core of this debate evolves around Augustine's reception of some of Plotinus' *Enneads*.¹¹² The question is whether Augustine used not only Plotinus' imagery, such as of the human being wandering through the sensible world¹¹³, but also his concepts.

Plotinus believed that the human soul was fallen. First, because in a very fundamental way plurality and individuality meant for Plotinus a digression from the transcendent unity of the One. The One is the ultimate reality and from it emanates all other existing beings (*hypostases*). The emanations come from a willingness to share the Good from the perspective of the One. But the emanated beings have the task to return to their source and reunite with the One. In as far as they have a preference for autonomous existence and an actual autonomous existence, they are morally culpable and hence plurality and individuality are reprehensible divisions from the One. This already goes for the first *hypostasis*, which is *Nous*.

But Plotinus considers the human soul itself as fallen for a second reason. The human soul is situated at the fringes of the realm of the intelligible, but gives form to the body and administers it. The body is situated in the realm of sense, and in this way the human soul has a middle position between the intelligible and the sensible. But even if the individual soul has a natural proclivity to bring form and intelligibility to matter, the human soul is supposed to contemplate the intelligible and look upwards towards the One, which is the source it ultimately comes from. But it becomes enmeshed in the world of the senses, and thereby ceases to be wholly united to the Soul (*Psyche*).¹¹⁴ In turning from the intelligible world to inform matter, the soul is fragmented into individual souls and distended in time.¹¹⁵ And therefore, even if the One shares its goodness freely and the Soul is meant to inform the material world, the mere fact of existing outside of the One, and being turned towards the material world, are why Plotinus regards the human soul as fallen. Both are effects of the desire to be autonomous, self-sufficient, and other than One, which desire is named *tolma* by Plotinus. Furthermore, the soul is pre-existent on the body, given that the soul through its fall becomes individuated, and that the soul gives form to the material world.

Ronnie Rombs took a step forward with his book in 2006 on precisely this debate. His analytical innovation is to separate these views of Plotinus into three aspects. For Plotinus' views on the fall of the soul cannot only be seen in a moral aspect, but also in an ontological and cosmogonic aspect. The ontological aspect of the fall of the soul is where the soul becomes

¹¹² There are different estimates of the number of *Enneads* used by Augustine at the time of his conversion. The differences in estimates are partly due to differences in method: on the basis of ideological or philological parallels or a mix of those. For different lists of *Enneads* and a short history cf. Rombs (2006), 4-6, cf. also n.4 p. 112.

¹¹³ *Ennead*, 1.6.8; cf. Rombs (2006), 201-8.

¹¹⁴ *Ennead*, 4.8.7.

¹¹⁵ Rombs (2006), 18.

individuated, and joined to the corporeal body it administers. The cosmogonic aspect is where the individuated soul 'participates as an efficient cause in the process of the coming-to-be of the lower world'.¹¹⁶ Rombs's analysis is helpful in getting a grip on Augustine's reception of Plotinus and on describing the debate concerning it.

Nineteenth century's *Quellenforschung* recognized Augustine's dependency on Plotinus (and Porphyry¹¹⁷), but from the late '60s of the twentieth century, Robert O'Connell started the modern debate on Augustine's reception of Plotinus, when he focused not so much on which exact *Enneads* were used by Augustine from a philological perspective, but on whether Plotinus' conceptual scheme was taken in.¹¹⁸ He espoused his ideas in three key publications. In the first *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man A.D. 386-391* (1968) O'Connell argued that the young Augustine indeed defended the fall of a pre-existent and individuated soul into body, through which the body gained its form. Thereby Augustine followed Plotinus in all three aspects, moral, ontological and cosmogonic, of the fall of the soul. According to O'Connell, Augustine held to a circular anthropology, in which the human soul fell into the body in this world and into time and anticipated a restoration to its origin after its separation with the body through death.

However, O'Connell argued in 1973 that Augustine changed his views and rejected a fall of the soul in around 415, due to the import of Romans 9:11. Augustine's insight then was that this testimony prohibited the soul to act before its embodiment. Moreover Augustine learnt about Origen's ideas on the fall from Paulus Orosius, and he concluded that if the soul could fall from beatitude earlier, it might also fall later from Heaven, and that is impossible. But for O'Connell this did not mean that Augustine radically broke with Plotinus. In *The Origin of the Soul in St. Augustine's Later Works* (1987) O'Connell argued that in his later writings (*Gn. litt.*, *Trin.*, *civ.*) Augustine would explain the universality of original sin though the idea that the human soul had a common life in Adam and a proper life (*propria vita*) of its own. But this distinction between common and proper goods was again taken from Plotinus. According O'Connell, Augustine thereby still argued for a pre-existent communal Soul, from which individuated parts fell into the body when they turned themselves from God towards individuated and proper bodily life.¹¹⁹ Augustine thus had in effect become a sort of crypto-Plotinian.

These views encountered quite some opposition from scholars such as Mary Clark and Frederik van Fleteren.¹²⁰ Goulven Madec agreed with the many textual parallels between

¹¹⁶ Rombs (2006), xx-xxi.

¹¹⁷ cf. *ibid.*, 8-9.

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*, (2006), 3-7.

¹¹⁹ *ibid.*, xx-xxiii.

¹²⁰ Clark (1971), Fleteren (1990)

Augustine's and Plotinus' texts, and thereby with Augustine's use of Plotinus, but he questioned whether textual parallels were enough to show ideological dependency.¹²¹ Gerard O'Daly agreed with a fall of the soul in Augustine's texts, but only with a moral fall. For O'Daly there is no ontological change involved in a fall of the soul, as the soul retains its middle position between the material- and intelligible worlds and remains an incorporeal being. Moreover the intrinsic goodness of Christian creation prohibited for O'Daly a fall of the soul into the body.¹²² Other scholars, such as John Rist accepted part of O'Connell's theses, and Roland Teske and Patout Burns and Joseph Torchia furthered O'Connell's program of research of (the early) Augustine's use of and dependency on Plotinus.¹²³

Up until the *Conf.* Augustine seems indeed to have believed in a fall of the soul in the way Plotinus did. Like Plotinus, Augustine believed the soul to be in a mid-rank position, between the higher intelligible world and the inferior sensible world.¹²⁴ Moreover, for Augustine the soul gives form to the body so that the body can exist in the first place, which mirrors Plotinus' cosmogonic function of the soul.¹²⁵ The soul is the core of the human being, reducing the body to an instrument of the soul, which, cast off after death, leaves the soul free to return whence it came.¹²⁶ For the soul had a pre-existence before the body. This is also clear in Augustine's early epistemology, before his theory of illumination, which treats knowledge as the remembering of truths forgotten since the bodily life of the soul.¹²⁷ This pre-existent soul thus fell into the body.

For Plotinus the fall of the soul was both necessary in order to produce the lower world, but also culpable through the soul's desire to be independent from the One. Similar considerations seem to have moved Augustine. In the *mus.* he seems to consider the idea that the human soul has been 'knitted' into the fabric of the material world.¹²⁸ But the fall of the soul for the young Augustine was also through Adams' original sin. Augustine analyses three causes of sin: concupiscence, curiosity and pride. O'Connell has shown that these are three aspects of Plotinus' notion of *tolma*.¹²⁹ The soul desires to take a part of the material world as a private good, and thereby desires to be 'more' than what it is. Thereby it loses its bond to the One for Plotinus, or God for Augustine, thereby itself becoming fragmented and enmeshed in the

¹²¹ Madec (1965), 373.

¹²² O'Daly (1987), 40-1, 199-202. and (1974).

¹²³ Rist (1996), 104, 111-12, Teske (1991), Burns (1987), Torchia (1990).

¹²⁴ *Gn. adv. Man.*, 2.9.12.

¹²⁵ *imm. an.*, 24.

¹²⁶ *ord.*, 2.31.

¹²⁷ *Sol.*, 2.35 (with *Retr.* 1.4.4); *an. quant.*, 20.34.

¹²⁸ *mus.*, 6.30.

¹²⁹ O'Connell (1969), 46.

inferior material world.¹³⁰ It turns itself from God and towards the body. It therefore has the assignment to return itself to God, which can only be completely done when the body is cast off. In the meantime for Augustine the soul retains a bond with God. From Plotinus' perspective this is explained through his metaphysics of emanation. From the One the individual soul flows forth through the successive stages of Reason (*Nous*) and Soul (*Psuche*). The young Augustine reflects this way of thinking through his acceptance of the World-Soul and his idea that the soul is at the same time one and many.¹³¹

Moreover, Augustine shared these views with Plotinus through his assimilation of Plotinus' principle of 'integral omnipresence'.¹³² This principle is meant to explain the hierarchy in reality. Two worlds are posited, the intelligible world and the material world. The intelligibles are primary since they produce the sensible world through transmitting form to the material beings. For such a material being to exist, the whole form must integrally be accessible from all of the parts of the material being. The form therefore must be incorporeal itself and not bound by spatial boundaries. But thereby the One for Plotinus, or God, for Augustine, must be present in all the material beings, since they are the ultimate source of the intelligibles. This is the principle of integral omnipresence. It stands at the heart of the idea of participation: a thing can only participate in an incorporeal intelligible and exist because the intelligible, and therefore ultimately God, is present in the thing. This principle forms the backdrop for Plotinus' and Augustine's ideas of the fall of the soul as a descent into the body, and the description of it as a 'turning away from God'. For the fall the soul occurs when the soul as an ontologically primary being becomes involved in the body it gives form to in a way it should not. A sort of 'inverse participation' takes place in which the soul is directed to the body instead of to its own source. This is made possible by the soul's presence to the body. In this way Augustine could give an explanation of evil that did not require an ontological principle of evil, for evil was nothing more than this misdirection of the soul. O'Connell was convinced the *Conf.* was based upon this principle of integral omnipresence.¹³³

The highpoint of Augustine's assimilation of Plotinus' ideas on the fall of the soul was the *Gn. adv. Man.* In this exegesis, Augustine interpreted *Genesis* in such a way to incorporate elements from the cosmogonic, ontological and moral functions of Plotinus' fall of the soul. Augustine interpreted 'the green of the field before it was upon the earth' (Gen. 2:4) as an invisible spiritual creature from which individual souls are distinguished after sin and to which

¹³⁰ cf. Rombs (2006), 60-1.

¹³¹ *imm. an.*, 24; *vera rel.*, 11.22; *an. quant.*, 32.69.

¹³² Rombs (2006), 25-37.

¹³³ O'Connell (1969), 75-6.

the souls need to return.¹³⁴ In a parallel effort to interpret *Genesis* along Plotinian lines, Augustine has a preference to think of Adam's body in Paradise in only spiritual terms.¹³⁵ Adam would fall into a corporeal life after his removal from Paradise. Augustine modeled his description of the (first) sin and its effects on Plotinus' ideas too. *Tolma* was the model for the motivation for sin when Augustine described how the male or rational part of soul could be persuaded to consent to sin through the concupiscence, pride and curiosity of the female appetitive part of soul. The soul is thereby loosened from its tie with God, divided through the plurality of carnal desires and loses order and integration. These effects align with Plotinus, even if Augustine restricted them to psychology.¹³⁶

In the *Conf.* Augustine would further restrict his application of Plotinus' ideas on the fall to psychology. Augustine refrains from giving the fall any cosmogonic effects. The fall is not related to any individuation, and the spiritual creature of the 'heaven of heaven' from book 12 cannot be assimilated to the invisible spiritual creature of the *Gn. adv. Man.*'s 'green of the field'. For the heaven of heaven in the *Conf.* is not related to any culpable sin or fall, and therefore stands outside the scheme of an emanation or descent of the soul and neither should the soul return there.¹³⁷ Moreover, although the ontological effects of the fall of the soul into corporeal life are still present in the *Conf.*, they play much less of a role than they did in his earlier works.¹³⁸ Augustine is also now unsure whether there the soul is pre-existent, although he leaves the possibility open.¹³⁹ Augustine's real interest is in explaining how the will is perverted in our current penal state. It is here that the explicit reception of Plotinus takes place. Sin is again explained with pride, concupiscence, and curiosity, and the effects of sin are multiplicity, forgetfulness and an impoverishment through perverse desire and a turning away from God. But these effects are described in the life of the soul in the here and now, in corporeal life.¹⁴⁰

And so there seems to be a movement in Augustine's reception of Plotinus away from the cosmogonic and ontological elements of Plotinus ideas on the fall towards a focus on the moral and psychological elements of the fall. And this is indeed Rombs' overarching thesis in his book. For he will allow for reception of Plotinus in the mature Augustine too, but restrict it to the 'psychology of sin', and not to an ontological fall of the soul as O'Connell did. Indeed

¹³⁴ *Gn. adv. Man.*, 2.4.5; cf. Rombs (2006), 119-20.

¹³⁵ *ibid.*, 2.7.8; 2.14.20, with Rombs' (2006) caveat, 128-9.

¹³⁶ Rombs (2006), 133.

¹³⁷ *Conf.*, 12.9.9; Rombs (2006), 146-7.

¹³⁸ Rombs (2006), 140, 143.

¹³⁹ *Conf.*, 1.6.9.

¹⁴⁰ Rombs (2006), 148-52.

Augustine's reception of Plotinus has never been unmodified¹⁴¹ or static, as Rombs is apt to point out.¹⁴² And there are good reasons for Augustine to change the manner of his reception of Plotinus as he became more 'theological': the Plotinian metaphysics of emanation and return are incompatible with the Christian metaphysics of a creation *ex nihilo*. For Plotinus, diversity, individuation, and indeed existence (outside One) are morally culpable. The soul has the task to return to the One, with which it never entirely lost contact, in an ontological manner, and this return is achieved by shedding the body. Thus individuation is an effect of a negatively valued Fall. But the Christian God stands outside of his Creation. The individuals He created are intrinsically good. The efficient cause of individuation is not an emanation or descent into a lesser reality, but God himself. In a Christian metaphysics sin can only happen after the Creation takes place, if God is not to be forced into forming individuals through necessary causes outside of Himself. Even if the soul should harken to God in a Christian metaphysics, it cannot return to a place it never was or ever will be since it is distinct from God as a creature. The anthropology is therefore not circular, but linear: the human being as a created being awaits immortality and beatitude. By contrast, in a Christian metaphysics the human being ultimately is not only the soul, which is unfortunately bound to a body, but is right from the start a composite of soul and an intrinsically good body.

The incompatibility of a cosmogony from a creation *ex nihilo* by God and an emanation-descent were already apparent even in the *Gn. adv. Man.* and the *Conf.*, and it lead Augustine to eventually the fall of the soul altogether.¹⁴³ The catalysts in this process were the Pelagians. Pelagius and Caelestius arrived in North Africa in 411, and in the debates against them Augustine carried out his conviction that original sin, thus Adam's guilt, was universal over the human race. He returned to the question of the origin of the soul again, since the answer to this question is instrumental to the explanation of the universality of original sin. He reinterpreted Rom. 9:11 -which he hitherto had used to defend God's freedom of choice- as a rejection of the possibility of action and sin before birth in the *pecc. mer.* 1.22.31.¹⁴⁴ Augustine rejected the fall of the soul, and indeed the pre-existence of the soul, so that the only two viable options of the original options of the *lib. arb.* 3.21.59 that remained were creationism and traducianism.¹⁴⁵ This

¹⁴¹ e.g. in the *Gn. adv. Man.* Adam's sin leads to the mortality of his body, and not to an individuation of souls, as it did with the invisible creature.

¹⁴² (2006), 113-5.

¹⁴³ *Gn. adv. Man.*, 1.2.4; *Conf.*, 12.15.19; cf. Rombs (2006), 147.

¹⁴⁴ Normally the *pecc. mer.* is dated 412, but O'Connell would rather see it dated as 415.

¹⁴⁵ *Gn. litt.*, 10.11.19, 10.23.39.

also meant that there could no longer be a fall of a pre-existent soul into a body, but that the human being was created with both a soul and a body.¹⁴⁶

This development is visible in the *Gn. litt.* given that its composition history is so long (401-415). In book 1 of the *Gn. litt.* Augustine still posits an intellectual creature, the 'light' from Gen. 1:3, with a cosmogonic function.¹⁴⁷ But in book 2 the 'light' has become a multiplicity of spiritual creatures, the angels.¹⁴⁸ Individuation there is a part of Creation, and, moreover, the angels do not serve as an instrumental cause in bringing about beings in the material world.¹⁴⁹ Augustine rather uses Wisdom 11:21 to show that God has ordered all individual beings in Creation according to their measure, number and weight, with the Word of God as instrumental cause. In book 7 Augustine extensively analyzes the hypothesis of a pre-existent soul and rejects it, exactly because the soul cannot suffer adverse effects from being coupled with an intrinsically good body, and because the soul cannot fall into time as it already is a creature in time-bound Creation.¹⁵⁰ Sin is only possible in one's own life (*propria vita*) through Rom. 9:11, and Adam therefore had a proper life before his sin, precluding a fall. But Augustine observed that Paul had also stated in Rom. 5:12 that 'all die in Adam, in whom all have sinned'.¹⁵¹ And so it was the relationship between Adam and the other human beings that provided Augustine with an alternate explanation for the universality of original sin and guilt.

Augustine did use Plotinus' distinction *communis* - *propria*, e.g. in *trin.* 12.9.14 and s. 165.6. For O'Connell this signaled that Augustine was reverting back to a theory of a fall of the soul. Before his proper life, the human being had a communal life in Adam. In this way Adam's sin could become universal over the human race. A baby would therefore be affected by the penal state of the human race, even if it had no chance or agency yet to sin in his proper life. We therefore shared an ontological identity with Adam, who thereby became some sort of (as Rombs would say) 'transindividual'.¹⁵² For O'Connell this goes back to the young Augustine's ideas of the soul being one and many at the same time. With Plotinus' metaphysics behind it, it would mean that a communal Adam was ontologically prior to individual proper life.

But this is not what Augustine had in mind. As Rombs correctly points out, Augustine used a different way than a fall of the soul to explain how original sin was proper to every individual's life, and this was not related to Plotinus. In order to explain Rom. 5:12, Augustine

¹⁴⁶ e.g. *Trin.*, 13.3.12.

¹⁴⁷ *Gn. litt.*, 1.9.17.

¹⁴⁸ *Gn. litt.*, 2.8.16.

¹⁴⁹ Rombs (2006), 172-3.

¹⁵⁰ *Gn. litt.*, 8.20.39.

¹⁵¹ *Gn. litt.*, 6.9.14-5.

¹⁵² O'Connell (1987), 300; Rombs (2006), 103.

used a more biblical way of reasoning for the universality of original sin. In the *pecc. mer.* and the *civ.* Augustine explained that it was our relationship of historical origin with Adam which makes for a propagation of original sin. There was no ontological and actual presence of an individual in Adam prior to his proper life.¹⁵³ The historical Adam is rather a historical mediator of our humanity, carrying the stain of original sin along. Original sin is described in terms of a derivation (*traxit*) from Adam.¹⁵⁴ The unity of human beings through Adam's common origin that Augustine describes in the *civ.* is not an ontological unity, but a *societas*.¹⁵⁵ In as far as this unity is not only a description of a shared historical origin but also a command from God to form a fellowship of mankind, it is dependent on the will of the human being to partake in it.¹⁵⁶ With this description of our relationship with Adam, Augustine had given an alternate explanation of the universality of original sin without needing an ontological fall of the soul and the Plotinian metaphysics it involved. It took the relevance away from the question of the origin of the soul, which hitherto had the burden of explaining in one way or another how original sin was universalized.¹⁵⁷ The propagation of the soul was thereby disconnected from the propagation of original sin so that Augustine could safely retain an agnostic stance on the question of the origin of the soul.¹⁵⁸

Does this mean that Augustine no longer believed in a fall of the soul after the *pecc. mer.*? In *trin.* 12.9.14 Augustine indeed describes a fall of the soul while using Plotinus' common - proper distinction and Plotinus' imagery. The body is a proper good of the soul and the soul falls towards it through a preference for proper goods over common goods. But Augustine's the fall of the soul in the *trin.* did not entail an ontological fall of the soul into the body and time. For in this description of sin, the body serves as the instrument through which the soul sins, so that the body cannot be an effect of the fall. Moreover, the process of sin is described with regard to the psychological process and effects behind it, in much the same terms as the young Augustine described the psychological and moral element of the fall of the soul in the *Gn. adv. Man.*¹⁵⁹

The reception of Plotinus by Augustine thus is dynamic. The young Augustine accepted the cosmogonic, ontological and moral elements of the fall as he learned them from Plotinus. Along with it came Plotinus metaphysics of emanation-descent and return. But gradually Augustine realized that these metaphysics were incompatible with a Christian creation *ex nihilo*.

¹⁵³ *pecc. mer.*, 1.9.9; *civ.*, 13.3.

¹⁵⁴ *ep.* 98.

¹⁵⁵ *civ.*, 12.22; Rombs (2006), 197.

¹⁵⁶ *civ.*, 12.28; Rombs (2006), 199.

¹⁵⁷ *pecc. mer.*, 1.22.33.

¹⁵⁸ Rombs (2006), 187.

¹⁵⁹ Rombs (2006), 157-60.

He therefore rejected the cosmogonic and ontological elements of Plotinus' fall of the soul, along with the metaphysics behind the fall of the soul. Through Paul he found an alternate explanation of the universality of original sin, so that the question of the origin of the soul (i.e. fall of the soul), which had been instrumental in explaining this universality, could safely be left unanswered. But Augustine did retain Plotinus' moral and psychological elements of the fall of the soul, along with its imagery.

1.4.5 Connection with the Pelagian issue

To conclude this chapter a final remark has to be made about the relevance of this issue of the origin of the soul. For this seemingly minor technical issue of the origin of the soul received, as the rest of this thesis will show, what may seem an undue portion of the attention in the centuries after Augustine. The reason for this is that it is tied up with that last major polemic in which Augustine was engaged throughout the last decades of his life, the Pelagian issue. This polemic revolves around the measures of dependency of the soul on grace and freedom of the will. Augustine in his polemic with the Pelagians came to occupy a position of extreme dependency of the soul on grace which consequently meant that any volition unaided by grace must necessarily be defective. This extreme position not only led to resistance with the Pelagians, but also with catholic monks in Hadrumetum and in the south of Gaul. The Pelagian controversy, or the issue over 'grace versus free will', would rear its head time and again over the course of the following centuries, but its history will not be written here.¹⁶⁰ What is important to keep in mind is that the account of the origin of the soul must for a catholic enable the universality of original sin. Earlier in this chapter it has been elaborated upon how this functions as the hinge of Augustine's theodicy. But this universality of original sin also determines the relationship between God and the human being after the Fall. For it is the defective nature of the human being after the Fall which necessitates its continuing dependency upon grace, over and above the dependency a person has on God for his bare fact of existing as a normal part of Creation. It is the way in which the account of the origin of the soul thus enables original sin to be universalized which will be written over many pages in the coming chapters, the first of which will be on Eugippius' *Excerpta ex operibus Sancti Augustini*.

¹⁶⁰ E.g. a good account of (and deconstruction of the established narrative concerning) the reactions of the monks in southern Gaul has been written in the first few chapters of Augustine Casiday's *Tradition and Theology in St John Cassian* (Oxford, New York 2007).

Chapter 2. Eugippius and the origin of the soul in the *Excerpta ex operibus sancti Augustini*.

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Eugippius' selection criteria and audience for the *Excerpta*

Eugippius' aim with the *Excerpta* was to provide the reader with one volume (albeit massive one, Knöll's modern edition has 1100 pages) of relevant excerpts taken from Augustine's enormous oeuvre, which would be easier to procure than the different separate manuscripts. 'Certainly, if none of the great men deemed it worthy to do or to have this, at least such men for whom the fullness of such a great work is absent perhaps will enjoy these excerpts, because one will be able to procure one codex easier than many.'¹⁶¹ Eugippius self-professed stance in his collecting is one of humility and passivity: the only thing Eugippius did to the

¹⁶¹ *Quorum omnium [vicariorum illius] ego prorsus abiectior ex aliquantis eiusdem beati viri praeclaris operibus perpaucis ruminando quodam modo lambendoque decerpsi, quae praestantibus amicis integra legeram: nam omnia illius habere vel invenire quis possit?* 'Epistula ad Probam virginem' in Eugippius, *Excerpta ex operibus S. Augustini* (ed. P. Knöll, Vienna 1885), 23.

'Of whom [the very lowly herd] I –even more improper- have straightforwardly gathered from a considerable number of very famous works of the same blessed man a few things by chewing them over in some way and 'licking' them gently, which things I had read in their entirety with admirable friends: for who could have or find all works of this famous man?' [All translations of the prefatory letter to Proba are mine].

A complete translation and discussion can be found in Gomez (unpubl. 2008), 87-99.

Certe si nullus magnorum id vel facere vel habere dignetur, saltem illi quibus plenaria tanti desunt operis his fortasse delectabuntur excerptis, quia facilius unum codicem quis poterit sibi parare quam multos. 'Epistula', 3.

'Certainly, if none of the great men deemed it worthy to do or to have this, at least such men for whom the fullness of such a great work is absent perhaps will enjoy these excerpts, because one will be able to procure one codex easier than many.'

excerpts was ‘gently lick’ them into place.¹⁶² Indeed Eugippius stayed true to Augustine’s texts and only made some changes to fit the excerpts on to each other if necessary. Eugippius himself is not present in the *Excerpta*, apart from the chapter headings he gave to the excerpts. Together with the prefatory letter Eugippius wrote to Proba, these amount to the totality of Eugippius’ explicit expressions on his material. Much of what will be said in this chapter will therefore have to come from inferences from Eugippius’ selection and placement of excerpts in his florilegy. Eugippius’ priorities, programme and creativity have to come out in the structure and assembly of the excerpts, in the way that he -in modern terms- ‘copy-pasted’ Augustine’s work. For Eugippius himself is tight-lipped about his selection and placing criteria. He gives one clue in his letter to Proba, when explains his selection of the first and last few excerpts:

Therefore, because of this [broad mandate of double love], I believed it to be appropriate and fitting that in these excerpts love, through which generally all things, which are dispersed, are united in wholeness, would provide the beginning of the book, the love which is both the perfection of all the virtues and the fullness of the heavenly law; the same love, which itself has no end, also provided the end to the work...Indeed, if anyone, in transcribing this work should wish perchance to add other things to these that have been assembled [here], let him add [them] in appropriate places in order that the above-mentioned headings on the subject of love may always maintain [their position as] the end of the selections’¹⁶³

¹⁶² ‘Epistula’, 2: *Quorum omnium [vicariorum illius] ego prorsus abiectior ex aliquantis eiusdem beati viri praeclaris operibus perpaucum ruminando quodam modo lambendoque decerpsi, quae praestantibus amicis integra legeram: nam omnia illis habere vel invenire quis possit?*

‘Of whom [the very lowly herd] I -even more improper- have straightforwardly gathered from a considerable number of very famous works of the same blessed man a few things by chewing them over in some way and ‘licking’ them gently, which things I had read in their entirety through the offering of friends, for who could have or find all works of this famous man?’

On the procedure of Eugippius’ ‘licking’, Vogüé (1971), 241-54.

¹⁶³ ‘Epistula’, 3-4. *Integrum vero librum visum est excerptorum debere esse principium et ille potissimum mihi praeponendus occurrit, quem idem beatus Augustinus antistes ad sanctum Hieronymum post primum de animae quaestione noscitur scripsisse presbyterum, solvens illam ex epistula Iacobi apostoli quam in primo praenotavi capitulo quaestionem: in quo libro quattuor illas virtutes, id est prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem atque iustitiam, ad illud geminae dilectionis dei et proximi latum mandatum nimis, in quo tota lex pendet et prophetae, mirifice rettulit* Translation of the second sentence is Gomez’. *ob hoc [geminae dilectionis dei et proximi lato mandato] itaque congruum putavi atque conveniens ut his excerptis caritas, qua dispersa solent adunari integritate, libri daret exordium quae et virtutum omnium perfectio et supernae legis est plenitudo; ipsa quoque finem dedit operi, quae non habet finem...si quis sane transferens hoc opus his quae congesta sunt alia addere forte voluerit, congruis adiciat locis, ut praedicti duo de caritate tituli finem semper teneant excerptorum.* ‘Epistula’, 3.

The ‘book’ of which Eugippius is speaking in the first sentence is *ep.* 167. This letter does not deal with the soul, but with a question about the exegesis of James 2:10 (‘Whoever observes the whole law, but offends on one point, is guilty of all’), in which Augustine argues that one virtue entails all the others. The letter in which Augustine does treat the origin of the soul is 166. In 415 Orosius brought these letters together to Jerome, and in the *retr.* 2.45

For the rest he claims his *Excerpta* are a ‘disorderly heap’ (*inordinata congestio*), yet some more clues may be gained from Eugippius’ praise of Augustine. Eugippius describes how Augustine provides ‘abundant sustenance’ (*copiosa pabula*) for the christian ‘flock’ (*oves*) ‘from the meadows of scripture’ (*de pratis scripturarum*) and, presumably ‘for the ones hungry’ (*esurientibus, ieiunis*) for initiation into christianity that Eugippius speaks of as well. But Augustine also provides ‘those who are fighting with weaponry’ (*diminuantibus armatura*) against the enemies of the church and ‘particularly the bishops of the apostolic seat’ (*praecipue apostolicae sedis antistites*) ‘against especially against the shape-shifting enemies of the grace of God’ (*maxime contra versipelles inimicos gratiae dei doctrina*).¹⁶⁴

Does this mean that Eugippius selected his excerpts for both audiences of pupils and polemicists? Modern commentators hold that Eugippius was more into teaching than into gathering ammunition for debates and that he shied away from debate and controversy. Joseph Lienhard states that Eugippius’ ‘interest is in information rather than speculation; his problems are the problems of the classroom, not those of controversy.’ Eugippius only had to ‘appropriate the truth in Augustine’s writings’ so that a monastic ‘reader, by turning to the correct chapter, can solve his problem with this or that verse in scripture; the tranquility of his life will not be disturbed.’¹⁶⁵ James O’Donnell states that ‘What was valuable about Augustine was not what was distinctive about him but what he had said that formed a useful part of the common deposit of faith and interpretation... The ‘authority’ of Augustine for Eugippius is what there is in Augustine that helps the reader come to a better interpretation and fuller understanding of the scriptural text.’¹⁶⁶ Conrad Leyser hypothesizes that Eugippius’ activity as a compiler, both in the *Excerpta* and in the *Rule*, was -among other things- a strategy to build consensus and to create a moral community.¹⁶⁷ This picture fits in with Eugippius’ placement of the excerpts on *caritas* at the end and beginning and is further confirmed by both O’Donnell’s and Karla Pollmann’s observation that Augustine’s material on grace and the Pelagian issue is underrepresented.¹⁶⁸ In this chapter I will argue on the basis of his excerpts on the soul that this view is correct but not complete: on the surface Eugippius may present the tranquility of orthodox consensus, but

Augustine refers to these letters as ‘two books’ (*duo libri*). This quotation shows that Eugippius does treat the letters as one inseparable text, since it is hard to imagine that Eugippius made an error, given the importance of the question of the origin of the soul for Eugippius – as I will argue in this chapter.

¹⁶⁴ I owe ‘shape-shifting’ to Gomez.

¹⁶⁵ Lienhard (1977), 30-1.

¹⁶⁶ O’Donnell (1991), 18-9.

¹⁶⁷ As well as a strategy for political survival and autonomy. Leyser (2001), 67,73.

¹⁶⁸ Pollmann (2009), 25; O’Donnell (1991), 18-9.

below the waterline he tries to make a contribution to the predestination debate by way of the question of the origin of the soul. And this is also useful for leading minds.¹⁶⁹

2.1.2 Edition trouble

One would like to make some observations about the structure of the *Excerpta*. For the structure of the *Excerpta* seems to be compatible with the idea of Eugippius' presenting an orthodox Augustine, useful in monastic context for both instruction and reference. Eugippius' own remark notwithstanding, one must have a particularly low esteem of Eugippius as a compiler to suppose that there is no structure to the *Excerpta*.¹⁷⁰ Yet much must remain in the realm of the hypothetical. Apart from the scantiness of Eugippius' own remarks there are problems with Knöll's modern (1885) critical edition. This is due in no small measure to the function of the *Excerpta*. Pollmann sees it as a '...ganz aus Augustinus zusammengestellte Proto-Katene, die nach Eugippius eventuell auch durch spätere Redaktoren erweitert werden kann, vorausgesetzt, daß die abschließenden Abschnitte zur >caritas< ihren Ort behalten (CSEL 9/1, 4, 3-6). Eugippius macht immer wieder deutlich, daß es sich um Auszüge handelt, die dem Leser Appetit auf mehr Lektüre über seine *Excerpta* hinaus machen sollen.'¹⁷¹ And sure enough Knöll's edition of the *Excerpta* contains a number of interpolations. This is already suggested by Cassiodorus' mention that Eugippius' *Excerpta* had 338 chapters, whereas Knöll has 348.¹⁷² Conrad Leyser therefore warns that 'Eugippius' very reputation as an augustinian scholar may have left his authority vulnerable to appropriation.'¹⁷³ For Knöll's modern critical edition these problems are aggravated by Knöll's principal use of the by far oldest manuscript of the *Excerpta*, the sixth-century Italian *Vat. lat.* 3375 (V), whereas Knöll did not use nor knew what Michael Gorman has shown to be the best manuscripts, Monte Cassino 13 (C) and Munich Clm 6247 (F), both eleventh-century.¹⁷⁴ Gorman therefore concludes that Knöll's edition 'reveals neither the original structure of Eugippius' work nor the precise text of the archetype'.¹⁷⁵ For the student

¹⁶⁹ I am here foregoing a more rigorous socio-historical discussion about the intended authorship of the *Excerpta* here, excluding for example lay aristocratic readership, since the focus of the chapter is on the content of Eugippius' use of Augustine.

¹⁷⁰ Apart, that is, from the excerpts concerning *caritas* at the start and the beginning, for which placement we have Eugippius' own statement, as just given. Brunhölzl (1975), 44 has such a low opinion of Eugippius as compiler.

¹⁷¹ Pollmann (2009), 24-5.

¹⁷² Cassiodorus, *Institutiones* 61.23-62.9, Mynors (ed.) (Oxford 1937). Michael Gorman (1982a), 13-14; (1982b), 233-4.

¹⁷³ Leyser (2001), 73.

¹⁷⁴ Knöll, praefatio, I; Gorman (1982a), 22, 25-6; (1982b), 233-40.

¹⁷⁵ Gorman (1982b), 263.

of Eugippius these problems can be ever so slightly mended by comparing the structure of Knöll's edition to the structure of the edition in the *PL* (62), in which Migne reprinted the *editio princeps* by Iohannes Herold (Basle 1542). A comparison between the structures of the two editions has been made in the appendices 3.3 for the parts of the *Excerpta* which are relevant for this chapter. Some general remarks about the structure of the *Excerpta* may still be made.

2.1.3 Structure of the *Excerpta*

The *Excerpta* can be seen as consisting of two parts of roughly equal size.¹⁷⁶ The first part deals with salvation history from the 'first' Fall (not of Adam but of the Devil) and the origin of evil to the resurrection (25-174). However, Eugippius does not stick too rigorously to a chronological scheme; for instance, he chooses to treat some questions concerning the New Testament (such as minor contradictions in the gospels concerning the passion) after the resurrection (175-203). One reason for this seems to be that these questions eventually lead to a smoother transition from the first part to the second than a rigid chronological scheme would have allowed. Yet this placement of the last paragraphs aside, Eugippius gives the reader excerpts which could answer some questions and impart some doctrines (e.g. creation at one stroke, but fulfilment through *rationes* in excerpt 11) which are useful when acquainting himself with salvation history (as much as some of these events are still supposed to take place in the future) through the Bible.

Eugippius has a different priority in the second part. It is not so much concerned with history but with Christianity as theological doctrine and with its religious practices in the here and now. The questions which seem to bring a measure of coherence to the paragraphs are 'How do I become Christian?', 'Who are the relevant authorities to learn Christianity from and what is baptism?', 'What is the Trinity?', 'How do I read the Bible?' and 'How do I behave as Christian and relate to Christian practices?' The whole of these two parts are introduced and concluded by texts on love and the virtues. This conceptual frame indicates that these are the core values of Christianity and the way to the good Christian life. Taken together, the parts give a well-rounded introduction to Christianity -leaning heavily on Biblical sources- which in principle is useful for both converts (recent or future) and teachers or as a reference work for anyone interested.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. table 1 in the appendices; Cf. Lienhard (1977), 29-30, Hofmann (1998), 300-1.

2.1.4 Eugippius' Augustine

How do we meet Augustine through Eugippius' *Excerpta*? The research presented in this chapter is not sufficient for a well-balanced answer, but a sketch must be made here. I will start with Eugippius' use of his sources. A survey of Eugippius' sources is made easy due to Knöll's *index excerptorum*. Eugippius uses a wide variety of works of Augustine with an emphasis on works on exegesis and hermeneutics (*Gn. litt.*, *Qu.*, *Qu. eu.*, *doctr. chr.*), on theological speculation (*Trin.*, *div. qu.*, *bapt.*), the 'larger' works *Conf.* and *Civ.*, and the polemical *c. Faust.* Notable omissions are works which do not make much use of Scripture, such as the *mag.* and the early dialogues. The *ord.* is an exception to this pattern, which Eugippius uses because of Augustine's views on the proper sciences and curriculum.¹⁷⁷ In his selection of Augustine, Eugippius sometimes gives a large extract from one text but deletes sentences or paragraphs he deems irrelevant. The separate and 'cleaned up' stretches of text that remain make up the excerpts. This happens for example with paragraphs 80-101 where he uses excerpts taken from the *Qu.* to treat questions concerning the Old Testament. In other instances Eugippius compiled a sort of dossier with many relevant excerpts on the same topic coming from a range of different works. This happens notably with the two heresies that Eugippius gives attention to, the Origenist heresy and the Pelagian heresy, in excerpts 30-37 and 305-323 respectively, even if the anti-Pelagian materials are under-represented.¹⁷⁸ When treating the individual excerpts on the soul later in this chapter, it will thus be a relevant question to ask whether Eugippius inserts the excerpt on the soul without its context, or whether it fits in a range of excerpts taken from the same work in which the excerpt on the soul follows naturally.

A next question is what, according to Eugippius, Augustine's most important message is. As indicated the *Excerpta* are 'enveloped' with the double commandment of love and the virtues. Love is not only an emotion or motivation, but *caritas* is measured in virtuous action, and the four virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice (which would later become the 'cardinal virtues') flow forth from the mandate for the 'double love' for God and 'thy neighbour' (Math. 22:37-40). Eugippius' main concern thus seems to go out to the human being in his moral capacity, the rightful actions he can perform and –in contrast with this– the pitfalls and temptations drawing him toward sin. The way for the human being to overcome sin, through the mediation of Christ, constitutes an essential part of the analysis of the 'moral human being' for Eugippius. To say that love and the virtues, as forming the beginning and the end of

¹⁷⁷ Excerpt 23 uses *Ord.* 2.7, 2.24-9.

¹⁷⁸ Cf. Knöll's table (1124-49) for the sources. Pollmann (2009), 25.

the *Excerpta*, are therefore ‘alpha and omega’, is more than just a metaphor. For the love for God and one’s neighbour and the virtues lead to a very specific good life, namely the Christian good life as perceived by Augustine. This is a life which is concerned with the immutable, the eternal, and the divine. In other words, this is a life focused on the immortal God who stands outside of time. *Caritas* and the virtues thus make the reader focus on the timelessness of God, on the cause of the universe, its beginning and its end. After the long introduction on *caritas* and the virtues (some 100 pages of the edition on a total of 1100), as a next step Eugippius selects some excerpts concerning the creation of the universe. Thus from the focus on the timeless God and truth, Eugippius goes on to ‘create’ the world from paragraph 25 onwards. Similarly, after treating the temporary life of the Christian, the focus slides again towards the enduring *caritas* and the eternity of the life to come. The concern for love and the virtues can also be detected in the two heresies that Eugippius is prepared to spend time on. He focuses not so much on the nature of Christ or the Trinity (at least not in a polemical context), but on the Origenist heresy concerning the origin of evil and on the Pelagian heresy concerning the relative weight that good deeds and grace have for one’s salvation. Both heresies have something to do with the human being as moral agent. These heresies therefore bear a relationship to *caritas*, and the virtues as guides for the proper focus of one’s life and principle of choice constitute the goals for the human being as moral agent. *Caritas* and the virtues therefore serve as a principle of choice and structure for Eugippius in so far as he is concerned with the human being as a moral agent. Instead of having the eternal God as the beginning and end of his work as Augustine would be prone to do, Eugippius thus chooses the actions which lead to this eternal God to encompass his *Excerpta*.

This focus on the moral side of the human being can also be detected in the larger structure of the *Excerpta*. In the first half of the *Excerpta* Eugippius is concerned with salvation history. Salvation history is heavily involved with the moral side of the relationship between God and the human being: from his status of untainted created being, towards the Fall from Paradise, the redemption by the actions (dying on the cross) of God in human form of the Christ, culminating in the resurrection for all and the entering into heaven for those human beings who followed the proper moral standards. In the second half, guidelines are given to the proper behaviour of the Christian in the present. *Caritas* and the virtues are the highest expressions, the goals that Eugippius sees for the human being as Christian moral agent. He seems to have taken the advice from *doctr. christ.* I.36.40 to heart: ‘Whoever, then, thinks that he understands the Holy Scriptures, or any part of them, but puts such an interpretation upon them as does not tend to

build up this twofold love of God and our neighbour, does not yet understand them as he ought.¹⁷⁹

Yet Augustine had a wide range of interests, and treated topics which are not included by Eugippius. Epistemology or philosophy of language, as we encounter it in the *mag.*, are utterly absent from the selection made in the *Excerpta*. The Augustine we meet through Eugippius' choice of excerpts is a biblical commentator and predominantly concerned with the moral outlook of the human being. It is to a much smaller degree that Eugippius also includes dogmatic topics like reflections the Trinity and rituals like baptism, aspects not relevant for my argument. In the rest of this chapter the focus will be on the excerpts which treat the soul. What Eugippius selected from Augustine's varied works and where they fit into the structure of the *Excerpta* should clarify Eugippius' aims with these excerpts.

2.2 The origin of the soul

Given that Eugippius does not write a *De anima*, but tries to give an overview of (Augustine's) Christianity via eschatological history and 'timeless' contemporary Christianity, it is not surprising that the relevant excerpts are spread out over the work, with only one explicit excerpt dealing with '*De animae quaestione*' (372). The other excerpts are grouped around the creation and the Fall of Adam and sections concerning the Trinity. Moreover, when looking at the excerpts concerning the soul, it becomes apparent that Eugippius had a rather limited interest in the human soul. Eugippius did not so much want to convey to his audience what kind of entity the human soul is, or what its activities and functions are, or how it constitutes some kind of individuation of the single person. The framework of the *Excerpta*, that the human being stands in need of God for a good (after)life through a reciprocal love, guided him in the message that the soul serves as the anchor for the moral status of a person. It is the soul which loves the right or the wrong things, and it is what changes in the moral realm. For people who strive to improve themselves through a rigorous regime in day-by-day life, such as the monks who constituted at least part of the *Excerpta*'s audience, this is an important message. In this context the relevant question for Eugippius was how evil encroached on the human soul through Adam's original sin and what its consequences were.

¹⁷⁹ *Quisquis igitur scripturas divinas uel quamlibet earum partem intellexisse sibi videtur ita ut eo intellectu non aedificet istam geminam caritatem dei et proximi, nondum intellexit.* Transl. O'Donnell.

This is expressed in the overriding interest that Eugippius displays in the origin of the human soul. This question, although it may appear to be an ontological technicality, is important for the question how original sin affects new and existing souls alike. This in turn ties in with questions about the fallen state of the human soul and what is needed to redeem it. The wider relevance of the question of the soul's origin may therefore be sought in contemporary debates about the nature of the agency of the human being in faith and good works between those who propagated an extreme predestinationism on the basis of Augustine and the 'Provençal Masters', such as Vincent of Lérins, Cassian and Faustus of Riez who reacted against it.¹⁸⁰ However, given that the *Excerpta* were probably written before Eugippius took up the abbacy of the monastery at Castellum Lucullanum in 511, the upheaval caused by the Scythian monks and Fulgentius of Ruspe's subsequent polemic against the then already deceased Faustus of Riez cannot have formed the direct cause for Eugippius' selection of excerpts concerning original sin and the origin of the soul.

2.2.1 Excerpt 372

The problem of the origin of the soul is treated in excerpt 372, titled '*De animae quaestione*'. That the problem of the origin of the soul is identified as the only question gives a glimpse of the weight of the question, and this is further underlined by Eugippius' very careful composition of this excerpt, as it is constructed out of several different texts taken from Augustine. This is unusual for Eugippius, who has the majority of his excerpts consist of one or a few subsequent paragraphs of the same text. The beginning is made up by the last paragraph (19) of *ep.* 205 (written in 419 or 420) to the catholic layman Consentius on the resurrection of the flesh. This paragraph is on the creation of the soul from the *flatus dei*, affirming that the soul is a created being and not divine. Even though Eugippius reproduced this letter (minus the first paragraph which is directed to Consentius in a more personal way) in the course of the previous excerpts (369-71), he chose with good reason to use this last paragraph as the start to his '*De animae quaestione*'. It defines God as the ultimate origin for the created being of the soul, and with

¹⁸⁰ These predestination debates were formerly known under the heading 'semi-pelagianism', but Augustine Casiday has very forcefully deconstructed Prosper of Aquitaine's framing of anyone who did not agree with his interpretation of Augustine (most notably Cassian) as opposed to Augustine (2007), e.g. 41-46. Further on these fifth and sixth century debates on predestination from a socio-political perspective Mathisen (1989), esp. 244-72.

its absolute certainty forms a good counterpoint to the following tentative discussion of the origin of the soul.

For directly after this certain statement about God as the origin of the soul, Eugippius follows up with Augustine's sentence from the *retr.* 1.1.3 (427), in which Augustine –speaking about the *Acad.*– mentions that he did not know and does not know when writing the *retr.* what pertains to the origin of the soul: whether Adam's soul was created earlier than the others and how the embodiment of the soul works out technically.¹⁸¹ The bulk of the excerpt, following this quote from the *retr.*, is made up by parts from *ep.* 190 (418) and 202a (420), the two letters that Augustine wrote to Optatus, bishop of Milevis, concerning the origin of the soul.¹⁸² In these letters Augustine defends his agnosticism on the origin of the soul against Optatus' firm creationist position. The polemic in these two letters of Augustine is not so much about all the options of the origin of the soul (which as I have stated on p. 30 is more aptly described as the question of the embodiment of the soul), but mainly revolves around traducianism (propagationism) and creationism.¹⁸³ Along with his agnosticism, Augustine defends against Optatus the necessity that both these positions have to be compatible with the universal nature of original sin. Augustine seems inclined towards traducianism, since he sees a possibility of defending the universal effect of original sin with it.¹⁸⁴ But given that the authority of Scripture does not give clear guidance he is not choosing one side over the other; someone else may find a way of defending at the same time creationism and the universality of original sin even if Augustine himself cannot.¹⁸⁵ In his letters he therefore has to give the unequivocal Scriptural defence of original sin while showing the pros and cons of each solution to the question of the

¹⁸¹ *Nam quod attinet ad eius originem, qua fit, ut sit in corpore, utrum de illo uno sit qui primum creatus est, quando factus est homo in animam vivam, an similiter fiant singulis singulae, nec tunc sciebam nec adhuc scio.*

This piece from the *retr.* is overlooked by Knöll in his edition, who does not mention the *retr.* as a source for the *Excerpta* at all.

¹⁸² I am following the dating by Roland Teske in his notes to his translation of the letters in four volumes. All these letters are in volume 3: Augustine, *Letters* 156-210 (ed. Boniface Ramsey, trans. Roland Teske), (New York 2004), in the series 'The Works of Saint Augustine. A Translation for the 21st Century'. Eugippius' mixing of the letters makes it clear that he is not so much interested in the chronology of the letters or a development of Augustine's thought, but is looking for the timeless message of Augustine.

¹⁸³ The problem of a possible prior spiritual material from which the soul is created is only brought in as a further complication of creationism. E.g. *ep.* 202a.4.8.

¹⁸⁴ E.g. *ep.* 202a.2.6.

¹⁸⁵ E.g. *ep.* 190.4.13-14; 190.5.16-19.

origin.¹⁸⁶ For where the difficulty with creationism is the compatibility with universal original sin, with traducianism it is hard to imagine one soul engendering another.¹⁸⁷ But it is clear for Augustine that Optatus' argument for creationism does not hold: the fact that God shapes each soul does not determine creationism to be true, since God also shapes each body and it is clear that bodies are propagated.¹⁸⁸

When reviewing what Eugippius actually selected from these letters (190.5.16-19; 6.23; 6.25; 202a.2.6; 202a.7.15-8.18) there are several observations to make. Eugippius not only removes the personal or historical paragraphs, but also the explanatory material. From *ep.* 190 these last are the long paragraphs on the certainty of original sin and God's justice in electing the persons he will save and from 202a the paragraphs which are meant to assure Optatus that there is no contradiction between traducianism and the fact that God shapes each soul. What remains is a most forceful picture of Augustine's uncertainty and almost vulnerability on this matter. The passage 190.5.16-9 consists of Augustine's exegesis of the relevant Scriptural passages, in order to deconstruct them as arguments for one side or the other. 202a.2.6 again affirms Augustine's uncertainty, where 7.15-8.18 exacerbates the problem since Augustine here asks whether it is for the human being to have knowledge of the origin of his soul in the first place. Eugippius further added paragraphs stating that infant baptism is an effective sacrament (190.6.23) whichever position one holds, and that the soul of Christ was unaffected by original sin (190.6.25). In effect

¹⁸⁶ E.g. *ep.* 190.2.5; Optatus, as a young bishop had difficulties establishing his authority in his diocese against a group of older priests. They held on to traducianism since they believed that the soul as material being is propagated together with the body from the parents. Optatus argued against them for creationism and sent several letters to people in Caesarea, of whom the monk Renatus and Optatus' relative Muressi came to Augustine, who at the time was in Caesarea on business for the pope Zosimus, to question him on the origin of the soul. From *ep.* 202a one can ascertain that Optatus responded to letter 190, stringently asking Augustine for Jerome's reply to Augustine's *ep.* 166, in which Augustine asked Jerome for his arguments for creationism. But Augustine would never receive Jerome's reply and was unwilling to find himself in another controversy with Jerome by publishing *ep.* 166 without it. Augustine could not therefore help him with further arguments for creationism in *ep.* 202a. But in the meantime, in 418, Vincentius Victor, who was part of the circle around Optatus (and who A. de Veer hypothesizes to have been on the lay court that Optatus asked to settle the issue over the origin of the soul, 287 n. 17) found *ep.* 190 with a certain priest Petrus and decided to write two books against Augustine (which are lost except for some quotes in the last two books of the *an. et or.*) to defend Optatus. This prompted Augustine to write the *an. et or.* in 419 to refute Vincent Victor and ask him to recant, which Vincent indeed did. On the further historical circumstances of the composition of *ep.* 190 and 202a and their connections with *ep.* 166 and the *an. et or.* cf. the introduction to the *an. et or.* in the BA 22 (*La crise Pélagienne II*), 275-90 and the notes complémentaires 27-28, 756-64 by A. de Veer.

¹⁸⁷ *ep.* 190.4.15.

¹⁸⁸ *ep.* 202a.5.12.

Eugippius has almost removed Augustine's theological arguments for his agnosticism in favour of his exegetical reasoning and affirmation that this knowledge may come to close to the mystery of how the creation was technically realized. Eugippius was thus not so much interested in the theological side of the problem, or what it has to reveal about the soul as a being, but more in the mystery about the soul which even Augustine was unable to overcome.

For the uninitiated reader this must therefore be a strange paragraph to read. If one turns to this excerpt as the most general excerpt on the soul and expects to find some kind of overview of the positions on the soul that Augustine held, this excerpt would prove a disillusion. It is not that the title is a misnomer, but the presentation of the issue is less than clear: Eugippius makes the reader find out that the main problem is the origin of the soul, only to leave it in the dark, omitting obvious passages on the origin of the soul from the *Gn. litt.* which treat the problem a bit more analytically (to which I will come later). It therefore rather seems as if Eugippius is trying to quell a debate rather than to give intellectual support to the inquisitive mind.

It is then revealing to take a further look in order to see whether this interest in the origin of the soul is also present in the other excerpts on the soul, and if so, how it is treated there.

2.2.2 Original sin and the *rationes*; excerpt 40

Other excerpts which convey Eugippius' overriding interest in the origin of the soul, excerpts 31, 40, 53, 82, 103, are all part of Eugippius' selection concerning salvation history.¹⁸⁹ The focus in the rest of this chapter will be on excerpts 40 and 53. Excerpt 82 defies treatment here as it is very short and aporic and even extended analysis would remain in the realm of hypothesis. In 31 and 103 Eugippius has Augustine confirm his agnosticism on the problem. But, even though Eugippius will not undermine Augustine's agnosticism, the analysis will become considerably more complicated when reading 40 and 53. In salvation history, there are two human beings who always have a status apart from the rest of humanity, viz. the first human being and the human being who was also God. Even though these two humans are vastly different from each other on account of Jesus also being Creator and Adam only creature, theirs are the only souls, together with Eve's soul, which have known a state without original sin. These

¹⁸⁹ cf. table 3 in the appendices for a complication with excerpt 40, which in my opinion is not grave.

two excerpts deal with these two extraordinary human beings. Excerpt 40 revolves around the question how Jesus' soul can be exempted from original sin, as seen from the technical background of the origin of the soul. Excerpt 53 revolves around the creation of Adam. These two excerpts take the *Gn. litt.* as their source and in them the *rationes*, God's instruments of causality to bring about and influence his Creation, play an important role. According to excerpt 53, Adam, as first human being was created through a *ratio*, but according to excerpt 40 Christ has a special *ratio*, so that he is not affected by original sin. The combination of these two excerpts, together with their respective placing in the history of salvation of the *Excerpta*, seems to suggest that Eugippius has found another vehicle for the transmission of original sin, the *ratio seminalis* of the human body. As a consequence the problem of the origin of the soul would be freed from the burden of the transmission of original sin. This idea would therefore 'neutralise' the problem of the soul's origin. It is clear that Augustine himself would not see the problem of the origin of the soul relieved this way. Augustine's explanation of Christ's exemption from original sin by way of a different *ratio* is clearly a hypothesis. And letters 190 and 202a, from which excerpt 372 takes its bulk, were written later than the publication year of the *Gn. litt.* (416), and also in the *Gn. litt.* itself Augustine elaborated greatly on the problem in book 7. None the less, Eugippius chose to incorporate these texts on the *rationes* and leave out other relevant texts.¹⁹⁰ Eugippius through this bias seems to want to pin Augustine down on this solution.

Let's explore the just sketched line in more detail. Excerpt 40 is taken from book 10 of the *Gn. litt.* which deals with the origin of the human souls after Adam. In the excerpt, *Gn. litt.* 10.20.35-21.37, the question is how *Hebrews* 7:4-10 bears on the origin of the soul of Christ (especially 7:9-10: 'And, as it is right to say, because of Abraham Levi too, the receiver of a tithe, was tithed; for he was still in the loins of Abraham'¹⁹¹). It revolves around the tithes which the priests are due from the Jewish people. In order to distinguish the priesthood of Christ from the Levitical priesthood, Augustine took the position that Christ was not tithed as Levi was, with the implication that Christ did not suffer the consequences of original as other humans such as Levi do. The question then becomes how Christ was – or more importantly was *not* – present in Abrahams loins. Since it is clear that Christ, by way of Mary, was as present in Abraham just as Levi according to his physical substance, Christ's soul must not have been present in this

¹⁹⁰ as explained in paragraph 2.2.5.

¹⁹¹ As taken from the *Gn. litt.* 10.19.34: *Et, sicut oportet dicere, propter Abraham et Levi accipiens decimam decimatus est; adhuc enim in lumbis patris sui fuit.* All translations from the *Gn. litt.* are from Edmund Hill.

bloodline.¹⁹² Two things are important here: (1) which consequences Augustine drew from ‘the case of Christ’ for the origin of the soul and (2) how Augustine speaks about Christ’s exception from the universality of original sin and the transmission of the human bodily nature.

As may be expected Augustine refrained from drawing any clear inferences for the origin of the soul. For one may explain this text in several ways which lead to the opposing positions of traducianism and creationism. One may come to a reading of the text in which Christ is not affected since his special soul is not part of the normal human ‘chain’ of souls, so that his soul was not subject to tithing. Then the consequence is that Levi’s soul was in the loins of Adam – the key difference being that Christ’s soul as special soul was not –, so that one comes to a traducianist position. On the other hand, one may say that the difference between Christ and Levi was not in the presence of their souls in Abraham (Levi’s was and Christ’s was not), but in the way the seed of their bodies were present; Levi’s in the normal way through sexual intercourse, Christ in a different way. With this explanation the text is still compatible with creationism, since Christ’s special soul can no longer be taken as the exemption to the rule of traducianism. And so Augustine is not inclined to choose sides (1).¹⁹³ It is clear that these two readings are hypotheses, but it becomes interesting when we take a closer look at his explanation for creationism (Christ was conceived differently).

Augustine explains the difference between Levi and Christ with the *rationes seminales*, the ‘seminal reasons’, or as in 10.20.35 with the *invisibilis ratio* (‘invisible formula’ – after Edmund Hill’s translation).¹⁹⁴ Augustine uses the *rationes* to solve the tension which exists between God’s continued interference in his temporal creation, and the idea that God himself stands outside of time and created everything to completion in one instant.¹⁹⁵ The *rationes* are the causal conditions

¹⁹² *Gn. litt.* 10.19.34.

¹⁹³ *Gn. litt.* 10.20.35-21.37.

¹⁹⁴ *Gn. litt.* 10.20.35 *cum enim sit in semine et visibilis corpulentia et invisibilis ratio, utrumque cucurrit ex Abraham vel etiam ex ipso Adam usque ad corpus Mariae, quia et ipsum eo modo conceptum et exortum est. Christus autem visibilem carnis substantiam de carne virginis sumsit; ratio vero conceptionis eius non a semine virili, sed longe aliter ac desuper venit. Proinde secundum hoc, quod de matre accepit, etiam in lumbis Abrahae fuit.*

‘Since, you see, there is in the seed both visible bodiliness and an invisible formula, each of these ran from Abraham, or even from Adam himself, as far as the body of Mary, because this too was conceived and born in that way. Christ, however, indeed took the substance of his flesh from the flesh of the Virgin; but the formula for his conception did not come from male seed, but in a very different way from above. Accordingly, following this line of argument, what he received from his mother was also in the loins of Abraham.’

¹⁹⁵ This is a theme which is recurrent throughout the whole of the *Gn. litt.*, e.g. 1.9.17; 1.18.36; 4.33.51-34.54; 5.12.28; 6.10.17-11.18. cf. de Veer’s ‘notes complémentaires’ of the *BA* 48, 653-668. The notes draw attention (662-

which God planted in his temporal creation which bring everything to fruition in their own time. In order to gain at least an initial understanding in the notion, there are two things to be kept in mind. The first is that Augustine is rendering the Stoic idea of *logos* with his term *ratio*, with which the Stoics indicated the principle, cause and reason of a being. In their ideas about causation, some Stoics made a difference between the divine generative cause of things on a cosmic scale (*pneuma, logos spermatikos*) and a ‘swarm of causes’, the conditions which give rise to certain situations inside the cosmos (with which difference some Stoics wanted to explain fate).¹⁹⁶ The second is that Plotinus took the term *logos spermatikos* to refer to the creative power of the Ideas in the Intellect. With this information the more analytical explanation of the *rationes* of *Gn. litt.* 6.10.17 (a passage which is used by Eugippius in excerpt 53, which will be discussed shortly) can be understood. In this passage Augustine says that things pre-exist in their causes on four levels¹⁹⁷: in the Word of God as an eternal presence (I), in the primordial causes (*primordialis causa*) with which God instated his creation (‘the framework’) (II), in the proximate causes which lead to an individual being in time (a single being within the time-bound operating of ‘the framework’) (III), and finally ‘in the seed’ with which he wants to say that some (living) being can pre-exist in the (re)productive power of a previous created (living) being in time, so that this previously created being in time can be compared – albeit on a smaller scale – with a primordial

3) to the fact that Augustine gave several accounts of the *rationes*, notably in 5.12.28 and 6.10.17, the passage treated in the main text. The account in book 6 mentions the *rationes seminales* but the account in book 5 does not. De Veer explains this with Augustine’s interest in the human being in book 6 of the *Gn. litt.*, and concludes that Augustine there is not only interested in how the *rationes* cause the physical or chemical transformations of the universe, but rather in biological phenomena. Eugippius’ choice to use book 6 instead of book 5 in excerpt 53 is very understandable since his main focus is on the human being, for which the *rationes seminales* are important. De Veer in his description focuses on the Plotinian heritage of the *rationes*, but leaves the Stoics out completely. Cf. also note 13, 247 of Edmund Hills’ translation: Saint Augustine *On Genesis*, New York 2002). The idea of the *rationes* is also tied up with the bible text of Wis 11:20 ‘You have arranged all things in measure and number and weight’. The *mensura, numerus* and *pondus* stand for the plan according to which God made his creation, cf. *Gn. litt.* 4.3.7-5.12, esp. 4.5.12.

¹⁹⁶ Frede (2003), 187. She points to Cicero’s *De fato* 41 (ed. Remo Giomini, Leipzig 1975): “*causarum enim*” inquit [Chrysippus] “*aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae. quam ob rem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri causis antecedentibus, non hoc intellegi volumus: causis perfectis et principalibus, sed: causis adiuvantibus [antecedentibus] et proximis*” ‘Among the causes some are complete and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. For this reason when we say that everything happens by fate through antecedent causes, we do not want this to be understood as if it were through complete and principal causes, but through auxiliary and proximate ones (transl. Frede).

¹⁹⁷ A turn of phrase I have taken from Hill’s chapter heading, *On Genesis*, 310.

cause (IV).¹⁹⁸ The great divide in these levels of causality lies between the first two and the last two, the first two being atemporal and the last two temporal. Augustine seems to have taken the Stoic notions of causality to explain the workings of our day to day cosmos, over and above which he instated the Plotinian notion of the *logos spermatikos*. For in Augustine's classification of causes the Plotinian *logos spermatikos* can be interpreted as the Ideas in God's head, which is cause I. With these Ideas God created his cosmos (reminding one of the *mensura, numerus* and *pondus* from Wis 11:20), so that the functionality of the Ideas in God's head in the process of creating can be taken as cause II. The Plotinian *logos spermatikos* therefore seems to be accountable for the first two levels of causality. The Stoic 'swarm' of causes are the proximate causes, thus cause III. The *pneuma* together with the further seeds they produce can be taken as cause IV.¹⁹⁹ When Augustine wants to speak about the temporal creation of Adam, of Christ (as human being) or of any other human being, he will point to the latter two temporal levels of causality, since these are internal to the Creation, just as these creatures are internal to Creation. It is in this way that both Levi and Christ can be said to be in the loins of Abraham, since the 'seminal reason' or 'invisible formula' was present in Abraham as waypoint along the causal chain leading up to them.

Yet, when we compare the birth of normal human beings with the special human beings Adam and Jesus (and Eve?), these third and fourth levels of causality are not in the same way effective. The difference between the third and the fourth levels of causality is that the third level

¹⁹⁸ *Gn. litt.* 6.10.17 'sed haec aliter in verbo dei, ubi ista non facta, sed aeterna sunt, aliter in elementis mundi, ubi omnia simul facta futura sunt, aliter in rebus, quae secundum causas simul creatas non iam simul, sed suo quaeque tempore creantur: in quibus Adam iam formatus ex limo et dei flatu animatus, sicut fenum exortum, aliter in seminibus, in quibus rursus quasi primordiales causae repetuntur de rebus ductae, quae secundum causas, quas primum condidit, extiterunt, uelut herba ex terra, semen ex herba.'

(I) 'But all this is very different in the Word of God, where these things were not made but are eternal; (II) different in the constituent elements of the universe, where all things to come were made simultaneously; (III) different again in things that are being created, not now simultaneously but each in his own time, in accordance with its simultaneously created causes, like Adam already formed out of mud and 'ensouled' by the breath of God, like the hay that sprang up; (IV) different in seeds, in which it is as if the primordial causes are being repeated again, derived from things which came into being in accordance with the cause which he first established, like grass from the earth, seed from grass.

As can be seen from the quotation Augustine does not use a technical term for 'proximate cause'. However, it is clear that he has something in mind which can be described by the term, and the term itself was around, cf. Cicero *De fato* 41, n. 196. For the first level of causality, the creation of the things 'in the Word of God' Augustine likes to use Wis 11:20, cf. note 196.

¹⁹⁹ Even though for the Stoic the *pneuma* may be the highest imaginable divine cosmic cause, for someone who claims that God is not inherent in the cosmos but is an external creator this cause on a cosmic scale is superseded by the cause of an 'extracosmic' scale.

lacks the fourth level's (re)productive animated power, which is involved in normal human reproduction. Augustine will therefore never refer in the *Gn. litt.* to the creation of Christ as a human being (or Adam for that matter) with the term *ratio seminalis*, since the whole point of the passage at hand is that Levi was born via the natural human way, the sexual intercourse of which spreads the stain of concupiscence, while Christ was not born through a human *ratio seminalis*, but had a divine supernatural *ratio* (supernatural at least from a human perspective).²⁰⁰ There is thus a strong connection implied between the normal bodily procreation of the human being via *rationes seminales* and original sin, since through Adam's Fall it involves concupiscence. Thus this is the way in which Augustine speaks about it:

‘The very flesh indeed, not just of Abraham but of that first and earth-made man, had in it simultaneously the wound caused by the transgression and the medicine to heal the wound; the wound from the *transgression* in the law of the members fighting back against the law of the mind, *which through all the flesh propagated from there is, so to say, encoded in the seminal formula*; and the *medicine* for the wound in what, without any lustful activity, was taken from there of the Virgin in its bodily material alone *by means of a divine formula for its conception and formation* – this for the sake of sharing in death without iniquity, and providing an instance of resurrection without falsity.’²⁰¹ [my italics]

Augustine thus explains the absence of original sin for Christ by stating that there is a different *ratio* for his human body. Augustine thus separates in this passage the transmission of original sin from the problem of the origin of the soul by tying this transmission in with the seminal reasons of the body. It is in this way that the creationist could answer the traducianist.

²⁰⁰ Cf. de Veer 662: ‘Il faut bien noter pourtant que lui-même n’emploie l’expression *ratio seminalis* que deux fois, et chaque fois apropos d’un être vivant susceptible de se reproduire par un *semen* (IX, xvii, 32; X, xx, 35)’. Even though Christ and Adam themselves may have been ‘susceptible of reproduction through a semen’, their own genesis was none the less supernatural.

²⁰¹ *Gn. litt.* 10.20.35 *eadem namque caro non Abrahae tantum, sed ipsius primi terrenique hominis simul habebat et vulnus praeveraricationis et medicamentum vulneris: vulnus praeveraricationis in lege membrorum repugnante legi mentis, quae per omnem inde propagatam carnem seminali ratione quasi transcribitur; medicamentum autem vulneris in eo, quod inde sine operae concupiscentiali in sola materie corporali per divinam conceptionis formationisque rationem de virgine adsumtum est propter mortis sine iniquitate consortium et sine falsitate resurrectionis exemplum.*

2.2.3 Chapter headings for excerpt 40

In the previous paragraph it was stressed that the explanation concerning Christ's different *ratio* was a hypothesis. Yet the argument at present hinges on the idea that Eugippius took this hypothesis as the solution to the question. How can we know Eugippius' thoughts on that piece of the *Gn. litt.*? The capitulum is not very helpful in the case of this excerpt (40): '*On the titthing of Levi in the loins of Abraham*'. The title is useful for a reader with a strong knowledge of Scripture, but does not hint at the fundamental problems, nor does it show Eugippius' mind. Fortunately, with the excerpts taken from *Gn. litt.* we have other capitula as well, namely the chapter titles which are present in the medieval manuscript tradition and which Michael Gorman has shown to be inserted by Eugippius himself.²⁰² These chapter titles need to be 'read' not only for their meaning, but also for the way in which Eugippius divides the text into chapters, seeing how his chapters do not agree with the Maurists'.²⁰³ Eugippius thus at times perceives a different coherence than a modern reader is lead to see through the Maurists' eyes. The capitula for the *Gn. litt.* from which Eugippius took his excerpt 40 are XXIX-XXXV (this takes a little more of the *Gn. litt.* into account -from 10.18.33 onwards- but these chapters form a coherent part of text in which the origin of the soul of Christ is discussed, eventually leading up to the quotation from Hebrews 7:4-10).²⁰⁴ The chapter titles relevant for the argument are XXXI and XXXIV²⁰⁵:

XXXI *Argumentum pro secunda opinione.*
Argument for the second opinion.

²⁰² Gorman (1980), 88-104; esp. 100-4. The edition by Zycha of the *Gn. litt.* (CSEL 28) has these chapter titles 436-56. Solignac reproduces them in BA 49 461-93 with some remarks 461-3. Both the CSEL and the BA edition therefore lacks the chapter titles of book 1 (due to a lacuna in the ms. on which Zycha based his text edition), but Gorman provides them 89-90. The corrections he gives on 97 concerning book 10 are meant to put the chapter headings in a different place in the text.

²⁰³ Solignac inserts the location of these chapter titles in the Latin text with small Roman numerals. On the basis of further manuscript research, Gorman emends some of the starting points of the chapters 95-7. Relevant for this excerpt is that Gorman changes the beginnings of chapters XXX, XXXI and XXXIII, 97. According to Gorman XXX starts at '*aut quod fidenter dicendum est*' (10.18.33) and not at '*et fortasse ideo ait*'; XXXI at '*at si propterea decimatus est Levi*' (10.19.34) and not at '*hic existent illi, qui traducem animarum defendunt*' (10.20.35); XXXIII at '*quapropter nec Levi nec Christus in lumbis Abrahae secundum animam*' (10.20.35) and not at '*Ille est ergo decimatus in Abraham*' (10.20.36).

²⁰⁴ BA 49, 483-4.

²⁰⁵ Zycha (CSEL 28) 449 = BA 49 483-4.

XXXIII *Argumentum pro prima opinione.*

Argument for the first opinion.

XXXIV *Quod anima Christi non sit ex traduce Adae adversum opinionem secundam.*

That the soul of Christ does not come from Adam as propagator, against the second opinion.

In these capitula, the ‘second opinion’ is the traducianist hypothesis, the ‘first opinion’ is the creationist hypothesis. A preliminary observation is that with chapter XXXI Eugippius sees a coherent unity between a) Augustine’s argument in 10.19.34 that Christ was present only with his flesh in Adam, but not with his soul and b) the traducianist position which he derives from this argument in the beginning of 10.20.35. Yet, this unity is not necessary, since a creationist starts out from the same premise, but follows up with another line of argument (Christ is present in the flesh, but not with his soul since all souls – Levi’s too – are created separately for each individual). The modern editors thus have this chapter start in 10.20.35.

For the present argument – that Eugippius wants to press Augustine with the solution of propagation of the consequences of the Fall through a connection with the *rationes* – the following two observations are important. The first is that Eugippius misrepresents traducianism in his title for chapter XXXIV. Augustine clearly states at the end of 10.20.36 that even traducianists would agree that in the special case of Christ’s unaffected soul there is no propagation from Adam.²⁰⁶ Christ cannot be constructed as a counterexample to traduciansim since he was not conceived sexually so that his soul could not propagate. Yet this is exactly what Eugippius implies with his chapter title. This confirms Solignac’s observation that the titles sometimes incorrectly reflect the argument.²⁰⁷ More importantly, the effect of this misrepresentation is that it tips the reader’s disposition in favour of the creationist explanation

²⁰⁶ *quapropter quod anima Christi non sit ex traduce animae illius primae praevaricatricis, puto, quod etiam ipsi, qui animarum traducem defendunt, consentient - per semen quippe concubentis patris transfundi etiam semen animae volunt, a quo genere conceptionis Christus alienus est - et quod in Abraham, si secundum animam fuisset, etiam ipse decimatus esset; non esse autem decimatum scriptura testatur, quae hinc quoque sacerdotium eius a levitico sacerdotio distinguit.*

‘Accordingly, that the soul of Christ does not come by transmission from that soul which was the first to transgress is something, I think, that even those who support the transmission of souls will agree, because their idea is that the seed of the soul is also transfused with the father’s seed in the sexual act, a kind of conception quite foreign to Christ. Again they will agree that if he had been in Abraham as regards the soul, he too would have been tithed; but scripture testifies to his not having been tithed, distinguishing his priesthood from the Levitical priesthood as it does by this very fact.’

²⁰⁷ Solignac, *BA* 49, 463, cf. Gorman, (1980), 98.

(‘first opinion’) of the transmission of original sin involving the *rationes seminales* of the body. Eugippius thus seems to have regarded the transmission of original sin through the *rationes seminales* of the body as the correct explanation. The preliminary observation strengthens this notion. For Eugippius treats Augustine’s explanation of propagation of original sin through the seminal reasons of the body in chapter XXXIII as one coherent passage. (in the Maurists division it would be the last part of 10.20.35 and the first of 36).

2.2.4 Excerpt 53

As mentioned earlier, for a correct understanding of salvation history not only the origin of Christ’s soul is important but also the creation of Adam. Augustine treats the creation of Adam in book 6 of, again, the *Gn. litt.* and it is from this book, 6.18.29 -together with the last sentence of 6.9.16, conforming to the start of his chapter X of the *Gn. litt.*- that Eugippius takes his excerpt concerning Adam, ‘On the creation of the first human being and on the causal *rationes* or how it can be said that fifteen years were added to the life of king Hezekiah, whom he had foretold not to live.’²⁰⁸ In the paragraphs leading up to 6.9.16, Augustine has been describing several options for reading *Gen.* 2:7. The problem that Augustine has to explain is the human being is created twice in *Genesis*, once in 1:26-7 (discussed in *Gn. litt.* 3.19.29-24.37) and once in 2:7. In the *Gn. adv. Man.* (finished 388) Augustine had grappled with the same problem and had decided that the two texts describe the same moment in creation.²⁰⁹ The consequence of this exegesis was that the distinction between Adam and the other human beings is minimal, since the ‘generic’ human being of *Gen.* 1:26 is indistinguishable from Adam in *Gen.* 2:7. The

²⁰⁸ *De creatione primi hominis et de causalibus rationibus vel quomodo dicantur additi anni XV Ezechiae regi ad vitam, quem praedixerat non victurum.* From 6.9.16 Eugippius only takes the last sentence, with which he also starts out his chapter X of the *Gn. litt.*

²⁰⁹ *Gn. adv. Man.* 2.7.9. *sed etiam si nunc quoque hominem ex corpore et anima factum intellegamus, ut non alicuius novi operis inchoatio, sed superius breviter insinuati diligentior retractatio isto sermone explicetur, si ergo, ut dixi, hominem hoc loco ex corpore et anima factum intellegamus, non absurde ipsa commixtio limi nomen accepit.*

But even if we understand that at this point too the man was made of body and soul, not in the sense that some altogether new work was being undertaken, but that what had been stated in summary form earlier on was here being unwrapped in a more detailed account; so if, as I am saying, we understand that in this place the man was made of body and soul, it was by no means absurd to give that mixture the name of mud. Trans. Edmund Hill. Cf. O’Daly (1983), 185.

interesting thing is that it was specifically Augustine's view on the origin and Fall of the soul which was responsible for this exegesis. In order to defend the Christian world-view against the Manicheans and in order to provide a theodicy, Augustine argued that the soul was not of divine origin and that the evil that it encountered was of its own doing, thus upholding God's justice. In this period of his life Augustine may have held that the human soul was a fallen soul which was incarcerated in the body. The Fall of the first soul in this case directly means the Fall of all souls. In any case, there was no reason for Augustine at that moment to make a distinction between the creation and origin of the first soul and the creation and origin of subsequent souls. The creation of the soul and the Fall of the human being (in general) according to Augustine did not have to be treated in a historical manner.

But Augustine changed his idea that there is no distinction between Adam and subsequent human beings with regard to the creation of their souls, perhaps prompted by the question of Caelestius while writing the *lib. arb* (finished 395).²¹⁰ Augustine came to contemplate the differences between the situations of Adam and other human beings, and the relationship between them, as specifically treated in book 10 of the *Gn. litt*. The soul was no longer regarded as having fallen from a state of bliss (as exemplified in the story of Adam) even though all souls currently do live in a fallen state.²¹¹ This is a paradoxical statement, and it is exactly from explaining this paradox that all the problems stem. For his explanation Augustine had to show that, logically speaking, there is no necessary relationship between the consequence ('we live in a fallen state') and the premise ('our souls fell from bliss'). Augustine found the proof in Romans 9:11, where God is free to choose between Jacob and Esau, without any action on their part.²¹² If

²¹⁰ *lib. arb.* 3.19.53. '*si Adam et Eva peccaverunt, quid nos miseri fecimus*' "If it was Adam and Eve who sinned, what did we poor wretches do?"

²¹¹ The question of the origin of the soul is more aptly described as a question of the embodiment of the soul. Given that – at least from Augustine's point of view – the option of the divinity of the soul had already been ruled out, both creationists and traducianists agree on the point that God is the creator of all souls, but disagree on the way that they find their place in the human body (but as the case of Vincentus Victor shows not all Christians at that time were ready to accept the soul as a created being, cf. note 186. In that case the differences about the origin of the soul between a creationist and a traductionist are also about the ontological status of the soul which becomes embodied).

²¹² From the same book, 9:21-23 comes the citation which Augustine would use to great effect in his letter 190.3.9 and his manner of referring to the human being as 'vessels' (*vasa*) (of mercy or anger). There are two interesting conclusions to be drawn from this quotation. The first is that humanity is compared to a bodily lump of clay, from which God as a potter can make his vessels, into which he can subsequently pour something. Hence, Adam through his Fall condemns the whole lump from which humanity is made, so that Augustine can speak of humanity as a very

God would have to send the soul to the body for incarceration as a punishment, His justice would trump His freedom.²¹³ Consequently Augustine identifies the origin of the soul as based on previous merits with the heresy of Origenism, e.g. in *ep.* 202a4.8. Augustine could therefore no longer easily identify Adam's Fall with the fall of other human souls.

This is reflected in the way that Augustine in the *Gn. litt.* treats the different accounts of the creation of the human being in *Gen.* 1:26-7 and of Adam in *Gen.* 2:7. Now Augustine sees *Gen.* 1 as an affair on a spiritual level, in which the 'framework' of the cosmos is created and *Gen.* 2 as a history from the workings of the cosmos in time in which not all human beings were created, but only the first one. And this is where we pick up the story in excerpt 53, with the creation of Adam in history. It is from the beginning of this excerpt that the analysis of the *rationes* given in paragraph 3 stems. In this excerpt Augustine treats the creation of Adam consisting of soul and body, and from 6.12.20 onwards specifically in his bodily aspect, insisting that the origin of the first soul will be treated later, which eventually happens in book 7. It is therefore the specific technicalities of the creation of the human body of Adam in terms of the *rationes* which bears the brunt of the content. Questions such as whether Adam was created as adult or went through the process of growing up, whether his coming into being was necessary or possible, whether that was natural or supernatural, whether Adam's *rationes* were inserted along the lines of natural determinism or according to some special will of God occupy Augustine in this passage. The chapter titles that Eugippius gives in the *Gn. litt.* range from X to XXII.²¹⁴ It would go too far to treat them in detail, but I would like to shortly draw the attention

bodily 'lump' – or 'mass of condemnation' (*massa damnationis*, e.g. 190.3.10). The second is that with this quotation Augustine tries not only to uphold God's freedom, with which He as a creator can create, but – at least as important – God's justice: since we are all condemned through Adam, the dispensation of grace is a gift freely given without obligation, the condemnation is a just course for the rest.

²¹³ Cf. *Gn. litt.* 6.9.15. And thus the need for child baptism: if our souls did not come into the body because of previous personal sin, we are all equally condemned owing to the Fall of Adam, so that adults and babies have the same need for baptism.

²¹⁴ CSEL 28 441-4 = BA 49, 472-3, cf. Gorman (1980), 96 for alternate beginnings. Apparently the manuscript tradition has several ways of counting the manuscript titles (Gorman eventually gives XXXIII headings, whereas Solignac XXXI), Gorman 92-3 (indicating a very frequent use of this specific book?). Gorman chooses from chapter XI onwards to give the chapter numbers as $n_{\text{Solignac}}+1$. As well as this choice may represent the manuscript tradition, it leads to the problem that the content of the chapter titles now covers the next chapter. This is especially clear e.g. for the chapter on Hezekiah (XXI for Solignac, XXII for Gorman, but the title of XXI mentioning Hezekiah while XXII mentions Adam). I therefore hold on to Solignac's numbering and stop at XXII, not at XXIII.: Cf. appendices 2.4 for the chapter titles.

to the following. It has been mentioned that Augustine in book 6 mainly treats the creation of the body of Adam from mud, juxtaposing this with the creation of the soul in book 7. This is especially clear from the first sentence of 6.12.20. Therefore the modern editor chooses to commence a new paragraph, even if Augustine in the following paragraphs still goes on to discuss the finer technical details in relation to the *rationes*.²¹⁵ But looking at the chapter titles and divisions given by Eugippius to the *Gn. litt.* it becomes apparent that he does not share this understanding of this passage. He does not start a new chapter at 6.12.20, instead including it in XIII ('Here he teaches that the human being is formed in his time visibly and invisibly, i.e. soul and body, and before this formation he says the human being was predestined in the prescience of God'). Eugippius' chapter titles themselves only start specifically mentioning the body (of Adam) from chapter XXIII onwards ('It is asked whether our animal body was formed from mud or our spiritual body'. *Quaeri solet, utrum animale corpus hoc nostrum sit formatum e limo an spirituale*) until XXXI. And it is from this chapter XIII onwards that Eugippius declines to copy the *Gn. litt.* into his *Excerpta*. Eugippius thus does not lay the stress on the bodily creation of Adam in book 6, but on the creation of Adam by way of the *rationes*. It thus seems as if Eugippius up to XXIII (6.19.30) perceives Augustine to speak of Adam as a whole human being, body and soul, even if Eugippius presumably recognizes that Augustine declines the idea of *rationes* for the soul in 7.23.34 with his chapter title XXIX for book 7 ('It is asked whether perhaps this causal *ratio* was inserted by God in the nature of this first day.' *Quaeritur an fore in illius primi diei natura causalis haec ratio sit a Deo inserta*).²¹⁶ It thus seems that Eugippius with his excerpt 53 tries to cover the creation of the whole of the first human being by way of the *rationes*, foregoing book 7 on the creation of the first soul.

How then does this relate to the ongoing investigation? For neither original sin is mentioned in this excerpt, nor does Eugippius understand Augustine to be speaking about the body, as I have just argued. However, I maintain that this excerpt supports the impression which was formed previously in this chapter, when it is taken in the context of the history of salvation as portrayed by Eugippius throughout the excerpts. After creating the world in excerpt 27 and pushing on to time and light (28-30), the next important topic on Eugippius' list is giving a theodicy (underlining the overall moral focus of the *Excerpta*). Eugippius does this through excerpts 31-45, showing how the world is not created for the punishment of souls (31), that evil

²¹⁵ *iam ergo videamus, quomodo eum fecerit deus, primum de terra corpus eius, post etiam de anima videbimus, si quid valebimus.*

'So now, then, it is time for us to see how God made him, first his body from the earth; later on we shall also see about his soul, if we find we are up to it.'

²¹⁶ *BA* 49, 476.

was introduced through the free will of the devil (36-38), that God is not responsible for the sins of human beings (39), how the propagation of original sin technically works in the human being through the *rationes seminales* of the body (40!), and how evil and sin eventually fit in God's greater providential plan with the cosmos (41-45). Herewith Eugippius has finished his theodicy on a cosmic scale, but he has not yet shown the Fall of Adam in history.²¹⁷ This is what Eugippius does through 50-53, first giving 'the story of evil' in three parts (part 1: the devil in 50; part 2: Adam in 51; part 3: expulsion from paradise in 52) before (!) he goes on create the first human being through the *rationes*.²¹⁸ Eugippius therefore wants us to understand with excerpt 53 not only how Adam as first human being was created, but also how he fell, how this sin was transmitted subsequently through the *rationes* that Adam passed on (as treated in 40) and how this fits into God's plan (the *rationes* eventually being the means of providence). He still wants to show how the human being is responsible for his own fallen state through the *rationes* with which he tries to stress an alternative line of explanation for the transmission of original sin rather than via the question of the origin of the soul, a question which Eugippius keeps on stressing in 372 and 40 is impossible to solve.

It depends on the use of the *Excerpta* how much a reader perceives of Eugippius' agenda in his presentation of Augustine. If a reader would use the *Excerpta* as a reference work and turns to single excerpts for some clarification, e.g. if he would read excerpt 53 only to get an overview or reference of either the creation of Adam or of the workings of the *rationes*, he would not likely be aware of this agenda. This is not to say that he would not be reading Augustine through Eugippius' eyes, because this is the case. He would for example still read excerpt 372 and take Augustine's agnosticism from it, without being informed of Augustine's analysis of creationism and traducianism. But only when he tries to get an overview of, say, the workings of evil in history, or specifically selects the excerpts on the soul, then Eugippius' agenda impresses itself on the reader to its full extent. Eugippius' *Excerpta* is thus constructed to suit the needs of the reader. Only the readers who invest enough time or who already know where to look will perceive Eugippius' program. But should one yet be 'ready' yet for these difficult questions, then excerpt 372 serves as a firm dead-end.

²¹⁷ in this way of presenting salvation history Eugippius mirrors Augustine's understanding of the creation in 'two moments' of *prima conditio* and *administratio*. Cf. *BA* 48, 659-61.

²¹⁸ Cf. table 3.2, p. 176 in the appendices for the exact passages.

2.2.5 From silence

Arguments from silence are often dangerous. If not mentioning something is significant, a strong case needs to be made that this was actually in the forefront of the mind of the locutor, which necessitates that he has the knowledge of what is not mentioned and judged it as not fitting. If there is jackpot, we have hit it with Eugippius. The brute existence of the *Excerpta* already shows that Eugippius was an encyclopaedic and prolific reader of Augustine, and if there is a plan in the *Excerpta*, which newer scholarship holds, Eugippius must have read more of Augustine than he selected.²¹⁹ Moreover, in this investigation the chapter titles that Eugippius gave to the *Gn. litt.* have already been mentioned and used. But it must be stressed here that these chapter titles mean that Eugippius read the whole of the *Gn. litt.*, a hugely important work for Augustine's theorizing on the origin of the soul, and made an effort to understand it. We can thus proceed without any hesitation to draw inferences from Eugippius not using book 7 of the *Gn. litt.* on the origin of the soul (and book 10 'only' for the creation of Christ and transmission of original sin). Unfortunately we do not have the same advantage we have with the *Gn. litt.* for some other relevant texts. Eugippius used lots of letters of Augustine and it is common sense to suppose that he would have a letter collection at his disposition. But Eugippius did not use letter 166 to Jerome on the origin of the soul. Would this popular letter have been omitted from this collection?²²⁰ And what about the *lib. arb.*, where Augustine writes on the origin of the soul as theodicy in 3.21.59? Already during Augustine's lifetime the *lib. arb.* was well disseminated and in letter 166 Augustine makes many references to the work.²²¹ But how certain can we be that Eugippius left the *lib. arb.* out intentionally, if he does not use it in the *Excerpta*? Or did the work just not fit his more scriptural selection criteria and was it too analytic for his taste?

Yet, when we place all the relevant passages on the soul of *Gn. litt.* 7, *Gn. litt.* 10.2.3-10.17, *lib. arb.* 3.20.56-21.59 and *ep.* 166 next to each other, a pattern emerges. In all these passages Augustine analyzes, although in a more or less extended version, and explicitly enumerates the alternatives for the origin of the soul. The options may change a bit in formulation or enumeration throughout these passages (and in the *lib. arb.* Augustine still takes

²¹⁹ Hofmann (1998), 299; and despite some reservations of O'Donnell (1991), 19.

²²⁰ Moreover Eugippius does use *ep.* 190, 202a and the *an. et or.* which together with *ep.* 166 seem to form a dossier of texts concerning the origin of the soul, cf. note 186, making it further questionable that Eugippius did not have access to *ep.* 166.

²²¹ *ep.* 166, e.g. 3.7.

the possibility of a fall into the body into account, which he leaves out in the *Gn. litt.* but still mentions in *ep.* 166.3.7). These options for the embodiment of the soul are (in the first mention of the *lib. arb.* 3.21.59) traducianism, creationism, and the sending of a pre-existent soul by God to the body (and finally the Fall of a pre-existent soul into the body). In *Gn. litt.* 7 this third option of a pre-existence of the soul, whether in *rationes* or by some material, is extensively researched and finally rejected, which search is repeated, albeit on a smaller scale, in *Gn. litt.* 10. But none of these passages are taken into account by Eugippius and we can be sure that he knew at least the *Gn. litt.* thoroughly. The reason for this cannot be neglect but must be conscious exclusion.

The effect of this exclusion is that the number of options for the origin of the soul is reduced from three (or four) down to two: traducianism and creationism. Since Augustine comes to a negative answer concerning the technical options of a pre-existence of the soul, one might say that there is no need for Eugippius to include this particular research; it was an hypothesis which was rejected. Yet, a significant side effect of this reduction is that Eugippius also does not have to mention anything which potentially undermines the role of the *rationes* for the transmission of original sin, even if Eugippius used Augustine earlier to show that it was specifically the *rationes seminales* for the body which are responsible and not any of the *rationes* which are responsible for the coming into being of the soul. A further inquiry into the function of the *rationes* in the *Excerpta* (also mentioned explicitly in excerpt 11, but given the abundance of material of the *Gn. litt.* in the *Excerpta* there must be more) would be recommendable. The fate of the other two options is well known from excerpt 372: Augustine does not know. But, on the bright side, Eugippius had already shown in 40 and 53 how influential the *rationes* can be, so that Augustine could be absolved from his agnosticism and the sting maybe could be drawn out of a contemporary debate.

Conclusion

Eugippius in his *Excerpta* shows a marked concern for the moral side of the human being. The soul does interest Eugippius as the fundamental constituent of the human being, but he is mainly concerned with the fact that it serves as the anchor for moral change of the individual. The ontological questions concerning the soul (e.g. divinity, corporeality, connection with the body) with which Augustine occupied himself are not taken into account by Eugippius except for the question of the origin. Nor are questions considered about the Trinitarian

structure of the soul's activities or questions about how these activities or the place of them in the *mens* constitute a principle of individualization. The one ontological question concerning the soul which did occupy Eugippius is subsumed under an umbrella of ethics: the impact of the question of the origin of the soul has everything to do with the theodicy and the transmission of original sin. The human being for Eugippius is thus especially a moral agent.

This tunes in with O'Donnell's overall view of the *Excerpta*: 'the 'authority' of Augustine for Eugippius is what there is in Augustine that helps the reader come to a better interpretation and fuller understanding of the scriptural text.' The more intricate questions concerning ontology, dynamics and individualization concerning the soul did not fit this goal:

'Eugippius had no idea of producing 'The Essential Augustine' with a view to illuminating Augustine's special contributions to Christian thought or his distinctive positions. Rather, the usefulness of Augustine lay in his way of representing the common Christian tradition. What was valuable about Augustine, put another way, was not what was distinctive about him but what he had said that formed a useful part of the common deposit of faith and interpretation. He had acquired his authority not by being unique and brilliant and original, but by accomplishing the common task of interpretation and teaching in a way that others could share wholeheartedly.'²²²

All the elements of this view expressed by O'Donnell are correct, and yet this is not the whole story. This account of the *Excerpta* portrays Eugippius as a bland compiler who takes all the 'hot stuff' out. It does not give credit, or at least not enough, to the persona of Eugippius as a scholar of Augustine and to his creativity as a scholar and interpreter of Christianity. The way that Eugippius selects and manipulates Augustine on the soul as shown in this chapter, can be taken as a case study for this. O'Donnell may have been caught in a ruse of Eugippius. Conrad Leyser has argued that Eugippius may have placed himself consciously in the ancient tradition of compiling, not because of his 'lack' of persona, but in order to avoid controversy as newcomer in the contemporary Italian political climate: 'Eugippius' marked preference for compilation can in turn be understood as a strategy for consensus-building' and 'Eugippius' activity as a compiler can be understood both as a tactful strategy of political survival, and as a determined assertion of

²²² O'Donnell (1991), 18.

moral autonomy.’²²³ Indeed, Leyser calls attention to the fact that in 5th century Gaul the Augustinian florilegium was an established strategy to argue for a position in the predestinationsist controversies around 430. Leyser sees the possibility that Eugippius actually was prompted to compose his *Excerpta* because of this controversy as well. Whether this is the case or not, Leyser sees this controversy at work in the compilation of Eugippius’ *Rule of the Master*: ‘The tenor of the *Rule of Eugippius* suggests that, like ascetics in Gaul – Caesarius of Arles included – Eugippius was keen to avoid polarisation over the issue of grace and free will. The Rule as we have seen balances out an augustinian emphasis on the grace of charity with a commitment to a science of moral progress drawn from the work of Cassian, the arch ‘semi-Pelagian’. Here, again, Eugippius seems to have taken advantage of the florilegium as a literary space in which contrary perspectives could be reconciled.’²²⁴

And here we are, with the *Excerpta* in which Eugippius regards the soul mainly as a place of moral change, and is only interested in its origin when it comes to the soul as a being in its own right. It is not difficult to contextualize the argument from this chapter with the historical circumstances. Several commentators have already remarked that there is little material in the *Excerpta* referring to Augustine’s theory of grace.²²⁵ And in this chapter I have argued that Eugippius shows a bias in his selection of excerpts concerning the soul, through which he (1) stresses Augustine’s agnosticism in the debate about its origin between creationists and traducianists and (2) tries to solve the underlying problem of the transmission of original sin with the *rationes* which are transmitted through the body. It is just *as if* Eugippius tries to remove the sting out of the debate between the traducianists and the creationists, while not using any material from *Gn. litt.* 7 which could undermine the status of the *rationes* as alternate explanation for the transmission of original sin. When we remind ourselves that the debate between traducianism and creationism can easily be framed (albeit imperfectly as Augustine argues in *ep.*

²²³ Leyser (2001), 67 and 73. He draws attention on both pages to the dedication of the *Excerpta* to Proba, who was a member of the Symmachian faction to offset his association with the Laurentian Paschasius.

²²⁴ Leyser (2001), 74.

²²⁵ Pollmann (2009), 25; O’Donnell (1991), 18-9: ‘What was valuable about Augustine, put another way, was not what was distinctive about him but what he had said that formed a useful part of the common deposit of faith and interpretation. He had acquired his authority not by being unique and brilliant and original, but by accomplishing the common task of interpretation and teaching in a way that others could share wholeheartedly. So we might think that, especially in view of the controversy over grace and free will that had animated Gaul in the fifth century, a reasonable anthology would have a distinct section of clear and concise excerpts from the anti-Pelagian writings, to make Augustine’s position clear. Those writings are seriously underrepresented in the collection as a whole, and the few excerpts that do appear come near the end, with no special emphasis.’

190) as a debate between anti-Pelagianism and Pelagianism, it seems that we are allowed to remove the words ‘as if’ from the hypothesis of this chapter. *Caritas* is the overarching principle of the *Excerpta*, but the moral transformation of the inner man towards God is what Eugippius stresses when it comes to the soul. He thereby not only avoids controversy, but tries to build unity. ‘By the time he wrote the *Commemoratorium*, Eugippius, notoriously, assumed that the Roman Empire had come to an end, its paychests for the legions now empty: what his work makes clear is that he expected moral community to endure.’²²⁶ The case of Eugippius thereby shows that the reception of Augustine is a creative meeting between older texts and contemporary concerns. It is this creative act which forms a living tradition. A tradition is thus as much a treasured relic as it is a treasure trove, with which one can both look back at history and forward to solutions to contemporary problems at the same time, which is the ultimate *raison d’être* of a tradition in the first place (as the notion of ‘invention of tradition’ also shows). It is through the reception of a tradition that a culture tries to transform its ‘inner man’, if not towards God, at least towards one’s neighbour.

²²⁶ Leyser (2001), 75.

Chapter 3. Augustine and Cassiodorus: an uneasy mixture.

3.1 Goals of the chapter

Cassiodorus Senator's use of Augustine in his *De anima*, written 538-540, is paramount. Augustine must have served as guide for Cassiodorus in more ways than one. Both converted to Christianity from a thriving secular public life, established a monastic community, and in between those two both took a ciceronian retreat to produce literary work. Cassiodorus wrote his *De anima* during this retreat (1.2 *quietus portus*), as a stage of his conversion not unlike Augustine's Cassiciacum, on 'the bridge' between public life and monastic life.²²⁷ It was composed directly after the *Variae*, as Cassiodorus' first specifically Christian work, and in the manuscript tradition this is reflected since it is sometimes included as the thirteenth book of the *Variae*.²²⁸ Textually, Cassiodorus certainly was very familiar with a few works of Augustine, and probably had had a wider reading of 'that excellent teacher, warrior against the heretics, defender of the faithful and winner of the palm in widely known contests' when he came to compose his *De anima*.²²⁹ The critical edition of the *De anima* by James Halporn lists many instances of use of Augustine, though probably not all.²³⁰ Mark Vessey has judged that, whoever made Cassiodorus write the *De anima*, 'its textual occasion was a dialogue with Augustine'.²³¹ First, Augustine is the only authority mentioned by name, Christian or secular,²³² and second, already the build-up of the text of the *De anima* betrays its roots in Augustine's texts. The introduction features an

²²⁷James O'Donnell (1979), 109; Kannengiesser (2001), 28.

²²⁸ cf. *De an.* 1.1 (after this only the chapter and lines will be mentioned), Halporn (1973) 'introduction', 526-7; Vessey (2004) 'introduction', 19.

²²⁹*Ipsae etiam doctor eximius beatissimus Augustinus, debellator hereticorum, defensor fidelium et famosorum palma certaminum.* Cassiodorus, *Institutiones*, 1.22. ed. Mynors (1937), trans. James Halporn, 1.22, 154.

²³⁰ There are a few cases where Cassiodorus used Augustine which are not listed by Halporn. For example in the introduction to the translation Mark Vessey notes the similarity in clearly identified questions in the *an. quant.* and the *De anima* (intr. 21). I will identify them where they are useful for my argument. But Halporn's notes can overall be taken as a very good guide, of which I have made ample use.

²³¹ Vessey, 'introduction', 21.

²³² 9, 552; 11, 557. cf. Vessey 'introduction', 20.

explicit list of questions similar to the questions in the introduction of the *an. quant.* 1.1 and Cassiodorus' prayer at the end of the text reminds one of the frequent prayers in the *Conf.*

During his composing Cassiodorus must have had the excruciating experience that all students of Augustine sometimes have: trying to pin down Augustine on an opinion or line of argument, while the tenets of faith he adheres to are always indubitable. This is at least how Cassiodorus himself later would come to describe reading Augustine for his monks in Vivarium: '[Augustine] is in some books obscure because he is so difficult; yet in others he is so clear that he is available even to children; his clear statements are sweet, but his obscure words are a rich feast of great usefulness.'²³³ But Augustine himself never wrote a specific *De anima*, which exactly is the purpose of Cassiodorus, who thus in some way or another had to collect and colligate Augustine. The reception researcher has an *embarras du choix* with Cassiodorus' text, and the question is not so much to find out where Augustine is hiding, but rather where to start writing. But this does not mean that Cassiodorus used every text of Augustine with the same intensity. In Cassiodorus' mind the *an. quant.* was always present, followed at some distance by book 7 of the *Gn. litt.* and books 21 and 22 of the *civ.* One of the aims of this chapter will be to explain why these texts were deemed so useful by Cassiodorus.

Nevertheless, from a first reading of the *De anima* it is also clear that this is not Augustine speaking. Apart from differences in style there are some topics which do not appear in Augustine, such as chapter 12 'how to recognize bad men', for which topic Cassiodorus probably felt the need after his political career. Moreover, however much Cassiodorus used Augustine, Michele Di Marco and Marcia Colish recognised some elements of Stoicism in this text as well. Di Marco speaks of the *De anima* as originating partly from a 'koine stoicizzante' and relates some of Cassiodorus' ideas to the materialist Faustus of Riez (against whom Claudianus Mamertus composed his *De statu animae*) and Colish notes Cassiodorus' acquaintance with the *hegemonikon* and the Stoic sage.²³⁴ In stark opposition to Augustine, the Stoics believed the soul to be material. A second goal of this chapter is to show in more detail than hitherto has been done how this tension between Cassiodorus' use of Stoic views and Augustine's texts plays out. This goes to show that, perhaps not unsuitable for a politician, Cassiodorus was an eclectic thinker who was informed by the major schools of thought in his era, but not overly concerned with the consistency of the underlying philosophical mechanisms of the systems he encountered.

²³³ [Augustinus] *in quibusdam libris nimia difficultate reconditus, in quibusdam sic est planissimus, ut etiam paruulis probetur acceptus; cuius aper ta suania sunt, obscura uero magnis utilitatibus farcita pinguescunt. Institutiones*, 1.22.

²³⁴ Di Marco (1985), 98; 101. Colish (1985) vol. II, 250.

In this chapter some investigation will be done to see how far Augustine's thought actually reached through to Cassiodorus. The investigation will be carried out in the way of a detective. For Cassiodorus' *De anima* presents itself as something which it is not. It presents itself as a work in tune with Augustine and his concepts on the soul, keeping to a spiritual and immaterial notion of the soul. But an analysis of Cassiodorus' actual treatment of the soul will bring out the Stoic models at work in the background. In this chapter a careful eye will therefore also be cast upon the signs of Stoicism in this *De anima*.

3.2 Reading Augustine

Augustine was Cassiodorus' largest religious 'authority of learned and truthful men' *veracium doctorum auctoritas* (4.4-5) and is the only authority, Christian or secular, mentioned by name.²³⁵ It will therefore be useful to first give an overview of Cassiodorus' use of Augustine before going into the process of close reading. However, directly a caveat must be placed. Cassiodorus does not employ direct quotations of Augustine, even if he is largely working under an Augustinian framework, and even if the majority of Augustine's important ideas about the soul can be found in this *De anima* in some way or another. But for a wide reader such as Cassiodorus, who would later set up his encyclopaedic project of the *Institutiones*, it cannot be excluded that he had picked some of these ideas up from other texts. An example is the idea of the body as a prison of the soul in 4.39-41, which Augustine affirms in *Acad.* 1.3.9 but denies in the rest of his work, such as *ep.* 166.9.27. Halporn duly reports these instances in Augustine, but the option really cannot be excluded that Cassiodorus (also) found this in (other) (Neo-)platonic texts available to him. Yet I will rely on Halporn's authority for this paragraph and it cannot be denied that Cassiodorus' conceptual framework seems very similar to Augustine's: the immortal human soul is created (although the technicalities of this creation are unsure), different from bodies, rationally seeks God but rules (and often becomes enmeshed in) the body with a mutable will, has an interiority of the memory in which it can be illumined by God, is saved by Christ from the Fall but has to deal with the adverse effects in secular life, and will come back gendered and bodily to receive its eternal reward or punishment. In the text this materialises as follows.

²³⁵ 9.21-2; 11.55. On Cassiodorus' amplification of the difference between secular and Christian authority, cf. Vessey 'introduction', 27-8. In his own introduction 1.5 Cassiodorus already made a difference between 'certain obscurities' he found *in libris sacris quam in saecularibus*.

Cassiodorus poses the following questions: What the soul is (3-6), what the soul does (7-8), how the soul is related to the body (9-11, with 9 treating the question of the origin of the soul), how to recognize virtue and vice in others (what is the sage like, and what is the opposite?) (13-14), and where the soul will eventually be going to (14-15). In the chapters on the ontology of the soul (3-6), Cassiodorus' program of defining the soul is very much taken from Augustine. He is arguing for an immortal, rational, and mutable soul (4). Furthermore Cassiodorus wants it understood that the soul is a creature (4), but that it does not have a place (or rather as we would say 'location' 6). Other topics in these chapters are the correct naming of the soul (3) and the quality of the soul (5), the last of which is rather barren on Augustine (and will be treated in paragraph 3.4, p. 80). Examples of Cassiodorus' use of Augustine are his stress on the soul as a 'distinct substance' (*propria substantia*, e.g. 4.5; 4.37) and 'simple nature' (*simplex natura* 4.200) taken from *an. quant.* 1.2, and the idea that the soul cannot be corporeal since it ponders immaterial principles, which thought is often expounded by the early and middle Augustine (e.g. *imm. an.* 17 and *Gn. litt.* 7.21.28). Usually the *Gn. litt.* (esp. 7), *an. quant.* and *ep.* 166 are identifiable in arguing for these points.

Cassiodorus answers with the 'virtues' of the soul to the question what the soul 'does'. These are divided into moral virtues, such as prudence and justice (7), and natural 'virtues' (powers), such as sensation and control over the limbs. There is a very brief Trinitarian structure in 7, resembling Augustine's Trinity of memory (*memoria*), will (*voluntas*) and understanding (*intellegentia*), e.g. in the *trin.* 10.11.18. According to Cassiodorus the soul has contemplation (*contemplatio*), judgement (*virtus iudicialis*), and memory (*memoria*). Contemplation confirms with Augustine's understanding. Memory is similar to Augustine's memory as a notion of interiority in *conf.* 10.8.15. But judgement does not confer directly with Augustine's will. The subsequent investigation will bring out that in Stoic vein Cassiodorus will positively evaluate judgement and associate it with reason. But for Cassiodorus judgement does not replace Augustine's will (*voluntas*), which Cassiodorus evaluates negatively and connected with the mutability of the soul. Cassiodorus uses very little of Augustine's works which one associates with the dynamical discourse. An example of this is the way in which Cassiodorus treats illumination. He mentions that 'we are not among those who say that the soul recalls rather than learns' in 4.218-9 and that '[the soul] sees obscure things that it could not know by its own means illuminated by its Creator', but there is no sign of any familiarity with the *mag.* or Augustine's development on this

matter in e.g. the *trin.* 12.15.24.²³⁶ This is especially interesting, since in Cassiodorus' much used *an. quant.* (20.34) Augustine still believed in knowledge as remembering (and the concomitant pre-existence of the soul for the body). Cassiodorus probably neglected Augustine's dynamic discourse of the soul since his Stoic background gave rival answers to the question of the activity of the soul so that he did not need to confer to Augustine on that account.

In the chapters on the relationship between the soul and the body, Cassiodorus' description of the problem of the origin of the soul (9) confers with only three of Augustine's possibilities, i.e. creationism, pre-existence of souls which God later sends to the body, and traducianism. It leaves the option of a pre-existence of the soul which later falls into the body out. This is ironic given that Cassiodorus himself mentions the body as prison in 4.39-41. One therefore suspects that Cassiodorus here rather followed *Gn. litt.* 10.3.4-6 than *lib. arb.* 3.56-9. Yet Cassiodorus follows Augustine's agnosticism on the problem, explicitly mentioning Augustine as his authority.²³⁷ In the chapter on the seat of the soul (10) Cassiodorus uses Augustine's idea in *Gn. litt.* 7.20.26 that the mind's forgetfulness of the body during intense concentration shows that they are different.²³⁸ However, Cassiodorus provides a very different context. He reworks it into an argument for the head as the seat of the soul (the mind forgetting the bodily senses in the head during concentration). Rather Stoically, it shows for Cassiodorus that the mind tends to move upwards in the body, just as mortal fire moves upwards (11.15-6). Cassiodorus also describes the Fall and the consequences for this life in this chapter on the seat of the soul in a way compatible with Stoicism. In a story reminiscent of the *lib. arb.* Cassiodorus mentions how Adam was created with 'free will and an inviolate sense of judgment' (*arbitrii liberi potens et inviolata sententia* 10.48-9), but lost it due to disobedience. But Cassiodorus differs from Augustine in his idea of the consequences of the Fall. For Cassiodorus these are mainly on the plane of cognition. From the *lib. arb.* 3.18.52 only the *ignorantia* is taken, but not the weakness of will of the *difficultas*. Cassiodorus thus removes Augustine's use of *akrasia* as effect of the Fall and sees its effects in us having to use signs as access to things. God's help for the human being subsequently consists of *illuminatio*, and Cassiodorus studiously avoids the word *gratia* for God's aid to the human being in (10.66), using the word *auxilio* instead. *Gratia* nor *concupiscentia* figure prominently in Cassiodorus

²³⁶ 4.218-222, *Nec de illis sumus qui dicunt recolere magis animas quam discere usuales artes et reliquas disciplinas, cum et ad interrogata sint paratae, ubi potuerint intellectus perveniente contingere, et nova sic audiant quasi nihil ex eis ante didicissent.* 'We are not among those who say that the soul recalls rather than learns the ordinary arts and the other sciences, since the souls are prepared for asking questions that they could have grasped intellectually, and they hear everything as new just as if they had learned nothing of these matters before.' 10.66-8, *Illuminata videt a creatore quae fuscata non potest a semetipsa cognoscere.* 'It sees obscure things that it could not know by its own means illuminated by its Creator.' All translations by James Halporn.

²³⁷ 9.21-4.

²³⁸ 10.40-4.

conceptual toolbox. Cassiodorus' stress on the soul's use of reason (treated in paragraph 3.6 and 3.7, 86-86) and his emphasis on the consequences of the Fall as epistemological, make for an intellectualistic *De anima*. In the chapter on the 'situation of the body' (11), Cassiodorus explicitly uses Augustine's authority (*Hoc etiam sensit pater Augustinus* 11.54-5) for the idea of the eyes emitting rays, which Augustine describes in *an. quant.* 23.44.

The chapters on the recognition of good and bad men do not employ Augustine, but there is some in the chapters on the eschatology of the soul. Cassiodorus is in accordance with Augustine *civ.* 22.17 when he says that the soul will come back embodied and gendered. Yet Augustine's *civ.* 21.2 and 21.4 are clearly identifiable in Cassiodorus' affirmation of an eternal punishment. Employing the same reasoning as Augustine, he mentions that since already in this world fire-salamanders and some worms have fire and heat as habitat, it cannot be denied that souls can be punished eternally in fire without decay.

The picture that emerges from this oversight of Cassiodorus' use of Augustine is that Cassiodorus especially wants to learn from Augustine how the human soul differs from the rest of creation, whereas he is not as interested in Augustine's dynamical discourse or Trinitarian structures of the soul. His use of Augustine's texts is accordingly, with the *an. quant.* and *Gn. litt.* 7 holding pride of place. Yet, this paragraph has also indicated that Cassiodorus sometimes gives Augustine a Stoic context, or adapts Augustine so as to be compatible with Stoicism. It is to this Stoicism in Cassiodorus that we must turn.

3.3 *Spiritus*

Cassiodorus' most important explicit interpretation of Augustine's theory of soul is with the word 'spirit' (*spiritus*). Cassiodorus used the qualification 'spiritual' to denote the substance of which the soul is made:

*Moreover, the soul of the human being, as the authority of learned and truthful learned men concurs, is a distinct spiritual substance.*²³⁹

Throughout the *De anima* Cassiodorus often uses this qualification when talking about the substance of the soul. With this qualification he wants to further express the special status of

²³⁹ *Anima autem hominis est, ut veracium doctorum consentit auctoritas, a Deo create spiritalis propriaque substantia.* 4.4-5.

the substance of the soul as a *sui generis* substance.²⁴⁰ What does he mean by this? We are not meant to guess. Cassiodorus spends chapter three on the question ‘why it is called the soul (*anima*)’. In this chapter the meaning of the word *spiritus* are explained:

*‘Spirit, then, is differentiated in three ways. That is properly and truly called spirit which requires nothing, but is required by all creatures. It inspires what it wishes and arranges all things according to what it wishes. It fills everything and is complete in the whole. Motionless in space and eternal in will it is uniquely influential over all the highest things. We also call spirit the fine substance invisible to us, created, immortal and endowed with as much power as it can use. Thirdly we give the name spirit to the substance scattered and contained throughout the entire body, which maintains mortal life with essential breath and which never rests but is constantly refreshed by its mobility.’*²⁴¹

Apparently this spiritual substance of which the human soul is made comes in a ‘family’ of three members. One of the members is something which more or less resembles the Holy Ghost, having a divine nature through its power and stability. Both the second and the third meanings of ‘spirit’ are coined in terms of substance, thereby presumably setting them as created beings aside from the divine first member. The difference between these last two members is that the substance of the third meaning is confined to the body. But for the moment it remains unclear whether they are two different substances or only differ in place (body) and function (life giving). However, it is clear that we here encounter the meaning of ‘spirit’ that Cassiodorus wants us to understand when we hear him speak about the ‘spiritual substance’ of the soul. It is a spiritual substance because it is life giving, spread throughout the body and constantly moving.

Augustine would certainly concur with these characteristics of the soul. The soul is after all the principle of life, contained throughout the whole of the body and mutable, thus susceptible to movement. He calls the soul spiritual in *Gn. litt.* 12.7.18-8.19, where Augustine indicates what he means by Paul’s ‘spiritual vision’ of Jerusalem. And Augustine occasionally speaks of *spiritalis substantia*, e.g. *conf.* 6.3.4 although Augustine admits at that point that he does not have a clue about it.

²⁴⁰ 4.195-203.

²⁴¹ ‘*Spiritus itaque triplici modo dicitur. Appellatur enim veraciter et proprie spiritus nullis indigens, ipse vero a creaturis omnibus indiget; inspirans quod vult et dispensans omnia prout vult; complens universa, totus in toto, immobilis loco et voluntate aeternus, cunctaque quae summa sunt singulariter potens. Vocamus et spiritum substantiam tenuem nobisque invisibilem, creatam, immortalem, quantum illi utiliter datum est valentem. Tertio, spiritum dicimus per totum corpus emissum atque receptum per quem vita mortalium flatu necessario continetur, nec aliquando otium capiens, ingi mobilitate reparatur.*’ 3.15-26; trans 240-1.

But normally his appliance of the adjective would be narrower. This has to do with his exegesis of Gn 2:7, in which God breathes life ('blew into him the spirit of life') into the first human being. In order to prevent the conclusion –in line with Hellenistic thought– that the human soul is therefore divine, Augustine would resist connecting the human soul too closely to this spirit. Augustine does this both in his spiritual exegesis of the *Gn. adv. Man.* 2.8.10 and the literal exegesis of *Gn. litt.* 7.6.9-7.10. It is also in this use of spirit, of the Christian life of the inner man, or the Christian guideline that should keep the soul on the right track, that Augustine uses the term *spiritus* in the *Gn. litt.* 6.28.39 and chapter 75 of the *an. quant.* In the literal explanation of Gn 2:7 Augustine wonders whether God's breathing should mean that the soul has been formed from 'spiritual material' (*spiritalis materies*). In *Gn. litt.* 7.6.9-7.10 he therefore hypothesizes the existence of such a spiritual material. However, the problems with a spiritual material are that if the material is rational, it leads a blessed life before it becomes soul, but then is formed by God into the worse form of the not so blessed human soul. But if the material is not rational and thus did not have a blessed existence before God's formation into the human soul, then the same material may be used to form the animal soul. That would lead to the trouble of transference of the animal soul into a human body, something which was too much for Augustine as well. And thus the hypothesis of a spiritual material is rejected. Notice, however, that Augustine here does not speak of spiritual substance (*substantia*), but of spiritual material (*materies*). To take 'substance' as matter is a specific interpretation. Augustine therefore does not reject spiritual substance as something immaterial. But it remains that he uses a lot of space in the *Gn. litt.* to show that the soul cannot be too closely connected to the spirit. Augustine thus would not normally call the soul 'spiritual'. And the likelihood of Cassiodorus coming across these differentiations of spirit and soul is high, given his knowledge of the *an. quant.* and *Gn. litt.*

Even though Cassiodorus may have felt supported by Augustine's calling the soul spiritual in *Gn. litt.* 12.7.18-8.19, his real motivation to do so comes from his Stoicism.

3.4 Stoicism

When discussing the quotation of Cassiodorus' definition of 'spirit' in the previous paragraph, I spoke of a 'family' of three more or less Christian species of namely (1) the Holy Ghost, (2) the soul and (3) some other substance. The definitions actually are elements of the

same Stoic creative fire.²⁴² For the Stoics the divine, active principle (thus not the element ‘fire’) is immanent and pervasive in the cosmos. It is creative, self-sufficient, causes growth and preservation in the living beings, serves as their soul and is the substance of the stars.²⁴³ It is a distinct substance, on which everything depends but which itself is autonomous and immortal (and therefore the divine active principle – a conclusion from which Cassiodorus understandably shies away, solving the problem by cutting the substance up in three more or less Christian elements), permeating the whole of the cosmos (in souls, but also around souls). Below the surface of a conceptual framework given by Augustine –although as shown adapted at points– there are drops of Stoicism and it comes through at the definition of spiritual. Yet it must be noted here as well that Cassiodorus also upholds a firm belief that the human soul has a substance which can be distinguished from other spiritual substances, since the soul is the only type of spirit which assumes flesh.²⁴⁴ Thus the Stoic fire is what lends coherence to his definition of ‘spiritual’, yet at the same time Cassiodorus undermines this coherence with his Christian commitment to the unique nature of the human soul. I have no doubt that Cassiodorus thinks the latter is more important, and when accused of contradiction would reject the notion of the coherence of the spirit. But this does not mean it is not in the text.

With this Stoicism in mind it is interesting to see how Cassiodorus is describing the ‘quality’ of the soul. Following the Aristotelian categories, after giving the definition of the soul, the quality of the soul is described, followed up by the quantity of the soul (or the lack of it). But Cassiodorus does not call the chapter ‘quantity’ but rather ‘that the soul does not have form’. The soul, according to Cassiodorus, can be called a ‘light’, since it is created in the image of God. This is an interesting use of the argument. Augustine would state that God is light, and that he created the intellectual light which the soul sees.²⁴⁵ Accordingly, there would be an ‘eye of the mind’ which sees the ‘intellectual light’. But Augustine would never use the image of God idea to state that the soul therefore is light. Augustine’s argument of the image of God is used to state that the soul is immortal, or that it is rational. Cassiodorus is here expanding on Augustine with Stoicism in mind. For the idea that the soul can be called a light is consistent with other qualifications of the soul throughout the text. The soul is a ‘fiery force’, it brings ‘heat’ to the limbs and has an ‘innate mobility’, its vital power is a ‘natural heat’, the soul is mainly seated in the head, since already ‘mortal fire aims upwards, and because it has a most refined nature it

²⁴² di Marco (1985), 96-100 and Colish (1990) vol. II, 249-52 have earlier noted the Stoicism in Cassiodorus, both in 1985. In volume I, 333-4 Colish also notes some reception of Stoic logic in the *Institutiones*.

²⁴³ cf. White (2003), 133-8.

²⁴⁴ 4.37-9.

²⁴⁵ e.g. *sol.* 1.1.3; *contr. adv. leg.* 1.7.10.

rushes without hesitation to the higher places', implicating that the soul substance does doubly so.²⁴⁶ This is clearly not Augustine. According to *Gn. litt.* 7.13.20-15.21 fire and air serve as the messengers of soul, to carry information from the senses to the soul through the nervous system. But they are definitely different from the soul, even if they come closest to being incorporeal. Cassiodorus is in line with Stoicism.

A further view on this Stoicism can be taken from the secular authority which is mentioned in the chapter on the quality of the soul. The strategy that Cassiodorus adheres to is to mention the secular authority first and following up with the Christian authority. The relationship between these kinds of authority is not one of strict opposition. It is rather the case that Cassiodorus briefly sums up the secular theory in order to emend it or deepen it with Christian authority, which is held in higher esteem. Cassiodorus is adhering to principles of exegesis, giving a 'literal' natural philosophical explanation and following it up with a more useful Christian 'spiritual' (in its exegetical sense) explanation. This is at least how it seems in chapter 4 on the definition of the soul, and here as well.²⁴⁷ What is Cassiodorus thus giving as the secular theory of the quality of soul?

*'Authorities have said that this substance has a fiery quality. It is active because of its ever-moving heat, which gives life to the limbs when the soul has been joined to the body. Further they say that all things in heaven are made up of a fiery element, not the smoky fire of this world, exhaustible and temporal, but calm, nourishing and immortal. This fire neither diminishes nor increases, but continuously endures in the excellence of its origin. It cannot have an end because it is not, like a body, a combination of diverse elements. Being a simple element it does not admit an opposite; and thus it always remains since there is no conflict in its essence. In this way all created beings who have been granted a spiritual substance are said to be immortal.'*²⁴⁸

This description is certainly Stoic in origin.²⁴⁹ For the Stoics the soul is either made up of some divine creative fire, or of a mixture of fire and air (*pneuma*). In either case the soul has a fiery and very mobile nature. Moreover, at least some Stoics make a distinction between the

²⁴⁶ resp. 4.60; 4.62-4; 4.203-4; 8.19; 10.15-7.

²⁴⁷ 4.1-7; 4.115-32.

²⁴⁸ 5.1-12, *Qualitatem itaque substantiae huius auctores igneam esse dixerunt propterea quod mobili semper ardore vegetetur et iuncta corpori calore suo membra vivificet. Deinde quod cuncta caelestia flammis referunt vigore constare, non isto fumo, consumptibili, et temporali, sed ex tranquillo nutritore atque immortalis. Hoc neque minuitur neque crescit, sed in susceptae originis dignitate iugiter perseverat. Quod ideo finire nequit, quia nulla, ut corpus aliquod, elementorum diversitate concretum est. Unum enim atque simplex habere nescit adversum et ideo semper manet, quoniam in essentia sua non habet litem. Sicut immortalia cuncta creata dicunt quibus spiritalis est concessa substantia.*

²⁴⁹ cf. Annas (1992), 18-9 and 45-6.

element (*stoicheion*) of fire and the principle (*arche*) fire.²⁵⁰ The element fire is uncreative and consumes the fuel, the principle is creative, self-sufficient, causes growth and preservation in the living beings, serves as their soul and is the substance of the stars.²⁵¹ The secular authority that Cassiodorus here relates, describes rather the creative principle of fire, than the element of fire. Given Cassiodorus' three species of spirit, it is likely that this is what he is thinking of when he gives the soul a fiery quality. It seems that Cassiodorus in some way is drawn to the Stoic theory of the soul, but at the same time he largely operates under Augustine's conceptual framework of the soul. But, in opposition to Augustine, a central tenet of the Stoics is that the soul consists of matter. Could Cassiodorus be caught displaying materialistic tendencies in his *De anima*?

3.5 Materialism

Given Cassiodorus' reliance on Augustine, it is remarkable that one of the most central tenets in his theory of soul, that the soul is immaterial, is not really taken in by Cassiodorus. For it is in this aspect that the tension between Augustine's views on the soul and Cassiodorus' reliance on Stoicism is most profound. Cassiodorus seems to follow Augustine in his idea of an immaterial soul. Cassiodorus records the secular teachers saying that the substance of the soul is 'distinct from the matter of its body' (4.2-3 [*substantiam*] *distantem a materia corporis sui*), and adds Augustine-like arguments that the soul is not corporeal with the idea that the soul ponders principles²⁵² and cannot be circumscribed by lines or dimensions like bodies.²⁵³

Yet, despite these statements, Cassiodorus has some materialistic tendencies in his thinking about the soul.²⁵⁴ It starts with the idea that Cassiodorus' definition of the spirit can be seen as the Stoic divine fire. As mentioned earlier the Stoics were materialists.²⁵⁵ For them the possibility of interaction between the active and the passive principle is ensured by the fact that they are alike. The Stoics believed in a strict causal determinism and for them a cause can only have an effect of the same kind. We can all vouch for the fact that the passive principle, the stuff that we in our day to day lives interact with, is matter. Therefore the active principle, the divine creative fire which is the cause of it all, is material too. Cassiodorus' definition of spirit, as a fine substance spread out through the body, certainly carries materialistic overtones, and this is what

²⁵⁰ cf. White (2003), 134-6 for the difficult relationship between *pneuma* and the creative fire.

²⁵¹ a distinction reported in Stobaeus. White (2003), 134.

²⁵² 4.30-3. cf. *imm. an.* 17, *Gn. litt.* 7.21.28.

²⁵³ 4.20-4; 6.24-32. cf. *an. quant.* 3.4-4.5, *Gn. litt.* 7.21, *ep.* 166.2.4.

²⁵⁴ Colish (1990) vol. II, 249; Di Marco (1985), 95-6.

²⁵⁵ one of the notable exceptions being the *lekton*, which Augustine uses in his *dial.* and translates as 'dicibile'. The Stoics did allow for a class of things which are not beings (*onta*), but also not nothing. They are 'something' (*ti*).

Marcia Colish notes.²⁵⁶ But apart from this definition I would here like to show with two examples that Cassiodorus not only quasi-defines the soul as a material entity, but that he actually treats the soul as a material entity as well.

One of the apparently vexing questions in the theory of the soul is the mental development of the child, and in the exceptional cases in which this goes awry. How can the theory which gives everybody in every age group the same rational soul account for the observable fact that babies and children do not behave rationally like adults? For a materialist the answer would run along the line that the body of a child is smaller, or at least different from the body of an adult, so that the substance of the soul has a different interaction with the body. A very simplistic way of arguing, used by Augustine as a ‘straw man argument’ in the *an. quant.*, is to say that a larger body can simply accommodate for more soul. An adult thus behaves more rational because he or she has more of the rational matter in his or her guts. But if one claims that the soul is immaterial and therefore fundamentally different from the body one will have pains to explain how the differences in the body can account for differences in the functioning of the rational soul. Thus the answer to this question was a struggle for Augustine, who spends chapters 15.25-19.33 of the *an. quant.* on it. The conclusion Augustine arrives at is that the soul of a child needs to grow metaphorically by learning. The soul of a child is the same as the soul of an adult, but it lacks the same potency to act, which it increases through training. The interesting thing is that Cassiodorus duly reports Augustine’s answer to the question of child development²⁵⁷, but at the same time has a totally divergent explanation for the mentally handicapped:

‘If one shuts up a high blazing fire in a narrow container, it cannot strive upward in its usual way because a very constricting obstacle checks it. To each thing its own power seems sufficient when nothing contrary can oppose it. Thus one finds idiot children because, by an imbalance of the parts of the body or the thickness of the humours caused by a defect in the mother’s womb, the imbecilic mind is too much compressed in its dwelling and cannot exercise its strength while restrained in an inappropriate home.’²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶ Colish (1990) vol. II, 249-50.

²⁵⁷ 7.54-8.

²⁵⁸ 7.34-42, *Ut si ignem angusto vase concludas, altum, ut illius moris est, nequit appetere, quia eum artissimum obstaculum constat operire. Tunc enim unicuique rei facultas sua videtur suppetere, cum illi nihil contrarium praevalat impedire. Sic stultis iuvenibus obviat quod aut imparilitate partium aut crassitudine humorum materni uteri vitio suscepto, anima inepta nimis habitatione deprimitur et vim suam exercere non praevalat, inconvenientis domicilii sede praepedita.*

Again a simile with fire in this citation. But notice also the explanation of the imbalance of the limbs or defect in the humours. The first explanation is only viable if one thinks that the dimensions of the body have anything to do with the working of the soul in that body, something which should be denied by Cassiodorus since the soul according to him and Augustine has no dimensions in the first place. The second explanation is only viable if one thinks that the soul is actually mixed up with the humours. And how is that imaginable if the soul is immaterial? It seems as if Cassiodorus here is thinking that, even if the soul has a substance of its own, it is fundamentally on a par with the body, which explains the influence of the body on the soul and the mishaps for the mentally handicapped.

Another example is Cassiodorus' description of the eternal punishment of the damned. It is clearly taken from *civ.* 21.1-4. Augustine apparently had people asking him how it is possible to eternally burn in hell if common experience teaches that fuel is actually consumed in a fire so that it is no more. Augustine reacts, as Cassiodorus will later duly reflect in his text, that volcanoes persist and that fire salamanders have fire as their habitat, implicating that already in this world fire does not necessarily destroy everything it comes into contact with, and thus much less in the next. Augustine here does not speak of a substance of the soul or about the process of consumption itself. This is how Cassiodorus speaks about it:

“Therefore from this source, as from a vast river, issues forth a stream of dispute over how continuous punishment is supposed to be eternal since decay hardly allows a substance to exist that it does not allow to repair itself at any time. But it is completely unnecessary to think of this in terms of eternal principles. The punishment can also be of such a kind that it tortures without diminishing, and the substance can be of such a kind that it heightens the sense of pain without causing the decline characteristic of mortal things.”²⁵⁹

Cassiodorus expands this explanation of Augustine with some natural philosophy. Mortal substances decay in fire, if they cannot repair themselves. But the soul, being a distinct immortal substance, does not need repair. This sounds quite innocent and at this point Augustine himself would probably not object. But what happens if Cassiodorus had to answer the question why

²⁵⁹ 15.20-6, *Ex hoc igitur quasi vasto flumine quidam videtur rivulus altercationis exire, si iugi poenae concedatur aeternitas, dum consumptio vix substantiam permittat existere quam nullo se tempore permittit reparare. Sed istud omnino superfluum est in causarum perennium ratione cogitare. Nam et talis esse poena potest quae torqueat, non imminuat; et talis substantia quae sensum doloris augeat, non defectum mortalitatis incurrat.*

this is so? Why does immortal substance transcend the ‘eternal principles’ that hold sway over mortal substance?

Cassiodorus’ religious authority’s explanation why the soul is immortal is that it is made in God’s image.²⁶⁰ But this answer does not explain the physics behind it. That is what secular authority does. In 4 on the definition of the soul one of the many secular proofs of the immortality of the soul is that ‘whatever is not destroyed by an inherent opposition continually maintains itself as immortal’.²⁶¹ The substance the soul is simple, without such a destructive inherent opposition.²⁶² Thus the follow up question is how it is that mortal bodies have such an inherent opposition which the soul lacks. This is explained, again, in the much longer and much more detailed quotation of Stoic heritage given in paragraph 3.4, p. 81. The fire of which the soul is made is a simple element, whereas mortal bodies are made up of a mix of diverse elements. And these carry the oppositions (e.g. hot-cold, wet-dry) which mean the inevitable decay of the body. Thus when Cassiodorus is expanding on Augustine’s explanation of the possibility of an eternal fire of damnation, it is understood in the terms given by secular authority and best understood relating a Stoic material account of the soul. Augustine, deeming the soul incorporeal, would not care much for an explanation for the immortality of the soul which treats the ‘substance’ of the soul as some sort of special substance when compared ‘physically’ to other substances. He would take the (Neo-)platonist discourse in which the soul is connected with rationality and eternal truth, thereby showing that the soul is to be seen in a category with things that are unlike the body. But the upshot of the explanations of retardation and of the eternal fire of hell is that the soul is a substance mixed up with the body, although it is operating under its own laws. And on these premises it does not seem strange to regard it as a material, perhaps as some fifth type of element next to the usual four.

What then about the arguments which made Cassiodorus’ soul seem immaterial at first? One may find philosophical arguments to account for the Augustine-like tone Cassiodorus takes on this topic at first reading: The question is whether Cassiodorus would think it possible for something not to be corporeal, but still material. Yes, if you consider the substance of the soul for a Stoic to be in a state of mixture with the bodily substances without ‘behaving like a body’, thus without all the inherent oppositions. This not only goes for the large bodies, like trees or stones, but also for corpuscles, the four elements. This is consistent with the Stoic’s rejection of corpuscularianism, even if they were materialists. They believed the basic coherent unit of the

²⁶⁰ an adaption of *an. quant.* 2?

²⁶¹ 4.121-4 *Iterumque proponunt: quicquid a contrarietate originali non corrumpitur immortale iugiter perseverat.*

²⁶² This is one of the things which make God so ineffable and good men so beautiful. They combine opposing, seemingly contradictory traits. 13.62-5; 16.23-34. Cassiodorus takes this from *conf.* 1.4.4.

cosmos to be the cosmos itself, not an atom, and thus stated a seamless continuity.²⁶³ The soul is therefore mixed in even with the four elements, which are the basis for the inherent oppositions which destroy normal bodies. Seeing the Stoic background to some ideas in Cassiodorus thus alters the way in which one reads those words. And if the spiritual material is permeating the whole cosmos as it seems to do for Cassiodorus (invisible around us and making up for our soul, thus in effect being everywhere), would it still be meaningful to cut a section of it up and draw lines around it?²⁶⁴ But, the impression remains that Cassiodorus took no pains to commit to a thorough analysis of his varied sources.

With this paragraph the most important tension between Cassiodorus' commitment to Augustine's model of the soul and a Stoic model of the soul has been treated. But materialism is not the only topic at which both models clashed and where Cassiodorus adapted Augustine. Other topics are judgement, reason and the will. Cassiodorus used Stoic inspired rational judgement as a positive feat of the human soul, but Augustine's will to account for the mutability of the soul and sin.

3.6 Judgement instead of Will: restriction to the human being

Paragraph 3.2, p. 75 shortly touched upon Cassiodorus' Trinitarian structure in 7 and his substitution of 'will' with reasonable 'judgement'.²⁶⁵ Cassiodorus must have understood the discussions around predestination to mean that the human will is responsible for human hardship.²⁶⁶ But the Trinitarian structure of our soul is wherein we are made in God's image, so, as moral virtues of the soul, they cannot be rated negatively. Cassiodorus therefore again followed his Stoic line with his insertion of judgement. For the Stoics, judgement is the reasonable assent or dissent given to, for example, sense-data and desires. With it we are tapping into our divine part of the soul, gain understanding about the truth and keep ourselves in check. Compared to Augustine's Trinity, judgement keeps some sort of middle position between will and understanding, since it draws upon reason and decides on the truth of things, but also has

²⁶³ White (2003), 146.

²⁶⁴ The Stoics would speak of a total 'mixture' (*krasis*)

²⁶⁵ 7.18-20.

²⁶⁶ I have not doubt that Cassiodorus tried to stay away from these discussions, as he emphatically emphasises Augustus's agnosticism on the origin of the soul. The somewhat enigmatic remark at the end of that chapter (9), may also point in that direction, 9.59-61: *Suavis quidem nimium mihi facta digressio est, dum suspiciones improbas amovere contendo, sed dum ad aliud tendimus, hinc dicere multa non possimus*. 'I have made a digression that was indeed very sweet to me, while attempting to counter unfortunate suspicions. But while I direct my attention to something else, I cannot say much here.'

the final say when deciding upon action. Cassiodorus therefore also had to adapt Augustine's *intellegentia* with something else, deciding upon the (increasingly?) monastic *contemplatio*. Cassiodorus' Trinitarian structure is a light sauce which only slightly flavours the Stoic steak beneath. But that does not mean that Augustine's will is nowhere to be found. Yet, just as in the case of materialism, Cassiodorus is not prepared to go into the structural tensions between Stoic judgement and Augustine's will. Judgement and reason receive their eulogies, but will is not *per se* treated. Cassiodorus does not seem to think that Augustine's will involves reason (which it surely does for Augustine), but that it only involves irrational desire. In this optimistic *De anima*, which purports to describe that we are human through the use of reason, the will hardly finds a place. But it is Cassiodorus' ideal scapegoat to blame for our problems.

Cassiodorus' treatment of judgement, reason and will shall be shown through two topics. The first is a comparison between Cassiodorus' views on human and animal souls, which will establish the soul as a specific human feat and judgement as a specific human capacity. The second is a comparison between his respective treatment of reason and will as movements of the soul, which will show his different evaluation of the will.

The Stoic model of the soul and Augustine's model diverge in how they see the soul structured, and Cassiodorus positions himself along Stoic lines. Although the Stoics would reject Cassiodorus' idea that only human beings have a soul (they would rather separate sentient life from non-sentient life²⁶⁷) they would certainly agree that the human soul is in some ways unique, since it is wholly rational. They reject the Platonic division of the soul into three parts, maintaining instead that there is but one kind of soul, accounting for the different levels of complexity in life with a differentiation in structure of that one kind of soul. The Stoics therefore state that the human being does not share some division or structuring of the soul with the animal. Judgement, the rational assent or dissent, is for the Stoic specific to the human being as well.

According to Augustine the soul is the animating principle, so that every living thing has a soul, including plants and animals. The soul can therefore, in line with the platonic tradition, be divided into three parts of rising complexity, which all have their different functions. There is a vegetative part of the soul, which provides the impetus to grow, accounts for urges such as hunger, spreads nourishment throughout the body, and keep the body an harmonious whole. There is an animal part of the soul, which takes care of sensation, and regulates the appetites and

²⁶⁷ Annas (1992), 51; 71. The *tonos* (tension) of the *pneuma* decides whether the soul of the item is in a lifeless state (*pneuma* is also responsible for the coherence of e.g. stones) *hexis*, has vegetative growth by its soul in condition of *fusis*, or has perception and impulse because of the *pneuma* in state of *psuche*. However, only the human beings have a rational soul (*nous*).

movements of the body. Thirdly there is a rational part of soul, which only humans (and angels) possess, which accounts for the understanding of eternal truths. This theory is set out by Augustine explicitly in the two works that Cassiodorus used most: the *an. quant.* (33.70-73) and the *Gn. litt.* (7.16.22). How does Cassiodorus use these models for his *De anima*?

Cassiodorus acknowledges that the soul is a 'life giving power', something which is supported by both secular and Christian authority.²⁶⁸ But, other than Augustine and the platonic tradition, he would restrict the usage of the word 'soul' for the human being:

*"Soul", first of all, is properly spoken of for man, not for animals whose life is grounded in the blood.*²⁶⁹

The reason that Cassiodorus gives for this divergence is physical. Other than with the human being the animal soul resides specifically in the blood and is therefore only to be called 'soul' by an improper extension of the word.²⁷⁰ This is in opposition to Augustine, who spends chapter 31 of the *an. quant.* wondering over the consequences of the case of vivisection of a worm for his theory of the soul. One wonders whether Cassiodorus constitutes a step towards our modern tendency to restrict the use of the word soul to human beings. But it is clear that the whole theory of the soul in Cassiodorus is simplified from a three level building of rising complexity to account for all life on earth to a one-storey flat in which only human beings live. Cassiodorus defines this in the beginning of his *De anima*, and there is no misunderstanding that all that he has to say on the soul will specifically deal with the human being.

In line with this restriction of the word 'soul' for the human being is Cassiodorus' move to reserve judgement to the human being as well, thereby separating us from animals. In his description of the 'situation of the human body' in 11, Cassiodorus states:

*This animate body is, however, governed and ruled by the five senses. Although we share these senses with beasts, in us they are better distinguished and perfected through the use of reasonable judgement.*²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ 4.1-3; 8.19-20.

²⁶⁹ 3.1-2 *Anima igitur hominis proprie dicitur, non etiam pecudum, quia illorum vita in sanguine noscitur constituta.*

²⁷⁰ Cassiodorus' Stoicism would also be the origin –as also noted by Di Marco (1985), 96– of this idea since blood is the vehicle of the *pneuma*.

²⁷¹ 9.45-8, *Hoc autem corpus animatum quinque sensibus administratur ac regitur, qui, licet sint communes cum beluis, a nobis tamen rationabili iudicio melius distinguuntur atque complentur.*

James Halporn correctly directs the reader to the *lib. arb.* 2.8.26.²⁷² Although there is no talk of ‘reasonable judgement’ (*rationabili iudicio*) per se in that specific part of the *lib. arb.*²⁷³, in the larger discussion the idea of judging is prevalent. According to Augustine, judgement is a process that goes up all along the chain of perception and knowledge. The senses judge the quality of the object they sense, the inner sense judges the sense data given by all five senses to judge what is perceived and whether it is harmful or beneficial. Reason judges the (sensory) objects for what they are in order to gain understanding.²⁷⁴ Animals therefore certainly have judgement for they must have an ability to distinguish friends from foes. What Augustine denies animals is the highest forms of judging. In the *civ.* Augustine denies the bodily senses (presumably including the inner ‘sense’ as well) the judgement which consents or not to the truth of their sensory data, by implication barring them from knowledge.²⁷⁵ In the *Gn. litt.* he denies animals a free judgement how to react on sense information, thus animal behaviour is instinctive.²⁷⁶ In Augustine animals therefore are not exempt from judging, but for the highest forms which lead to such human affairs as knowledge and virtue. What is Cassiodorus doing with this theory?

First of all, Cassiodorus has removed the step of inner sense, which combines sense-data, from his description of the body and the senses. This removal serves his own goal, namely to point out how the human being excels the animals, playing down the features that the human body shares (i.e. the senses) with beasts. By not discussing judgement per se, by not indicating that judgement can be taken as ‘process’ to progress from one level to the next (e.g. from the senses to the inner sense), but just by mentioning that human perception excels animal perception through the reasonable judgement, Cassiodorus is also restricting judgement itself for the human being. Of course Cassiodorus’ statement is in accordance with Augustine’s theory. Augustine certainly concurs that ‘reasonable judgement’ only pertains to the human being, not to animals, since only the human soul has reason. But if Cassiodorus’ intention was just to point to reason, he would have had no use for the word *iudicium*. Cassiodorus does not only want to say that animals lack reason, but also that they lack judgement, thereby opposing Augustine. Further evidence for this is that in 10 (‘The seat of the soul’), the ‘animal’ level of judgement of the soul –thus discerning between the beneficial and the harmful- is reserved for the human soul as well.²⁷⁷

²⁷² cf. *Gn. litt.* 7.13.20-18.2 for a cruder description of the difference between the bodily senses and reason.

²⁷³ It deals with the inner sense which combines sense data into objects and an awareness of the external world, but lacks the ability to be conscious of its task. That requires reason, for which the inner sense is not suited.

²⁷⁴ *lib. arb.* 2.12.

²⁷⁵ *civ.* 8.7.

²⁷⁶ *Gn. litt.* 9.14.25.

²⁷⁷ 10.44-7. The chapter as a whole deals specifically with the human body as a seat for the human soul.

Thus, according to Cassiodorus, judgement is how the human being employs reason and is what separates us from the animals, and as such it is positively evaluated. We will now take a look at Cassiodorus' evaluation of reason and the will as movements of the soul.

3.7 Movement of the Soul: Rationality and the Will

According to both the (neo-)Platonic and the Stoic worldviews, judging, thinking, and anything that involves reason, are movements of the soul. For both Augustine and Cassiodorus willing is one of those movements, and they can therefore be compared and their different evaluations highlighted.

It all starts out with a fine case of collation –and thereby interpretation- of Augustine. Rationality is one of the possible 'motions of the soul'. For a treatise on the soul motion is important, since the soul was considered to be the cause of the motions of the body. Hellenistic philosophy had already established that a) the cosmos and everything in it moves, but that b) a distinction must be made in the cause of the movement. Bodies can be compelled to move by other bodies, such as when billiard balls clash, or bodies can have an internal cause for movement, for example when an animal searches for food. If a body moves because of an internal cause, it is a living body. The internal cause is ascribed to something called 'the soul' and this soul then is thought to be the principle of life and movement. Thus the search for what this soul is, sets off.

Cassiodorus actively used Augustine for the idea of the movement of the soul itself. All movement, or with another word 'change', must have a cause, thus the movement of the soul has a cause as well. On this point Cassiodorus states the following:

*I think that reason is an evident motion of the soul that advances from agreed-on facts towards some unknown and thus arrives at a <previously> hidden truth.*²⁷⁸

This sentence is an amalgam of two pieces of Augustine. In the *ord.* (2.11.30) Augustine says that:

²⁷⁸ 4.85-8, *Rationem vero dico animi probabilem motum, qui per ea quae conceduntur atque nota sunt ad aliquid incognitum ducit, perveniens ad veritatis arcanum.*

*Reason is a mental operation, capable of distinguishing and connecting things that are learned.'*²⁷⁹

and in the *an. quant.* (27.53) that:

*'...I must agree with you that we have knowledge before reason, because reason proceeds from a basis in something known in leading us to something unknown'*²⁸⁰

Cassiodorus chose these texts well since Augustine was treating rationality at both places. In the *an. quant.*, Augustine is making a distinction between ever present rationality and hard won knowledge, and in the *ord.* he is explaining what rationality is and what disciplines it leads to as training curriculum for students. I have some observations about this use of Augustine by Cassiodorus.

Cassiodorus grasps what Augustine says, but by combining the two sentences he is performing a 'mental operation' himself. The effect is that he makes a kind of abstract. He takes out the core of this thought of Augustine –that reason is a movement of the mind- with the half of the sentence of the *ord.*, and elucidates and explains it with second half of the sentence from the *an. quant.* With this shortcut from the *ord.* to the *an. quant.*, Cassiodorus makes it tangible what this movement of the mind consists in: it means the progression from agreed upon facts through dialectical reasoning to certain, though unforeseen conclusions. He thereby conveniently dismisses the surrounding discussions and difficulties and provides a shortcut to conclusions for which Augustine needed a long discussion. For in de *ord.* the whole of Augustine's object is to discuss what the distinction is between reason and its products and consequences. In the *an. quant.* Augustine displays a for the early dialogues usual caution in discussing what it means for the soul to be rational. Moreover, the rhetorical function of the sentence taken from the *an. quant.* changes radically. In the *an. quant.* the speech act of the sentence is to problematize the previously reached conclusion that knowledge or wisdom only follows after the application of reason. The problematization from the *an. quant.* thus becomes a definite statement.

Secondly, Cassiodorus' treatment only focuses on the dialectical side of reason as the motion of the soul. This focus can be seen as an interpretation of Augustine. For when Augustine regards the motions of the soul there is also is a definite moral component. For

²⁷⁹ *Ratio est motio mentis, ea quae discutuntur distinguendi et connectendi potens.* Russel's translation.

²⁸⁰ *propterea me tibi debere adsentiri scientiam nos habere ante rationem, quod cognito aliquo nititur, dum nos ratio ad incognitum ducit.* Collieran's translation

Augustine motion of the soul always has a direction: it can move towards its source or it can move away from its source. It moves towards its source when it uses reason to arrive at eternal truths, and it moves away when it becomes enmeshed in the life of the senses. Cassiodorus subscribes to the same ideas about reason and sensual life in 4.244. But the point is that Cassiodorus never connected these evaluations of reason and the senses with the idea of movement of the soul. The moral aspect of reason as movement of the soul is kept beneath the surface.

But Augustine never believed that reason was the only movement of the soul. Affections, for example, provide another source of movement of the soul. But, even though he did not believe that only one source of motion for the soul exists, Augustine singled out one source of motion in his writings. Moreover, this stress changed during his lifetime. In the early dialogues the most interesting source of motions of the soul for Augustine is reason.²⁸¹ This interest is, as we have seen, duly reflected by Cassiodorus. This is understandable since Augustine in these dialogues was concerned to show how the rational human being takes a special place in the Creation and how reason is a way to trace his provenance back to the divine. Reason thus serves as the bond between God and the human being. However, from the *lib. arb.* –finished in 395–, Augustine would stress the difference between Creator and creature, in order to provide for a stronger theodicy. The stress on what moves the soul for Augustine therefore changed from reason, which is dependent upon divine truth, to the independent human will.²⁸²

We can see this in Augustine's ideas on the mutability of the soul. The mutability of the soul, thus the motion of the soul, has always been used by Augustine in order to separate the human soul from the divine. In early works such as the *imm. an.* the example that Augustine would give of this mutability is that we can gain knowledge, where there was a lack of it before. That we are sometimes foolish, sometimes wise. But later Augustine would say that the soul moves because it can want different things at different times. In the *lib. arb.* (1.25.12) the will is even taken as a necessary condition for the use of reason: if you don't want to understand, you'll never use your rational abilities.

The interesting question thus becomes what we read in Cassiodorus about the mutability of the soul. Cassiodorus subscribes to the importance of the mutability of the soul for the same reason, i.e. that it is not part of God. But what is the cause of the soul's mutability for Cassiodorus? We read an echo of the idea that it is reason, when we are told that:

²⁸¹ e.g. *imm. an.* 5.7.

²⁸² e.g. *ep.* 140.31.74 (411/2); Augustine also accounts for the mutability of the soul through emotions (*affectus*, *commotio*), e.g. *vera rel.* 18, *ep.* 184A.2 (418). The emotions of the soul are much more akin the will than reason.

‘And so we are wise when we conduct ourselves well because of divine enlightenment and we are foolish when blinded by the mists of misdeeds.’²⁸³

But the real conclusion Cassiodorus reaches is this:

‘We have shown that the soul is changed in this world by an unstable and variable will, that it can both lose and receive good things, that it does not have constant and inflexible will, but can even change in various ways unintentionally.’²⁸⁴

We thus see that when speaking about the mutability of the soul Cassiodorus reflects both of Augustine’s sources of motion of the soul, but in the end follows the later Augustine. It also is to be noted that here in treating the mutability of the soul Cassiodorus does describe it in the moral terms, which were lacking in the treatment of reason.

The conclusion can be that when speaking about reason, Cassiodorus follows the young Augustine and his stress on reason as ‘motion of choice’. But when speaking about the mutability of the soul, Cassiodorus follows the later Augustine and his stress on will as the cause for this mutability. Cassiodorus thus separates the movement of the soul as a dialectical search for truth, from the mutability of the soul as a moral path of the will. But he does so without showing awareness that the actual movement of the soul is the same, even if the causes differ. Cassiodorus seems to create a real distinction between ‘movement of the soul’ and ‘mutability of the soul’, thus between different faculties of the mind which provide different movement of the soul. Augustine was only prepared to separate these conceptually, as his thinking of the mind in Trinitarian structures shows.

By not connecting these two sources of motion, Cassiodorus is exploiting the neo-Platonic side of the early Augustine. For the respective parts that reason and will play in Cassiodorus’ *De anima* are not balanced. Reason occupies a much larger place than the will in this *De anima*. The only, although admittedly not unimportant, mention of the will as the power to undertake a course of action is as cause of the just mentioned mutability of the soul. Cassiodorus does speak of an ‘imperative power’ (*virtus imperativa*) elsewhere, in the chapter on the natural

²⁸³ ‘Et ideo sapimus, cum divina illuminatione bene gerimus, atque iterum desipimus, cum delictis caligantibus obceaecamur.’ 4, 543; trans. 250.

²⁸⁴ ‘Constat ergo animam in hoc mundo instabili et variabili voluntate converti bonarumque rerum esse amissibilem ac receptibilem, nec uno semper voluntatis suae rigore subsistere, sed etiam contra dispositum suum multiplici se conversione mutare.’ 4, 544; trans. 251.

powers of the soul, yet he interprets this as the power to put the organs and the limbs of the body into motion. This is but a very technical aspect of the will that is one of the courses of the mutability of the soul.²⁸⁵ Reason, on the other hand, receives a more extensive treatment under its own heading (thus not as cause of some other feature of the soul). Moreover, when Cassiodorus speaks about the power that makes a person choose one course of action over another, he speaks of ‘reasonable judgment’ (*iudicium rationabilis*) rather than the will.²⁸⁶ This ‘Neo-platonisation’ of Augustine also goes well in-hand with the Stoic idea that reason is altogether different from the motivations and emotions which make up our desires. Since judgement is led by reason, a human being is not free to judge. Truth, thus good (true) and evil (false) are objective data, and reason will lead one to a proper true judgement. This is why judgement is a positive virtue of the soul. But this is not the case for the will. The will is free to will what it wants (although the right will needs grace) and that is the root of all evil, which is why will is often treated negatively. Perversity ensures that one can have a proper judgement, but not a right will (Adam knew it was wrong what he wanted). This analysis therefore serves as explanation why Cassiodorus would want to substitute will, with its negative connotation for a Stoic, for judgement in a positive part on the virtues of the soul. For practical purposes Cassiodorus thus interchanges ‘will’ and ‘judgement’, depending on whether he needs the positive rational judgement or negative will. We can see this in the application of will by Cassiodorus to show the mutability of the soul.²⁸⁷ Since this mutability of the soul is considered a negative trait (stability is better than perturbation), Cassiodorus chooses negative will over positive judgement to account for this mutability (‘we sometimes want wrong things’ instead of ‘we sometimes make wrong judgements’). How Cassiodorus thus juxtaposes Augustine's thought with the Stoic model that he adhered to, with all the contradictions this entails, took some detective work to bring out. Yet different though Augustine's and the Stoic's model of the soul may be, Cassiodorus, in the end used them both for the same reason: to show how the soul is different from the rest of creation.

²⁸⁵ 8,550; trans. 258.

²⁸⁶ 7, 549; trans. 256 and 11, 557; trans. 266. Even though in both circumstances the stress on the reasonable aspect of judgment can be understood in the context of both passages (the virtues and the difference between the human being and the animals), this does not detract from the fact that one finds ‘reasonable judgment’ in all the places where ‘will’ could have been –with the exception of the negatively valued mutability of the soul.

²⁸⁷ 4, 544.

Conclusion

The method with which Cassiodorus presented Augustine's arguments is very often by shortcut. Cassiodorus is presenting the results of Augustine's discussions, not the polemic itself. But in presenting these results, he makes some adaptations and interpretations of his own. Cassiodorus not only uses Augustine's model of the soul, but also the mutually exclusive Stoic one, which is most easily visible in his use of the qualification 'spiritual' of the substance of the soul. This indicates that Cassiodorus also had a –possibly prior and still hard to relinquish– materialistic way of thinking about the soul. This materialistic way of thinking may have influenced Cassiodorus' reading of Augustine in the first place, since it prompted him to look for answers regarding the question of the interaction between the body and the soul. It prepared Cassiodorus for the question what to select and –perhaps more importantly when confronted with an abundance of sources– what to forget when writing his own *De anima*. Cassiodorus all but forgets Augustine's dynamical discourse, having alternative Stoic answers to what the soul does. Augustine's will, however, is used as a convenient scapegoat to account for the responsibility of our sins, whereby Cassiodorus forgoes further deliberations on the relationship between judgement and will.

Cassiodorus thus is not passively repeating Augustine, but actively adapting, interpreting and using Augustine for his purposes. One of the main purposes of his *De anima* is to convince his readers that the substance of the soul is not like the substance of the body. His use of the *an. quant.* and *Gn. litt.* 7 is accordingly. But Cassiodorus never came to a thorough analysis of his views in the light of the mutual exclusivity of both his models. Cassiodorus solved his conceptual problems cosmetically rather than structurally.²⁸⁸ Cassiodorus' conversion took place when, as Vessey has it, 'Late ancient notions of Christian conversion, especially those articulated in monastic milieus from the fifth century onwards, laid more emphasis on continuance in a style of life than on any signal moment of crisis.'²⁸⁹ This 'continuance' does not only seem to have counted for Cassiodorus' style of life, but also for his style of thinking.

²⁸⁸ Concerning Cassiodorus' revision of Pelagius' commentary on the Pauline epistles along Augustine's lines, David Johnson (1991), 163 remarks 'Cassiodorus at times follows Augustine's doctrine, which gives the priority to predestination, and at times follows another doctrine entirely, found in the words of Pelagius, which gives priority to foreknowledge. His theological acumen is simply not acute enough for him to maintain consistency.'

²⁸⁹ Vessey, 'introduction', 18, with a reference to O'Donnel (1979), chapter 4.

Part Three. The ninth century

From the sixth century to the ninth

With the following two chapters this investigation leaves the sixth century in order to explore some aspects of the reception of Augustine's ideas on the ontology of the soul in the ninth century. In this century, one of the themes of the sixth century, predestination, became prevalent again. Gottschalk started the debate with his concept of 'double predestination', i.e. that the elect may go to heaven, but that therefore the rest is predestined to damnation. This sparked off the predestination debate in the 40's and 50's of the 9th century, since it not only calls the efficacy of free will into question -one of the main points of the predestination debate of the 5th and 6th centuries-, but also the universality of Christ's sacrifice and the power of the church to administer sacraments, to attend to its faithful and to spread the faith. Apart from the personal and political concerns of the participants, these were the theological reasons in the 9th century which rekindled this debate.²⁹⁰ Especially the Christological and ecclesiological aspects of the debate made this a typical debate for the ninth century²⁹¹ but this predestination controversy is especially known for its being rooted in Augustine's works. Even though Augustine was a major source for Carolingian scholars in all the other 9th century debates (the adoptionism debate with Alcuin, the debate on the *imago dei* with Theodulf of Orleans and on the Eucharist with Ratramnus), this debate on predestination specifically hinged on the point who was correctly interpreting Augustine's ideas. Whereas the predestination debate in the 5th and 6th centuries hinged on how far one had to follow Augustine, where Augustine was orthodox and where he left the perceived common tradition, the 9th century debate declared Augustine in sum total as orthodox, and the proponents tried to appropriate the standards for the correct interpretation of Augustine's predestination.²⁹²

Among all the theological debates of the ninth century, the debate around predestination specifically was conducted most acerbically, since it served, during the very turbulent middle decades of that century (rebellion, fraternal wars and Viking raids), to define factions among the

²⁹⁰ Diana Stanciu (2005), 14-15, although this general interplay is one of the concerns of the whole book.

²⁹¹ Otten (2001), 81.

²⁹² cf. Stanciu (2005), 29-30, Schrimpf (1982), 847. E.g. Eriugena in the *De divina praedestinatione liber* 11.2.46-9 ...*quod necessarium ducimus et utiliter ad rem pertinere videmus illius auctoris (i.e. Augustinus) dicta ponere, cui maxime Gotescalcus haereticus sui nefandi dogmatis causas solet referre.* '...because we think it necessary and see it as useful and relevant to cite the words of that author (Augustine) to whom the heretic Gottschalk is principally accustomed to refer the causes of his abominable doctrine.' transl. Mary Brennan.

clerical elite.²⁹³ Given the responsibility they saw for themselves for the salvation of their respective kingdoms²⁹⁴, the political troubles, and the accumulation of sins these troubles entailed, led to a spiritual sense of crisis from which a way out had to be envisaged. For Gottschalk this meant looking into the theoretical foundations of predestination. He probably was concerned that the clergy was preaching the false idea that being baptised equaled being saved, which might lead to moral complacency.²⁹⁵ Convinced that no one would be saved by falsehoods, he countered that idea by describing a theoretically coherent world in which Christians too sin and are lost, and in which God alone keeps his few elect from pursuing their sinful impulses.²⁹⁶ For Hraban, the first 'churchauthority' to take note of Gottschalk's ideas on predestination, this meant reacting against Gottschalk and stressing an active moral stance to change for the good in order to be saved.²⁹⁷ Less concerned with theoretical coherency, he feared that Gottschalk's ideas would lead to moral apathy.²⁹⁸ Although both Gottschalk and Hraban were in principle concerned with inciting people to lead a moral life²⁹⁹, they arrived at opposite theoretical conclusions. This set off the predestination debate. On a doctrinal level a way out of the crisis could be to put oneself into the hands of an all-powerful and intervening God, which is the way Gottschalk and his more moderate supporters took. Another could be to stress personal responsibility in the world³⁰⁰, to which Hrabanus Maurus, Hincmar of Rheims, Pardulus of Laon and John Scot Eriugena turned. This intertwinement between secular and theological factors is underscored by the fact that the theological debate itself became an official concern from 851 onwards (when Louis the German, Charles the Bald and Lothar decided communally to fight God's enemies), whereas its end was determined by politics.³⁰¹

The general circumstances, participants and contents of the texts produced during this controversy are well known.³⁰² In this research Gottschalk and Eriugena will be focussed upon

²⁹³ Ganz (1981), 286.

²⁹⁴ *ibid.* 286; 299.

²⁹⁵ Schrimpf (1982), 822, 830-1 and (1980), 169, after Devisse (1975), 120f.

²⁹⁶ Schrimpf (1980), 171.

²⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 169-70.

²⁹⁸ According to Hraban one can only lead a moral life once baptised, so that he could not explain how the unbaptised were punished for sins to could not help committing. He also cannot explain why this individual is baptised or saved and not another, whereas Gottschalk is able to show that God has a volition for every individual. Schrimpf (1980), 166-7, 169 and (1982), 827, 839. Gottschalk's and Hraban's different concerns were also informed by partaking in what Stanciu (2005), 19 calls the different 'scholarly discourse' (Gottschalk) and 'official discourse' (Hraban), the last one presenting the point of view and 'actionplan' of the church as institute.

²⁹⁹ Schrimpf (1982), 831, stresses that a theoretical foundation for christian moral exhortation was necessary in the context of the carolingian framing of identity as an *imperium christianum*.

³⁰⁰ also in line with the contemporary concept of *renovatio*, to which Stanciu (2005), 120 has drawn attention. cf. Schrimpf (1980), 165.

³⁰¹ *ibid.*, 297; 300-1.

³⁰² e.g. Ganz (1981) for the historical circumstances, Stanciu (2005) for a further description of the content of the treatises.

for their ideas on the ontology of the soul. Gottschalk started the controversy through his teachings on double predestination, and he put his thought down especially in the *Confessio brevior* (produced for the Council of Mainz 848) and the *Confessio prolixior* (written against Hincmar's *Ad reclusos et simplices* 849). Eriugena wrote his *De divina praedestinatione liber* (851) against Gottschalk's ideas at Hincmar's behest. However, should one be interested in the general positions of the two camps, Gottschalk and Eriugena are certainly not the best authors to look at. Both antagonists took radical opposite positions.³⁰³ Moreover if 'the correct response to uncertainty about doctrine was not novel argument but the careful assembly of texts', their original modes of arguing set them apart.³⁰⁴ Their reward was condemnation at ecclesiastical councils (Mainz 848 and Quierzy 849 for Gottschalk, Valence 855 and the meeting at Langres before the Council of Savonnières 859 for Eriugena). Furthermore Gottschalk underwent incarceration in the monastery at Hautvillers, which turned out to be life-long, and without Charles the Bald's patronage Eriugena's fate might not have been much better.

Yet these two authors provide excellent candidates to check their use of Augustine's text for the formation of their views of the soul and their arguments. Schrimpf has shown how their theories of predestination served to explain their anthropology.³⁰⁵ Gottschalk used it to explain how human beings in general came to be impulse driven (because of the Fall), but how the elect can exert self-control when grace blocks those sinful impulses. Eriugena used the doctrine of predestination to explain how human beings lost their knowledge of good and evil and power of choice (because of the Fall). Yet this knowledge and power may be retrieved through a correct understanding of God and when God elects one through the aid of grace to exert self-control and steer one's will in the right direction. Given that anthropology lies at the basis of their (or indeed any) predestination theory, their views on the ontology of the soul (what the soul is and how it is affected by original sin, and how it transmits original sin) are relevant for the debate.

³⁰³ That raises the questions what the mainstream position was. Ganz (1981), 290, speaks of 'an Augustinian tradition in which the sacraments do not bypass the limited nature of the elect Church' but leaves it at that. Stanciu (2005), 22 speaks of -among others such as 'threatened theological tradition', 42- 'attempts to preserve a threatened Augustinian tradition' (threatened presumably by both Gottschalks and Eriugena's extreme positions). Despite her evident learning on the topic it would have been fortunate if it would have been spelled out what that tradition exactly contained. In the conclusion she states, however 115: 'As for the issues of divine grace and free will, they all [minus Gottschalk that is] tried to assert the necessity of free will for salvation, even if the aid of divine grace was emphasised, regarding the corrupted human will after the Fall, to a lesser degree by Hrabanus and Hincmar and to a higher degree by the others.'

³⁰⁴ Ganz (1981), 284. cf. Schrimpf (1982), 848-50. This is not to say that one cannot argue for new positions through collecting texts, as has been shown through Eugippius. Nor does it imply that Gottschalk or Eriugena refrained from carefully reading Augustine widely.

³⁰⁵ Schrimpf (1982), 839.

Finally, these two authors exhibit in their writings a particular expertise of Augustine which makes their investigation especially worthwhile.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁶ Not everyone had good libraries stocked with Augustine's texts at their disposal. Hincmar for example did not have Augustine's late texts at his disposal at the beginning of the controversy and took the *Hypomnesticon* as written by Augustine up until the end, although Florus of Lyon proved it was not in 854. Stanciu, 36-7. Undoubtly this controversy was a factor in the dissemination of Augustine's texts throughout the Frankish realms.

Chapter 4. Gottschalk of Orbais and ontological predestination in his *Quaestiones de anima*.

The text under consideration in this chapter is the *Quaestiones de anima*. This is a short theological opuscle which explicitly treats the soul and its origin. As an additional boon it so far seems to have escaped the attention of the scholarly community.

4.1 Structure of the *Quaestiones de anima*

Lambot edited and brought together the several writings of Gottschalk (808-867) that Morin found in 1930 in Berne.³⁰⁷ Among those theological opuscles of Berne ms. 584, the *Quaestiones de anima* (opuscle XXI) holds a specific interest for the purposes of my research topic. As the time of writing of the opuscles, or any specific context of this opuscle seems as yet uncertain, it will be hard to answer questions about its specific place in the larger predestination debate in the 9th century. However, given that the opuscle is situated in a late 9th century manuscript,³⁰⁸ its context in the manuscript could provide some clues for future research. This is facilitated by the fact that Lambot fortunately exercised the good judgment not to alter in his edition the order of the opuscles as he found them in the manuscript.³⁰⁹ Among the other opuscles, only the *Responsa de diversis* deals explicitly with the soul, in questions x to xv. Unfortunately, in the manuscript precisely the pages containing questions xi to xv are missing, as if someone took out those pages to have a dossier on the soul ready at hand. My research will therefore have to be restricted to the *Quaestiones de anima* as regards Gottschalk's employment of

³⁰⁷ *Oeuvres Théologiques et grammaticales de Godescalc D'Orbais* (Leuven 1945).

³⁰⁸ Lambot, Introduction, xx.

³⁰⁹ Lambot, Introduction, xxiii.

Augustine's writings and ideas. At some later stage and in another context, the relation of this opuscle XXI to Gottschalk's writings on predestination could be further taken into account.

None the less a short sketch of Gottschalk's predestination theory has to be made here in order to see the material of the *Quaestiones de anima* in their proper context. Gottschalk started preaching his ideas on double predestination already on his journeys to Italy, from before 840 to 846, as the letters of Hrabanus of 840 and 846 show.³¹⁰ But it is far from clear when Gottschalk wrote many of his theological opuscles. Yet the historical context of the two main texts in which Gottschalk expressed his ideas on predestination is clearer. Gottschalk wrote the *Confessio brevior* to defend himself at the Council of Mainz in 848, and the *Confessio prolixior* to defend himself against Hincmar's *Ad reclusos et simplices* of 849.³¹¹ In the following sketch the opuscles will be used as well, however.

Gottschalk's theory is known as 'double predestination', of the elect to heaven and consequently of the reprobate to hell, citing among others Isidorus' *Sententiae* (*Gemina est praedestinatio sive electorum ad requiem, sive reproborum ad mortem*) as authority.³¹² In the *Confessio prolixior* Gottschalk would explain that this predestination is not actually double, but 'two fold' (*gemina* or *opus bipertitum*) since God is simple.³¹³ God's foreknowledge and predestination are therefore the same.³¹⁴ Yet it has different effects on different groups. The consequence of this position is that Christ's sacrifice was not made for the whole of the human race, but only for the elect.³¹⁵ Human nature alone therefore cannot be sufficient for salvation, but needs grace, all the more so since the Fall.³¹⁶ Free will therefore only can lead to slavery.³¹⁷ True liberty can only be attained when the will is directed towards the good by grace.³¹⁸

We will see that the ideas that Gottschalk expresses in his *Quaestiones de anima* do not so much concern this theory of predestination. Gottschalk will entertain a notion of, what I call, 'ontological predestination', i.e. that every individual human soul comes into being through a special divine volition. This kind of 'ontological predestination' is morally neutral however, as

³¹⁰ In 840 Hrabanus wrote a letter to Noting of Verona, 'Epistola V ad Notingum cum libro de Praedestinatione Dei', *PL* CXII, cols. 1530-53; in 846 Hrabanus wrote a letter to Eberhard of Friuli, 'Epistola ad Eberhardum comitem', *Monumenta Germaniae Historica Epistolarum* V (ed. Dümmler) (Berlin 1974), 481-7.

³¹¹ The *Confessio brevior* is in Lambot, 52-4 and the *Confessio prolixior* on 55-78. Hincmar of Rheims (ed. W. Gundlach), 'Epistola ad reclusos et simplices in Remensi parochia', *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 10 (1888), 258-309.

³¹² For this paragraph I have made ample use of Sancier (2005), 24-42. *Confessio brevior*, 52, 1-10 and 54, 15-6; Isidore of Seville, *Sententiae* 2.6.1.

³¹³ *Confessio prolixior*, 67, 4-68, 2.

³¹⁴ *ibid.*, 57, 13-9.

³¹⁵ *Responsa de diversis*, Lambot, 157-8. and Hincmar reporting in his *Epistola ad Egilonem Archiepiscopum Senonensem* in 866, Lambot, 46.

³¹⁶ *De praedestinatione*, Lambot, 185-6.

³¹⁷ *Responsa de diversis*, Lambot, 146-7.

³¹⁸ *ibid.*, 153.

opposed to the *gemina praedestinatio* of the elect and the reprobate. Yet Gottschalk's ideas on the soul, especially on the propagation of the soul and the universalisation of original sin in the *Quaestiones de anima* are very much in tune with Gottschalk's further ideas on predestination.

The *Quaestiones de anima* seems to be written for one specific addressee, and was in the first instance not intended to be released.³¹⁹ Even though it is not a long text (11 pages in Lambot's edition), it has the structure of a *De anima* text. It is therefore tempting -but speculative- to think that the book that Gottschalk pledged to write about the nature of the soul would have used this opuscle as its basis. As it stands, the text is directed to one specific reader, giving it a rather hybrid nature between epistle and a *De anima* treatise. As the structure will clarify, Gottschalk had two guides for his ideas on the soul, Augustine and Gregory the Great. Gregory the Great proved to be of minor relevance for Gottschalk, the major guide was Augustine. His thoughts about the origin of the soul set the terms from which Gottschalk's thinking for this *Quaestiones de anima* started out. But it also provided Gottschalk with the reason for writing it in the first place, since it is Gottschalk's 'discovery' of traducianism that prompts him to fix his thoughts in this debate in writing. The elements of a theory of the soul which do not directly relate to the question of the origin of the soul (e.g. soul as life of the body and the simple nature of the soul) are set up in direct quotations by Gregory and Augustine (see below), whereas the paragraphs which deal with the origin of the soul are written by Gottschalk. One might therefore say that if the genre of the *De anima* set the frame of the text, Augustine provided its focus. The structure can be analysed as follows.

³¹⁹ Gottschalk, *Opuscula Theologica*, 290. *Precor vos tamen propter dominum ut sit apud vos tamdiu secretum hoc scriptum meum quamdiu fuero sicuti nunc sum, quia certe sextus homo id est hoc anno completus est annus quod est hoc mihi a domino deo manifestatum et habeo factum votum hinc deo miserante et adiuvante cum placuerit ei scribere librum.*

'I beseech you, for our Lord's sake, that you keep this writing of mine as a secret with you for so long as I will be in the position that I am in now, since it is the case that with the spring of this year really the sixth year is passed that this has been revealed to me by the Lord our God and hence I have made a pledge to write a book, with the mercy and help of God, if it pleased him.'

This is an intriguing quotation. The context of the quotation clarifies that it is his conviction of traducianism. But was this insight of such an importance for Gottschalk to count the years hence and to have pledged to write a book? God's help and pity would have been scarce if this 11 page opuscle, a page and a half of which are direct quotations from Gregory and Augustine, would be the fulfillment of this pledge. The book is lost, if Gottschalk kept his pledge in the first place. Secondary literature does not mention any reference to a longer *de anima* type of work of Gottschalk in contemporary texts. Given the importance of the question of the origin of the soul for the predestination debate it is highly likely that his insight into traducianism was connected with his ideas of double predestination (which elaborated in paragraph 5), and it may even have served as a catalyst for these beliefs. This would place the time of his 'revelation' perhaps in Italy, but the writing of the *Quaestiones de anima* may rather have taken place in Hautvillers. The tentative *quamdiu fuero sicuti nunc sum* seems to refer to his incarceration, so that the *n.post quem* of the *Quaestiones* seems to be 849. If that is correct, it would suggest the *post quem* of the 'revelation' in 843.

part	page, line	content
I	283-284, 21	history of Aug.'s de <i>an. et or.</i>
II	284, 22-285, 14	uncertainty on the origin of the soul and statement of faith about the universality of original sin.
III	286, 15-287, 13	nature of the soul (=Greg., <i>Homil. in Ezech.</i> 2, hom. 5, n.9-11) ³²⁰ : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A) soul is life of the body B) the simple nature of the soul
IV	287, 14-288, 2	Three short paragraphs on the soul, the body, and the intellect. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A) is the soul self-sufficient? no, only truth=God, the soul can be fallacious (=Aug., <i>div. qu.</i> 1) B) did God make the body? yes, all beauty and good in as far as it exists comes from God. the body has some beauty and goodness, therefore it comes from God (= <i>div. qu.</i> 10). C) the human intellect comprehends itself, is limited to itself and loves itself it wants to know itself it loves itself. (= <i>div. qu.</i> 15).³²¹
V	288, 3-291, 12	Origin of the soul; Gottschalk's 'revelation' of traducianism. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A) Augustine's biblical evidence weighed against Jerome's biblical evidence, preference for Augustine. B) 'empirical' evidence: cutting the centipede in half creates two independent centipedes. <p style="margin-left: 40px;">conclusion: making/procreating is not proper creation, which belongs to God. since parents are not the</p>

³²⁰ PL 76, 990A-991B.

³²¹ In *qu.* 15 Augustine writes about the intellect in general, and there is no doubt that he includes God's intellect as well. In Gottschalk's text, however, the focus is clearly the human being, so that this quotation of Augustine is framed to talk about the human intellect only.

		creators of the soul, traducianism is possible.
VI	291, 12-294, 20	on the soul seeds. The human soul is sown into the womb by certain seeds. All the souls and their 'sowings' are predestined by God.

We can now see how the structure resembles a *De anima*. After an introduction or potentially a doxography, what follows is a description of the nature of the soul, followed by an analysis of the soul in the context of the whole person (soul, body, mind) and by an investigation of the origin of the soul. We have seen a similar structure in Cassiodorus (whose *De anima* Gottschalk mentions in the part where he describes the history of Augustine's *an. et or.*). It is clear that Gottschalk in this opuscle was not interested in the nature of the soul and the soul in the context of the whole person. As mentioned before, Gottschalk gives direct quotations from Gregory and Augustine which keep the level of information to a bare minimum. With respect to the quotations of the *div. qu.* 1, 10 and 15 one might add the following. It seems likely that these elements of the soul, body and the intellect were meant by Gottschalk to make up a theory of the whole of the human being. But if this is the case, Gottschalk did not deem it necessary as yet in this text to clarify that. These quotations on the nature of the soul and the relationship of the soul to the whole of the human person therefore seem to be condensed summaries, which he later meant to elaborate upon. In the rest of the letter however, which completely deals with the origin of the soul, Gottschalk himself is very present and the quotations he gives are short and to the point.

4.2 The origin of the soul: a case of agnosticism?

The real, and only, question of this text therefore is -again- the origin of the soul. This is directly clear from the beginning. We start in medias res with the history of the *an. et or.*, of which Gottschalk was perfectly aware. He refers to Augustine's *ep.* 166 to Jerome, 143 to Marcellinus, 190 and 202a to Optatus, tells how Vincentius Victor read and wrote against Augustine and how Augustine, notified by the monk Renatus, wrote the *an. et or.* against Vincentius Victor, addressed to Renatus and the priest Petrus.³²² Apart from the 'dossier' of these letters and the *an. et or.*, the

³²² Gottschalk, 283-4.

texts which Gottschalk employs are predominantly from Augustine's very early work (*an. quant., div. qu.*), besides one reference to the *contr. Iul.*, one of Augustine's latest works. The *Gn. litt.* seems not to be used in this text.³²³ It is possible that Gottschalk would have taken more extensive material from Augustine into account in his larger book.

The text's line of argument starts out on a familiar note. Augustine did not know what the origin of the soul was, whereas Pelagius was convinced of creationism. Gregory and Fulgentius of Ruspe followed Augustine in his agnosticism, just as Cassiodorus.³²⁴ Moreover, Gottschalk commends the person to whom this opuscle is addressed for his (rather than her) caution in this matter:

‘I felt this had to be remembered because your caution pleases me and the impudence of some others displeases me, in the same way as if for instance where the eagles are blind, the screech-owls and owls could see all the way through the mist.’³²⁵

A little later Augustine is praised for his agnosticism:

‘Among the many other things of the holy Augustine, who was laudably unsure about the origin of the soul, this most forceful expression was made in the Books against Julian,...: “Why do you flee towards the most obscure problem of the soul? For either it came from a transferral and hence it contracted sin, or if the soul was not drawn from there, it was sent into the body, which was liable to sin, and the soul was stained with sins and showed itself as sinner, just as the clean vase is soiled when something unclean is put into the vase.” ‘³²⁶

³²³ despite Gottschalk's use of *Sap.* 11.21 (‘Thou hast ordered all things in measure, number and weight’) in his last paragraph on the seeds of the soul. Since this is also one of Augustine's favourite bible quotations in -among others- the *Gn. litt.*, one might suspect the Gottschalk's use of the *Gn. litt.* in this paragraph. However, the content of this paragraph on the seeds of the soul is far from anything Augustine ever was prepared to consider.

³²⁴ Gottschalk, 283-4.

³²⁵ Gottschalk, 284-5. *Hoc idcirco commemorandum censui quia cautela tua placet nonnullorum displicet impudentia mihi, quasi videlicet ubi caecutiunt aquilae, ibi absque caligine cavanni cernant et ululae.* The eagles seems to refer at least to Augustine and the owls are at least to Pelagius. But it may well also refer to Gottschalk himself and some of his detractors.

³²⁶ *inter cetera multa sancti Augustini laudabiliter dubitantis de origine animae, hoc potissimum in Libris adversus Iulianum, ..., dicitur:* Quid fugis ad obscurissimam de anima quaestionem? Aut enim ex traduce venit et inde peccatum contraxit aut si inde tracta non est in corpus missa peccatis obnoxium et ipsa peccatis inquinata peccatrix inventa est, sicut inquinatur vas mundum si intra vas mittatur immundum.

This quotation from *c. Iul.* 2.10 would seem to set Gottschalk up for his conclusion:

‘Let us both therefore patiently remain in doubt together with such a great man, as long as we are in dark exile, and with us all the others who know that because of that single original sin we and all people ever had been worthy not only of that punishable ignorance about the origin of our soul, which we suffer with sufficient merit according to God’s just judgement, but also have been worthy of the perpetual torment of a hell whence from here specifically only thousands of little babies float, and that this is not only valid for those who had existed, but also for those who are born to be and for those which will be born to be’.³²⁷

And so Gottschalk seems to end the first two parts of his text with the wish that the origin of the soul remains hidden to us and our posteriors, just as it was hidden to our predecessors (*veluti latuit antecessores nostros sic etiam nos et posteros nostros lateat origo animae*).

4.3 It is indeed a case of traducianism

After a short intermezzo, Gottschalk takes up the origin of the soul again in the fifth part of the text. He sets scriptural evidence from Jerome³²⁸ (*John* 5:17 and *Eccle.* 12:7) off against some other Biblical texts (*Gen.* 46:26-7, *Ex.* 1:5 and *Hebr.* 7.9-10). It is worth noting that these latter Biblical texts are treated in Augustine, mainly in his epistles.³²⁹ Gottschalk prefers Augustine’s set of biblical texts, since they are more easily applicable in the explanation of the universality of original sin.³³⁰ Gottschalk chooses to explicitly identify Jerome, but not Augustine as his source. Maybe the biblical quotations of Augustine were commonplace for Gottschalk and his

³²⁷ Gottschalk 285-6: *Hinc ergo cum tanto viro, dum sumus [in] caliginoso exilio, patienter dubitemus ambo et nobiscum ceteri qui noverunt nos et omnes etiam propter illud solum originale peccatum fuisse, et eos qui nascuntur esse, et illos qui nascituri sunt fore dignos non modo hac poenali ignorantia de origine anime nostrae quam patimur satis merito iusto dei iudicio, sed insuper etiam perpetuo gehennae quo fluunt hinc solummodo multa milia parvulorum supplicio.*

³²⁸ with Lambot 288, Jerome, *Commentarius in Ecclesiasten* 12.6/8, line 270-1 in CCSL 72 (ed. Adriaen) and *ep.* 126.1, line 12-3 in CSEL 56 (ed. Hilberg).

³²⁹ *ep.* 143, 8-9; *ep.* 166, 5.11 and 8.26; *ep.* 190, 5.18. Lambot states in p. 289 that ‘De Exod. et Hebr. nihil inveni in Augustini operibus animam tractantibus.’ This can be augmented by *Gn. litt* 10.19.34 and *qu. in hept* 1.43.

³³⁰ Gottschalk, 289. *Mihi tamen plus incomparabiliter placent (i.e. the second set of scriptural evidence) ad nostrum sensum quam illa quae secundum sancti Hieronimi sunt prolata commentum id est expositum, quia revera propter originale peccatum multo magis mihi placet sensus et sententia nostra quam sua quia profecto non est firma.*

‘But they please me for my ideas incomparably more than those which were put forward according to the commentary, i.e. the explanation, of the holy Jerome. For indeed on the account of original sin, our opinion and judgment please me much more than his, which really is not firm.’

intellectual circles, or maybe he wanted to keep his powder dry and keep Augustine's authority for the argument which will settle the debate on the origin of the soul. For after his judgement of this biblical evidence, Gottschalk introduces a piece of 'empirical' evidence, referring to *an. quant.* 31, which will settle the debate. Separating a centipede, the two parts will go their separate ways. It is as if from one soul, two souls can be made. Gottschalk 'reads the book of nature' in a way which is also favoured by Augustine (e.g. the life of the fire salamander in the volcano explains the possibility of the eternity of the soul in the flames of hell in *civ.* 21.4). If human beings can separate the soul in a centipede, how much more certain is it that God 'is so much more able -- in the same way as he created, is creating and will create --, to create a soul as if by transferral from another soul and to give it to each individual new-born' (...*multo magis potest sicut et fecit et facit et faciet tamquam de traduce animam de anima creare et singulis nascentibus dare*). Here Gottschalk stresses again that this is compatible with the universality of original sin.³³¹

What has happened in this paragraph? Gottschalk makes a very bold move, but his rhetorical strategy is somewhat below the surface. His first step is to give the biblical evidence of Jerome and Augustine, so that he repeats very briefly Augustine's and Jerome's debate on the origin of the soul. Jerome was a creationist, but Augustine was -as mentioned in other chapters, e.g. 1, p. 33, not convinced, since creationism makes the universality of original sin harder to defend. But Gottschalk does not lay down the terms of the debate on the origin of the soul, nor does he refer to the debate between the two church fathers or mention Augustine by name. Instead, he uses Augustine's authority in the second step, where he uses the centipede to break through Augustine's own agnosticism to a traducianist position. This is all the more noteworthy since Augustine in the very *an. quant.* 31 is unwilling to explain this phenomenon, since it might support a materialist account of the soul and rather tries to divert the mind of his conversation partner (Evodius) elsewhere. Thus, Gottschalk here uses this piece of evidence of the *an. quant.* for a very different discussion. For the question of the (im)materiality of the soul is not necessarily related to the problem of the origin of the soul. Gottschalk's need for 'misapplying' this text -or any of Augustine's texts for that matter- is clear, since he will not find any text of Augustine which will explicitly break through his agnosticism. But it is therefore all the more poignant that he uses Augustine himself in the first place to force the discussion into a direction Augustine would never have endorsed. For Gottschalk did not choose to simply state the natural phenomenon as a matter of fact, and draw his conclusions from there. Gottschalk rather put it in a very 'textual' context, elaborately explaining that this is from the *an. quant.* and what the

³³¹ Gottschalk, 290.

circumstances were in which Augustine came upon the phenomenon, as mentioned in the dialogue of the *an. quant.*³³² He explicitly ties the name and the authority of Augustine to this piece of information, which leads to Gottschalk's 'revelation' of the truth of traducianism.

Thus, where Gottschalk seemed to be following Augustine, he is rather using him as a stepping stone for his own insight. Yet, although it is Gottschalk's own insight, it is thoroughly bred through reading and contemplating Augustine. Gottschalk thus struggles in a way with the same problem as Eugippius, yet his strategy is fundamentally different. Gottschalk, not prone to strive for reconciliation between opposing parties or for the middle ground, clearly chooses one option. Yet, although certain, he is also afraid of the consequences, and thus asks his addressee to keep the text unpublished for the moment (see above n. 1). It is as if Gottschalk started out writing a text which would safely confirm Augustine's doubts, but in the end Gottschalk could not keep silent about his own conviction.

4.4 Seeds of the soul

But Gottschalk does not end his *Questiones de anima* with this realisation of traducianism. If the soul is transmitted through the generations, in what way does this come about? In a last paragraph Gottschalk draws some inferences from his traducianism about this question. The Latin, however, is difficult to read and one of the reasons is that Gottschalk maybe did not yet himself have clarity on the questions he was treating.³³³ He argues against an imagined interlocutor on the point of the seeds of the soul (*semen animatum*). What the seeds of the soul exactly are is presumed as known, but from the text it becomes clear that Gottschalk means male

³³² And even throws in a detail which is not in the *an. quant.* at all, namely that Augustine and Alypius and other disciples were sitting at the *mensa lusoria* (betting table) when they started maltreating the insects. Gottschalk here rather reminds us of *conf.* 6.7.11, where Augustine recalls how his classes healed Alypius from his betting addiction in Carthage. Gottschalk invents a detail, which is verisimilar because of the story in the *conf.* But the detail is also an obvious fraud -obvious at least for the people who have both texts at hand- for the story of Alypius takes place in Carthage, whereas Augustine informs us in the *an. quant.* that he came upon the phenomenon (much later) in the Ligurian (Italian) countryside. But with this detail Gottschalk opens up the opportunity to quote from ps. Cato's *Disticha*: *Trocho lude, aleam fuge* ('play with the hoop, avoid the dice'). The *Disticha* served as a school text to learn Latin and as a moral compass in the middle ages, so Gottschalk is probably referring to a piece of knowledge already in his readers mind and not showing off his erudite knowledge of classical texts. So why does Gottschalk include this detail and the quotation of ps. Cato? It remains a bit elusive, but in my opinion the detail serves to further construct the image of Gottschalk's extensive knowledge of Augustine, so to speak of Gottschalk's authority of the authority of Augustine. For if one wants to make a story more believable, adding some small details which give colour and flavour (as the movie 'The usual suspects' so nicely illustrates). The quotation of common knowledge then again brings the story closer to the reader. But eventually it is all a distortion, for it turns the mind of the reader away from the obvious fact that Augustine in no way whatsoever would endorse Gottschalk's use of his text.

³³³ Others speak in general about Gottschalk's 'intense and aphoristic style'. Ganz (1981), 297.

sperm, as the seeds are sown in the wombs of women. The immaterial soul thus has some material carrier to cross the generations.

4.5 Predestination

4.5.1 Ontological predestination

In this last paragraph, Gottschalk has one concern. He argues that every seed of the soul and its sowing in the womb with an new human being as a result, is fore-ordained.³³⁴ His evidence is biblical; God sometimes opens, or closes the wombs of women for childbirth, e.g. in *Gen.* 20:18, *Gen.* 30:22 and 1 *Sam.* 1:6-6. This scriptural fact is used to solve some problems with traducianism and a material seed of the soul. It sets human procreation apart from animal procreation (would Gottschalk say that animals are not predestined to be, or is there some kind of special human predestination?), and it prevents technical questions about the fate of souls which were tied to seeds that ‘did not make it’ into a human body. One might otherwise ask where the souls went that were attached to the seeds of unsuccessful instances of intercourse, or more importantly, whether the souls of unborn children would have to suffer (or enjoy) the fate of the soul of the father in the afterlife without having had life on earth itself and be without their own body in the resurrection. En passant the predestination of childbirth as explained in the Bible gives Gottschalk another argument against creationism. If God opens and closes the wombs of women, apparently there must be a seed of the soul. And why would that be the case if God would just create each soul anew, as the creationists have it? But otherwise Gottschalk remains silent on questions regarding the status of the ‘unborn’ soul in the parent (are they dormant? where are all the soul seeds stored? etc.). These inferences from traducianism and

³³⁴ Gottschalk, 291. *Ego quidem, gratis auxiliante clementia dei, propter evitandam vel evadendam difficilem vel potius difficillimam de seminibus animatis quaestionem vel obiectionem beati Augustini atque sancti Fulgentii scilicet post apostolos tam profundorum fluminum quam nihilominus luculentorum luminum mundi, tunc tantummodo humanum satum seri serendumque dixi, vel ut recordaris et scripsi, semen animatum quando dumtaxat est a deo corpus hinc praedestinatum ut esset vel sit animandum.*

‘Because of the difficult (or rather, very difficult) question or objection about the seeds endowed with life, ([a question] one would like to avoid or pass over), which was raised by the blessed Augustine and St Fulgentius (profound rivers and - after the Apostles- brilliant lights of the world as well) I said at that time that human planting (or, as you recall and as I wrote, ‘seed endowed with life’), has been and should be sown in such a way that it would be and is endowed with life, because, as far as this is concerned, a body has been foreordained by God [to come] out of it.’

I am grateful to Professor Maxwell-Stuart for his help with this translation, and all other translations from this last paragraph.

argument for predestination in this last paragraph are far from anything Augustine would have imagined.

The predestination Gottschalk is talking about in this last paragraph is, so to say, amoral and ontological. It does not have anything to do with predestination as understood by Augustine (and Gottschalk himself in the wider debate), that is, with the fate of the soul in the afterlife, or at the resurrection. Moreover, it does not state that the mass of the human race will have to suffer for the original sin they committed when they were as one person in Adam. It just states that the being *per se* of each human being in its composite of body and soul is fore-ordained. There is a special kind of predestination, a special kind of divine volition for the coming into being of each human person. There is thus a special relationship between God and each human being on the ontological level.

How does that compare with Augustine? It is clear that there is a special ontological relationship between God and the human being for Augustine as well. The human soul is after all a strange kind of being which does not follow the rules of the other created beings in that it has no precursor (like for instance a *ratio* or a seed), and although it is mutable like the rest of creation, it is also persistent like the divine. It is in this respect not strange that Augustine never came to a satisfactory solution for the problem of the origin (i.e. transmission) of this strange being of the soul. It is clear that the human holds a special position in Augustine's ontological scheme of things, and that God has a special ontological relationship with the human soul according to him. But this regards the human soul in general and does not specify individual souls. It is clear that there was a special divine act for the creation of Adam's and Eve's soul, but it is not clear that God determines each individual soul more than he does each individual tree. To my knowledge Augustine never states that God has a special will for the creation of each individual soul as Gottschalk does. On the other hand, the fact that in Augustine the soul has no precursor necessitates a special volition on God's part for each individual soul, but this is an implicit consequence. However, it is clear that the human body is not included in any of these special ontological deliberations; it is as much part of normal creation as any other living thing.

A likely reason why Augustine did not have to stress a special divine volition for each individual human being, or why he did not come so far to do so, is that the human soul already holds such a special place in the ontological scheme of things. It is clear for everyone reading Augustine that the special moral relationship between God and the human being (as underlined by the predestination question commonly understood) is underpinned by a special ontological relationship. The reason why God cares so much about us is because we are created in his image. The human soul thus stands out from the backdrop of normal creation. The human soul's

introduction, transmission and projected end needs some divine intervention, while normal creation proceeds in a more process-like manner once set in motion. If we compare this to Gottschalk's description of affairs, however, Gottschalk's human soul is disconcertingly normal. It is much more part of normal creation than it is for Augustine since it has a rather normal precursor in the seeds linked up with male sperm and is transmitted by the parents, just like the rest of living nature. How then is Gottschalk going to create a special ontological relationship between God and the human being in order to underpin the moral relationship? How is he going to show that the human merits God's special moral deliberations? As we have seen, with a *deus ex machina* Gottschalk comes with his divine ontological intervention in the form of a special divine volition for each and every soul, so that they are again distinguished from the rest of nature. The one on one predestination between seeds of the soul and actual souls, thus the idea that there are no more seeds than there will be actual souls and vice versa, that Gottschalk posits is relevant for technical reasons (to prevent problems with fate of seeds that did not make it) but it also serves a far deeper need. It is an expression of the deep 'personal' involvement that God has with the human being and justifies God's moral concern with the human being.

4.5.2 Relationship with Gottschalk's double predestination

Although Gottschalk's predestination in the last paragraph of the *Quaestiones de anima* is an ontological predestination, it is legitimate to ask in what way the *Quaestiones de anima* relates to the predestination debate in general. Gottschalk's main point of the letter, his insight into traducianism, is closely tied in with 'moral' predestination since traducianism serves as an easily understandable explanation for the universality of original sin, and this universality is a necessary element of Augustine's predestination theory. God can only justifiably elect individuals to dispense grace gratuitously if the whole of humanity is in a fallen state for which it has itself to blame. If humanity would not be in a fallen state, grace would not be necessary, and if this state was not our own fault, God should not elect gratuitously. Gottschalk's focus on traducianism has two effects.

Traducianism, and the universality of original sin which it serves to underscore, rather focus on the negative side of the coin of predestination. We have seen that Gottschalk professed his belief in the universality of original sin in the beginning of the letter (note 327, p. 97), and that in a rather pessimistic way. But we must realise that, even if Augustine would paint a bleak picture for humanity in general in his later anti-Pelagian works because of polemical necessity,

his focus was on the elect and the dispensing of grace, i.e. on the predestination of those that would be saved.³³⁵ Although there is therefore no mention of double predestination in Gottschalk's letter, it not only is compatible with it, but also serves as a step towards it. The numerous polemical formulations in this letter, and the fact that Gottschalk asks his reader to keep it secret also suggest that the predestination controversy was well under way when Gottschalk wrote his *Quaestiones*.³³⁶ It seems likely that Gottschalk acquired his traducianism through his ideas on predestination rather than the other way around.

Secondly, in order to make traducianism itself best understood, Gottschalk introduced the idea of seeds of the soul, which nearly levels the human soul with the rest of living nature and introduces some technical problems. Therefore Gottschalk needs a special divine volition for the existence of each and every human being so that it merits God's special 'moral' predestination. Compared to Augustine, Gottschalk's approach leads to a focus on the individual, whereas the individual was never a special concern for Augustine. This is in line with Gottschalk's views of 'moral' double predestination, which focusses on the individual as well. Double predestination shows that each individual human being has a determined fate, as opposed to Augustine's predestination, which only deals generally with God's gratuitous election of the saved from the mass of damned humanity.³³⁷

³³⁵ e.g. *ench.* 103 with the exegesis of I Tim 2.4 *Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri*. cf. BA 9, note 48, 409-11. James Wetzel (2001), 49 rightly talks about Augustine's doctrine of predestination as being encapsulated by the definition in *persev.* 14.35 (*Haec est praedestinatio sanctorum, nihil aliud: praescientia scilicet, et praeparatio beneficiorum dei, quibus certissime liberantur, quicumque liberantur*), which only talks about the elect, not of the damned. The fact that if you are not a saint, you are a member of the *massa perditionis* is for Wetzel not so much part of the doctrine, but its 'dark corollary'. I would maintain, however contentious, that the effects of the doctrine are pessimistic, nasty and grim, but that the doctrine itself is about the people who are indeed saved, however few they may be. The one who tried to make the corollary into doctrine would be Gottschalk.

³³⁶ e.g. the following -which I find telling- after the quote of note 334 Gottschalk follows up (291):

Namque cum dominus de duobus loquens atque de quinque passeribus dicat: Et unus ex illis non cadit super terram sine patre vestro et sine voluntate patris vestri, valde ridiculum prorsus id censui si vel coniciatur nedum dicatur a quovis tenuiter ne dico mediocriter acuto vel astuto, instar avivum vel more brotorum animantium semper aequaliter animatum semen humanum fusum fundi simul atque fusum iri.

'For because the Lord, speaking about two and five sparrows, says, 'One of them does not fall to the earth without your father' (and without your father willing it), I thought it very silly indeed if anyone were to interpret this, (much less say carelessly), as *my* saying, (without any great acuity or shrewdness), that human seed is always and invariably poured out and is going to be poured out, after the fashion of birds or in the manner or brute creatures.'

Gottschalk apparently earlier aired his views in some way and had to defend himself against all kinds of criticisms. This would explain both the straw man argument that he sets up in the last paragraph and his request for secrecy of the letter.

³³⁷ cf. Schrimpf (1982), 839.

4.5.3 Materialistic tendencies

Another consequence of Gottschalk's views is that he widens Augustine's special relationship between God and the human soul proper to God and the composite of human body and soul. The reason why Gottschalk is forced to do this is that his biblical evidence speaks about shutting up and opening wombs. Gottschalk reads this evidence literally, having to do with the human body and physical process of conception and childbirth. Therefore he posits materialistic seeds of the soul. Consequently, he has to state that there is a one-to-one relationship between body and soul so that no soul gets lost in the process of intercourse (spilling of seeds) without conception or 'premature' death of the father (before the sowing of the relevant seeds). But it is worth noting that this is a step which is not necessary in the first place; Augustine might have read Gottschalk's biblical 'closing' and 'opening' of wombs as a metaphor and it is perfectly possible to think of some way of transmitting the soul through the generations without tying it up to a material seed. The real problem lies with the mysterious connection between the human soul and the body. As long as one has not reached some view on the nature of this connection, a traducianist does not have to vex himself with the relatively minor problems of the technical nature of transmitting the soul through the generations. Augustine might have said that Gottschalk here is still fighting to open his spiritual eyes and rid himself of any materialism of the soul.

Regarding the material seeds of the soul one may remark that therefore this is a step that Augustine would never take, since it would provide a possible breach in the barrier he erected against any materialism of the soul. If one reviews the concepts of material seeds of the soul, traducianism (through which universality of original sin is easily plausible) and 'negative' predestination, one can see that although the connections between these concepts are not necessary, they do form a powerful explanatory scheme. The question whether the soul has a precursor and the question what God's justification is for condemnation of the soul, are fundamentally different. But coupled through traducianism the soul seeds explain the transmitting of souls through the generations and the transmitting of souls explains God's justifiable punishment of all souls from the first one. However, at a cost! The bodies of human beings are material and their seeds for the soul as well. The scheme becomes more powerful still if one would posit a material soul in the first place. Augustine would be abhorred by Gottschalk's way of thinking. Augustine breaks this possible scheme with the idea that everybody has sinned in Adam, traducianism or not, no materialistic tendencies needed.

6. Conclusion

Gottschalk is thoroughly rooted in Augustine's concepts. The problem of the origin of the soul, the universality of original sin, traducianism versus creationism (not to mention the parts on the nature of the soul, which are partly totally quoted from Augustine, or Augustine as described by Gregory) are ideas that he all treats with the understanding one has about those from Augustine's texts. But he draws his very own contrary-to-Augustine implications. If the Carolingians displayed a 'growing self-awareness' and 'intellectual confidence', this text is a perfect example.³³⁸ Gottschalk is not afraid to draw his own conclusions, and knows where he departs from Augustine. But, at the same time, Gottschalk also poses himself as the dispenser of Augustine's authority. I cannot help but feel that the whole history of the *an. et or.* in the introduction is meant as a show off of his own mastery of Augustine. In this respect the use of *an. quant.* 31 is telling. In the grey area of correct use of a text, Gottschalk chooses to highlight his intimate knowledge Augustine³³⁹, brushing over that this is the exact point where he uses Augustine himself to break through Augustine's problems of the origin of the soul, with the result described in the previous paragraph. As much as Gottschalk is formed by Augustine, he appropriates him for his own purposes in a way that could not be noted in Cassiodorus or Eugippius.

³³⁸ Otten (2001), 66.

³³⁹ cf. the trivia of the history of the *an. et or.* in the beginning of the text and the circumstances of the experiment of the worm note 332.

Chapter 5. John Scott Eriugena and the will to sin.

5.1 Introduction

5.1.1 Preliminary remarks.

In 851 John Scott wrote his *De divina praedestinatione liber* (hence *div. praed.*) in order to refute Gottschalk's idea of a double predestination.³⁴⁰ As the title suggests, the main focus of Scott's work is not the soul, but predestination. The work in which Scott explicitly and systematically deals with the soul is the *Periphyseon*. Yet for a number of reasons the *De divina praedestinatione liber* fits better in the focus of my present enquiry. The *Periphyseon* provides material enough to merit a full study, and indeed, such a study has been written.³⁴¹ Moreover, the focus of this enterprise is a review of the reception of Augustine's ideas on the soul. The emerging line is that the ontology of the soul became tied up with the propagation of original sin via traducianism or creationism. It therefore stands to reason to review Eriugena's *De praedestinatione* in order to see how he acquitted himself of this task. In this work Eriugena was thus developing his thoughts in a polemical way against Gottschalk, much as Augustine would develop his thoughts in the multiple intellectual battles he fought during his life. Even if Eriugena was building a model of the human being in his head, as I will argue in this chapter, Eriugena did not mean this work as a definitive summa of his outlook on the world. Moreover, Eriugena's ideas would change to a great extent in the *Periphyseon*, due to the incorporation of Greek texts in his thought. This would introduce changes into Eriugena's ideas on *nous* and it would have its effects on Eriugena's anthropology. This chapter therefore needs to read in the historical context in

³⁴⁰ To reiterate, this work was not written specifically against Gottschalk's *Questiones de anima* from the previous chapter. In fact, according to Madec's index auctorum the *Questiones de anima* were not used at all by Eriugena for the composition of this text.

³⁴¹ Otten (1991).

which the *div. praed.* was written, which is as a polemic, commissioned by Hincmar, against Gottschalk's ideas on predestination.

In a birdseye view, Eriugena's overall strategy is to change the discussion on predestination from an anthropocentric to a theocentric perspective.³⁴² His main point is that God is simple.³⁴³ From this position the other consequences follow: 1) God did not deliver an *opus bipertitum* of double predestination. Even if God permits the non-elect to pursue their road to damnation, his will and direction towards salvation are one and simple. 2) There is no difference between divine will and divine omniscience, or in this case, divine prescience. God's foreknowledge was causing trouble, since even if God as an eminently good being cannot wish people a bad fate, his foreknowledge of their end would still necessitate it. John Scott's argument is that 'prescient' is an inaccurate predicate if substantially applied to a being outside of time. Yet one might say that God's omniscience still necessitates the fate of the non-elect. Eriugena's answer to this is that sin turns the human soul from God and makes it tend toward nothingness, it 'unforms' the soul. Knowledge can only be of beings, all of which eventually have their origin in God. God can therefore not have knowledge as such of the damnation of human beings. The 'origin' of the fate of the damned lies in the free will of the human being, when it operates without or contrary to God's intention. It is the human will which drives the human soul away towards nothingness, which God by his very nature cannot necessitate and therefore cannot be held responsible for not know.

When it comes to the human soul, it is therefore the will which holds a main interest for Eriugena. Let us see how this is reflected in the way that he uses Augustine when talking about the soul. Given that the use of Augustine is one of the issues at stake in the whole predestination debate of the ninth century, it is not surprising that Augustine is very present throughout the whole of the work. Scott uses many and varied works of Augustine, which date mainly from the early and middle periods of his career, the *civ.* (412-27) and *corrupt.* (426-7) being the notable exceptions. Yet, when we look at the instances where Scott uses a citation of Augustine in which the soul is explicitly mentioned, there are but three sources: the *vera rel.* (391), the *lib. arb.* (387-

³⁴² cf. Otten (2001), 78-80, apart from the numerous more specialised articles which have appeared on John Scot's use of Augustine in the *De divisione naturae*.

³⁴³ Gottschalk in his *Confessio prolixior* (Lambot, 59) had used the axiom that God is simple to deny Hrabanus' and Hincmars' differentiation between God's predestination (only for the elect) and God's prescience (also of the damned). Gottschalk drew the implication that prescience equals predestination so that predestination has to be double. Eriugena used the same axiom against Gottschalk to deny the possibility of a doubleness of predestination, as will be shortly shown. Both used the axiom dialectically for their own purposes, but one might say that Eriugena's logics are the most 'pure'. cf. Stanciu (2005), 40; Madec (1977), 189.

395), and the *c. ep. Man.* (397?). These are all anti-Manichean works and therefore congenial with Eriugena's aim in his *De praedestinatione*. After all the main point of difference between the Manichees and Augustine (after his rejection of Manicheism) is their interpretation of evil. Augustine, in line with Neo-Platonism, rejected the evil God of the Manichees in favour of an undivided benign God and an origin of evil in the free will. In the *vera rel.* Augustine was concerned to show how God as 'the one' (*unum*) is the source of all being and that the human being should return to that source.³⁴⁴ And in the *lib. arb.* Augustine offers a theodicy by showing how human beings possess a free will and how this free will is responsible for sin.³⁴⁵ Furthermore, it is striking that books 7 and 10 of the *Gn. litt.* are not used in the *de div. praed.*³⁴⁶, just as *ep.* 66 (and the other ones). All these texts of Augustine are relevant for the propagation of the soul, and we are bound to conclude that Eriugena's considerations of the soul will be very different from what we have observed in Eugippius and Gottschalk. In order to investigate Eriugena's ideas on the soul the *div. praed.* one might take to Madec's index and look at all the instances of Eriugena's use of *anima* ('soul' as life giving principle) and *animus* ('rational soul' or 'mind') and see how they figure. Are they are used by Eriugena himself and if so with what meaning, or are they quoted from Augustine, and if so from which text?³⁴⁷ But Eriugena also

³⁴⁴ cf. Lössl (2007), 20-5.

³⁴⁵ cf. *retr.* 1.9.1.

³⁴⁶ Scott uses the majority of the *Gn. litt.* in the *div. praed.* Together with chapters 7 and 10, chapters 5, 9 and 12 are 'missing'.

³⁴⁷ *animus* might not be the first term to look for when one investigates the ontological discourse of the soul, since it refers more to the activities of the soul (memory, will, understanding and such) than the ontological arguments about the mode of existence of the soul per se, for which the term *anima* would be used. However, in Eriugena's case, the term *animus* would be as valid, since, as will be seen in this chapter, he assigns an ontological role to will (*voluntas*) in the *div. praed.* Should one use Madec's index for such an approach, one would find the following for direct quotations:

The instances where the term *anima* is used in direct quotation are nearly all from the *vera rel.* (except one from the *c. ep. Man.*), while the quotations with the term *animus* are nearly all taken from the *lib. arb.* (except one from the *c. ep. Man.*). These are the following citations:

Augustine		Eriugena	
<i>c. ep. Man.</i>	27.29	10.62-71	<i>animus</i>
	35.39	10.71-88	<i>anima</i>
<i>lib. arb.</i>	1.11.21-2	6.34-64	all <i>animus</i>
	1.16.34-5	6.69-81	
	2.18.48	7.40-67	
	2.19.50	7.68-80	
<i>vera. rel.</i>	11.21-12.23	16.176-210	all <i>anima</i>

included in his *div. praed.* an explicit anthropology over the course of chapters 4-8. I have chosen to focus on these chapters (and chapter 16 on sin) since it seems more relevant to understand Eriugena's arguments about the human being and how they serve in the context of the whole of the text, than to focus on only the use of the term and how it figures in quotations.

5.1.2. Structure of *De praedestinatione*

At the basis of Gottschalk's and Eriugena's different views on predestination lay a fundamentally different conception of the human being. Their disagreement was over what drives the human being to action. According to Schrimpf, Gottschalk saw the human action after the Fall as being completely caused by urges (being affected by *concupiscentia*), which can only lead to sin.³⁴⁸ The function of grace is to block an urge from causing a sin. In this view human beings were heterogeneous beings, who are not able to control their own actions. Against this Eriugena was to defend the human being as an autonomous and being with free will.³⁴⁹ The will therefore had pride of place in his treatment of the human being as done in his *De praedestinatione*.

Eriugena used two approaches³⁵⁰ with which he denounced Gottschalk's ideas on predestination and the human being, namely philosophy and 'faith' (*fides*). Eriugena believed that true faith equals true philosophy, explicitly invoking Augustine's authority on this point with a quotation from *vera rel.* 5.8, yet these two approaches lead to two different parts in the *div. praed.*³⁵¹ Philosophy deals with logical reasoning³⁵², and through an analysis of the term

14.27	5.216-35
20.38-9	16.137-75
23.44	17.104-16
41.77	17.116-120

³⁴⁸ Schrimpf (1982), 823-4. This might come as a shock, since this has not at all been established in the previous chapter. However, this assessment is not made on the basis of Gottschalk's *Questiones de anima*. Unfortunately Schrimpf does not seem to deem it necessary to provide annotation for his findings, other than for the one paraphrase of Gottschalk he gives from the *De praedestinatione*. For the rest he rests assured by mentioning Lambot's edition of Gottschalk's theological opuscles, but he also mentions his Schrimpf (1980), 164-74.

³⁴⁹ Schrimpf (1982), 825, 840 argues that the benefit of Gottschalk's view is that he could explain how one human being was saved, while another was not. For this he had to trade off the autonomy of the human being. Hraban, Hincmar and Eriugena were not prepared to accept the moral lethargy which they perceived this tradeoff to have, but therefore also lost the ability to show why one particular human being was saved, but not the other. Predestination is however not the first focus of this chapter.

³⁵⁰ cf. Schrimpf (1982), 834, 853-57.

³⁵¹ 1.1.4-16 for philosophy and 4.3.55-8 for faith. cf. Madec (1977), 184.

‘predestination’ Eriugena reasons on logical grounds against Gottschalk in chapters 2 and 3 that predestination cannot be double. From chapter 4 onwards Eriugena uses faith. The method used here is ‘that kind of reasoning which is called apodeictic’ (*illa rationis specie quae dicitur ΑΠΟΔΙΚΤΙΚΗ*). It would be interesting to know where Eriugena derives the term ‘apodeixis’ (‘showing’, ‘proof’, ‘demonstration’) from since the word *illa* suggests a specific source (it is itself apodeictic so to say), but Madec does not enlighten on this point.³⁵³ Eriugena himself does not further specify himself what he means by this. But it is clear that with the ‘apodeictic method’ Eriugena shows what the proper views are on the basis of religious authority, be it Scripture or *patres*, primarily Augustine. Moreover the (re)interpretation of modes of speech of Scripture and the *patres* as metaphors or figures of speech play a major part in Eriugena’s argument (chapter 9 explicitly deals with figures of speech and the necessity for using them for the divine).³⁵⁴ A significant example of such a reinterpretation can be found in Augustine’s formulation *ad eorum damnationem quos iuste praedestinavit* (‘for the damnation of those whom he justly predestined [to punishment]’) in *Ench.* 26.100. In chapter 12.2.22-43 Eriugena explained that it was a figure of speech and had to be understood *e contrario*.³⁵⁵ A telling difference between the two approaches of reason (logic) and faith (apodeictic) can be seen in Eriugena’s rejection of Augustine’s idea that God prepares before the start of time what he would do later.³⁵⁶ In chapter 2.2.31-37 Eriugena draws the inference (*colligitur*) that if God alone existed before creation and prepared, his predestination existed before creation too, so that no difference can be made between God himself and God’s action of predestination.³⁵⁷ In chapter 9.6 he rejects the same

³⁵² 1.1.18-27 through the *quadrivium* of philosophy of *divisoria* (dividing one into many, i.e. logical analysis), *diffinitiva* (determining one among many, i.e. definition), *demonstrativa* (to the hidden through the manifest, i.e. deduction) and *resolutiva* (from compound to simples, i.e. induction). On this fourfold division cf. Madec (1977), 6; Schimpf (1982), 854-6, and Stock (1980), 88 on the idea of a ‘fourfold plan as interpretative activity’.

³⁵³ Ganz (1981), 292, points to Aulus Gellius *Noctes Atticae* 17.5.5. (rev. ed. G. Goold 1952) *Argumenta autem censebat aut probabilia esse debere aut perspicua et minime controversa, idque ‘apodixin’ vocari dicebat, cum ea quae dubia aut obscura sunt, per ea quae ambigue non sunt inlustrantur*. ‘Furthermore, he thought that arguments ought to be either convincing, or clear and not open to controversy, and he said that the term ‘apodixis’ or ‘demonstration’, was properly used only when things that are doubtful or obscure are made plain through things about which there is no doubt.’ transl. John Rolfe.) The term ‘apodeixis’ is indeed defined in this quotation, however, for the purposes of understanding Eriugena, it does not elucidate how this makes an argument based on logic differ from a demonstration based on authority. What is for example the difference between apodeixis and the logical ‘species’ *demonstrativa*? However, the difference between Eriugena’s two approaches also has to be sought in the negative character of the logical one (rejecting Gottschalk through ‘pure’ reasoning) and the positive character of the ‘authoritative’ one (showing what in fact is the case on the basis of proper authority). This negative approach hardly merits the name ‘demonstration’.

³⁵⁴ cf. Madec (1977), 184: ‘...le *De praedestinatione* est, à ma connaissance, l’un des rares essais de critique du langage ou du discours théologique.’; Stock, ‘In search of Eriugena’s Augustine’, esp. 89-90. Since we are dealing with the anthropology in this chapter, the metaphors and figures of speech Eriugena uses, deal with interpreting Augustine’s texts in a favourable manner. They are not used to approach the content matter (the will) as such, since it is not divine but part of creation.

³⁵⁵ cf. 15.7.142-55 for Eriugena’s explanation of the figure antiphrasis. cf. Stanciu (2005), 56-7.

³⁵⁶ e.g. *persév.* 17.41, cited by Eriugena in 11.7.174-181 and *persév.* 18.47.

³⁵⁷ 2.2.31-7.

notion by explaining that the terms ‘predestination’ and ‘preparation’ can only be used of God as a metaphor (*...verba significativa...translative proferri sunt*).³⁵⁸

However, the differences between chapters 1-3 and 4-19 are not set in stone. For it is not to say that Eriugena does not employ authority or reinterpretation on the basis of figures of speech in the first three chapters, nor uses logical devices in the later chapters. But authority is not the basis from which Eriugena argues in these first chapters, rather a supporting argument. Authority has a different function in these later chapters, namely as the basis from which Eriugena proceeds, and this is reflected in the higher frequency of the authority, the increased length and specificity. Eriugena is wont to use more direct and longer quotations. Vice versa Eriugena uses logical devices (such as the ‘method of conversion’ (*conversione*) in chapter 12.1, i.e. the establishment of the bi-implication in a definition by switching the terms) in later chapters. But Eriugena uses these logical devices to interpret authority. It would therefore be too much to claim that Eriugena used altogether different methods. Rather he used two different approaches.

When it comes to the content of these later chapters Eriugena presents Gottschalk’s theory of double predestination as a combination of the worst of both worlds of extreme Predestinationism and Pelagianism. The Predestinarians denied free will to the human being, the Pelagians denied the efficacy of grace. Yet both are present in this world. Free will is necessary for the just judgement of the human being, and to deny grace would be denying the salvation of the world (*salus mundi*).³⁵⁹ This may not be a fair rendering of Gottschalk’s views³⁶⁰, but it does set Eriugena up for the way he will use his apodeictic method. He will show first that free will exists and is responsible for sin in chapters 4-7 and then what grace is in chapter 8. Thereafter he shows how predestination is properly understood, chapters 9-15. Eriugena argued in these chapters that evil is a privation and cannot come from God as the source of being. But evil and punishment are understood to affect this world. So in chapters 16-19 Eriugena has to give an account of the way that punishment for sins is actually effected which is compatible with his argument from chapters 9-15.

It is thus in chapters 4-8 that Eriugena develops his anthropology, added with chapter 16 in which the structure of sin and punishment is described in anthropological terms.

³⁵⁸ 9.6.137-9. cf. Stanciu (2005), 57.

³⁵⁹ i.e. Christ, given that this refers to *Titus* 2:11.

³⁶⁰ Schrimpf (1982), 833 argues this interpretation of *gemina praedestinatio*, which was also taken by Hraban and Hinkmar, is faulty.

5.2 Philosophical Content

5.2.1 Free rational will

Right at the start of Eriugena's apodeictic approach, in chapter 4, Eriugena's task is to establish that the human being has a free will in order to ensure his liability for just judgement. In chapter 8 he distinguishes free will from grace. It is in these two chapters that Eriugena establishes the 'substance' of the human being as the will.³⁶¹ When Eriugena speaks of 'substance' he means the soul, which, apart from his overall usage in the text, also becomes clear from the definition that he gives of the human being (8.4.73-4): 'The human being is a rational substance receptive of wisdom'.³⁶² This substance has a Trinitarian structure: being, willing and knowing (4.6.166-9; 8.1.9-12). For Eriugena's purposes, this means that 'the whole nature of the soul is will' (8.2.1-2). The rationality of this substance is guaranteed by the fact that the human being is created in the image and likeness of God (4.5.160-4).

So far so good, but it is essential for Eriugena to maintain that the will is free. Just as the human will was created rational in God's likeness, it was also created free (4.5.160-4). A rational will also implies a free will (4.5.157-60; 8.5.107-8), so that the freedom is substantially part of the will (4.6.173-5). The freedom of the will is also recognised in the universal desire for happiness (4.6.180-3; 5.4.98-101; 5.7.142-5). Freedom of the will means that there is no external cause which compels the will (5.4.88-98).

Augustine figures heavily in Eriugena's account of free will. First of all Eriugena's language in his account of rational free will mirrors Augustine. Madec has drawn attention how these reverberations aid the philosophical understanding, and on the basis of Madec's edition, these instances are easily compiled.³⁶³ Eriugena's use of *rationalis vita* in 4.4.105 is reminiscent of

³⁶¹ *Aut quomodo eam divina voluntas, summa videlicet universitatis ratio, quae nulla necessitate stringitur, quoniam sua liberrima potentia potitur, imaginem sui similem faceret, si non eius substantiam crearet voluntatem liberam rationalem?* 'Otherwise how would the divine will, that is to say the highest reason of the universe, being unrestricted by any necessity as in the greatest freedom it possesses its own power, how could he make it to his own image and likeness if he did not created its substance a free rational will?' All translations of the *praed.* are Mary Brennan's. For the ontological meaning of substance see paragraph 5.2.5, p. 129

³⁶² Madec, 50 notes that he does not know this definition from elsewhere. To me it seems that this is an original wording of the more traditional 'the human being is a rational animal', with the 'soulish' part already translated into 'substance' and wisdom added to tie the human being closer to God. Eriugena seems to have a tendency to rephrase things into his own words, as we shall see later with the trinity of 8.1.12 further in this paragraph.

³⁶³ Madec (1977), esp. 187-9. cf. Madec's classification of Eriugena's use of Augustine's texts for his own composition in the same article, 186-7: 1) longer direct quotations which are signalled 2) varied anonymous 'emprunts textuels' which are normally easily identifiable to the educated reader, except for some in the preface and

vera rel. 30.54. Another instance is the word *egestas* ('poverty', 'want'), which Eriugena uses in 4.5.146 for the idea that a base will impoverishes the person. Augustine uses the same word in *vera rel.* 12.23 (a will that desires inferior, i.e. mutable, things in 'a state of want' in *egestate* goes to hell), 20.38 (the Fall was the product of a will against truth so that the human being fell from eternity into time and from riches into poverty *a copiosis ad egenam* -*egenus* is the adjective of the verb *egeo* from which *egestas* is the noun-), and 21.41 (for the fallen human being the temporal forms are 'riches of poverty' *copiosa egestas*). Moreover, *vera rel.* 12.23 is cited verbatim by Eriugena in chapter 16.5.195-210. In these three cases, the word *egestas* has temporal overtones, and it is in this way that Eriugena's impoverishment, from eternity to temporality, has to be read as well.

Then there are certain paraphrases. In 8.1.1 *iam nunc pulsanda est divina misericordia* is a paraphrase of *lib. arb.* 3.2.5. This specific paraphrase merits a little more than just a listing. In the *lib. arb.* Augustine (or rather Evodius) 'evokes' God's grace to open its doors wide at a very crucial point: how can God have foreknowledge of an evil will, but not be responsible for it? The overwhelming importance of this question for Eriugena's text (and Augustine's for that matter) does not have to be pointed out further. And Eriugena places it at a similarly important point in his text: where do we find the difference between human nature and grace? (we will go into this in paragraph 4). This is not a 'random' paraphrase, but consciously chosen at a similar point in Eriugena's text, evoking Augustine; shortly after 8.2.24-5 *cum enim omne bonum aut deus ipse est aut quicquid ab eo est* is a paraphrase from *lib. arb.* 3.13.36 and *vera rel.* 18.35. In 4.5.147-8 *Ars igitur ipsa per quam facta sunt omnia* is a paraphrase of *lib. arb.* 3.15.42. The distinction between *uti* and *frui* is made, albeit not extensively, in 4.5.138-40 (God gave the will to the human being in order to use *uti* it well to enjoy *frui* him). This distinction cannot only be found in *doctr. chr.* 1.3-4; 1.37), but also in *div. qu.* 30.³⁶⁴ This last work at least was used more often for the composition of the *divina praed.*³⁶⁵

Apart from these resoundings of Augustine's language in Eriugena's writing, Eriugena also takes some themes from Augustine for his account of free will. The Trinitarian structure in 4.6 *esse, velle, scire* can be taken from *Conf.* 13.11.12. Madec states that he cannot find the

first chapter 3) locutions loosely inspired on Augustine's formulae and theses. Especially these last come into play here.

³⁶⁴ cf. Chadwick 'Frui', *AL* vol. 3, 70-5. Madec does not note this as having its source in Augustine, but to me this seems to be the case. Madec probably thought it was so well known that it was commonplace.

³⁶⁵ Madec in his index auctorum does not list the *doctr. chr.* but lists the *div. qu.* with 28 in chapter 2.1.10-4, and 2, 4, and 51 in chapter 3.6.175-6. Of these only the first one is 'certifiably' used. The last three are more 'thematic intersections'. Eriugena shows how the commandment of 'double love' does not divide love as 'double' predestination does not divide predestination itself. *div. qu.* 2 deals with the justice of the gift of free will, 4 with the cause of human perversity, and 51 with the creation of the human being in the image and likeness of God.

Trinitarian structure from 8.1, *essentia, voluntas, scientia*, in Augustine.³⁶⁶ The problem is that Eriugena here explicitly evokes Augustine's authority (*sancto Augustino credimus*). However, this problem is solved if we recognise the substantive forms in the second Trinitarian structure taken from the infinitives of the first. It is true, however, that the substantive form cannot be found in Augustine, and this may serve as a first sign that Eriugena internalised Augustine's abstract structures and treated them creatively.

Another theme is the universal search for happiness. This comes back in 4.6.180-3 (every unhappy sinner desires happiness), 5.4.98-101 (desire for happiness after the Fall is a sign of free will in human nature), and 5.7.142-5 (no one wants to live unhappy, which would be impossible if the will is subject to compulsion). The universality of the desire for happiness is a common theme in Augustine. Again the *lib. arb.* springs to mind. Madec lists *lib. arb.* 1.14.30 (everyone wants to live happy, but not everyone wants to live rightly, so that some are unhappy) and 2.9.26 (everyone pursues happiness, but some stray from the path of wisdom, which is happiness). This universal desire in *lib. arb.* may only be implicitly connected with natural freedom (but present since without free will we could not set out on our own paths towards happiness). But this step is set by Augustine, however in *c. Iul. imp.* 6.11 and 6.12, where Augustine explicitly interprets the liberty of the will in having a right or a wrong will and identifies the will with what we use to live happily (6.11 *nam si, ut dicis, boni malique voluntarii possibilitas sola libertas est, non habet libertatem deus, in quo peccandi possibilitas non est.* 6.12 *Immutabilis autem cum qua homo creatus est et creatur, illa libertas est voluntatis, qua beati esse omnes volumus, et nolle non possumus.*

It shows that the *lib. arb.* and *vera rel.* figure heavily in Eriugena, not only in his direct citations (cf. note 347) but also in the themes Eriugena chooses and resoundings in his language. A more abstract analysis of Eriugena's use of the *lib. arb.* and *vera rel.* for his anthropology is therefore necessary.

5.2.2 Forcing Augustine to free will

But what has to be focussed on first is the way in which Eriugena speaks about this will. His arguments for the freedom of the will even after the Fall, which were treated above, amount

³⁶⁶ note 9/19, 48. Madec's edition, however, is of course of great quality, and without it this chapter would not have been written. This does remind one, however, of Madec's own 'D'autres développements s'inspirent, en revanche, de manière plus libre de formules et de thèses augustinienne.' from (1977), 187.

to the idea that free will is part of the substance, the nature of the human being, and is therefore inalienable. 'For, although by sinning, he cast away the life of happiness, he did not lose his substance which is to be, to will, to know'. And 'If we say it was free will he had [lost], then he lost his nature. But if reason points out that no nature can perish, we are forbidden to say that he lost free will, which without doubt is a substance.'³⁶⁷ What the human being lost after the Fall is not the freedom of the will, but the 'strength and the power of free choice' (*vigor et potestas liberi arbitrii*) which was not in the nature of the human being, but from the grace of God.³⁶⁸

Eriugena backs this up in 4.7.190-208 with Augustine's authority, with a quotation taken from *persev.* 7.13-4.³⁶⁹ And indeed Augustine says there that after the Fall the human being needs grace in order to come to God and stay with him, since it is no longer in the 'power of free choice' (*in viribus liberi arbitrii*). But these two paragraphs of the *persev.* treat grace, and are not at all suited to Eriugena's task of showing how free will is anchored substantially in the human being. Worse, Eriugena is aware that Augustine might actually not be on his side on this one. He therefore offers the potentially most explosive quote from Augustine for him to defuse. He picks the following sentence from *ench.* 9.30: 'Misusing his free choice, the human being lost both himself and it'³⁷⁰ and comments that Augustine here meant to say that Adam did not lose his substance, his nature, but 'changed it into an inferior thing' (*sed eam [naturam] in inferius mutavit*).

This reinterpretation boils down to an outright aggravated violation of the *ench.*³⁷¹ Augustine exactly wants to say that with the Fall the human being lost his free will. The *ench.* continues with -and it is not strange that Eriugena chose his quote from it rather selectively- : 'For as a man who kills himself is still alive when he kills himself, but having killed himself is then no longer alive and cannot resuscitate himself after he has destroyed his own life--so also sin which arises from the action of the free will turns out to be victor over the will and the free will is destroyed. "By whom a man is overcome, to this one he then is bound as slave." (2 *Petr.*

³⁶⁷ 4.6.166-8 *Quamvis enim beatam vitam peccando perdidit, substantiam suam non amisit quae est esse, velle, scire. 172-5. Si dixerimus liberam voluntatem [quam perdidit post peccatum], perdidit igitur suam naturam. Si autem ratio edocet nullam naturam posse perire, prohibemur dicere liberam voluntatem perdidisse, quae sine dubio substantialis est.*

³⁶⁸ 4.6.185-6, vs. Stanciu (2005), 64.

³⁶⁹ Schrimpf would probably call this 'divine authority', in concordance with Eriugena's method of first giving Scriptural evidence before the *patres* and seeing how Augustine in this quotation speaks about the Lord's Prayer. However, Schrimpf can also not deny that this piece of divine authority is molded in the words of Augustine. Cf. Madec 32 for an omission of 'et' from Augustine in Eriugena's text.

³⁷⁰ *Nam libero arbitrio male utens homo et se perdidit et ipsum.*

³⁷¹ O'Meara (1977), 193 might say that this would not be undeserved: 'If Augustine had such marked fondness for so benignly interpreting doctrine of an opponent inconvenient to him [in e.g. the *civ.* and *acad.*], one is perhaps justified in raising the question if Augustine himself gives grounds on occasion for equally benign interpretation of himself?' Stock (1980), 97 goes somewhat further: 'Perhaps the highest compliment Eriugena pays to the bishop of Hippo [in the *Periphyseon*] is the attribution to him of tenets nowhere found in his works.'

2:19) This is clearly the judgment of the apostle Peter. And since it is true, I ask you what kind of liberty can one have who is bound as a slave except the liberty that loves to sin?³⁷²

The liberty left to the human being in this further text of the *ench.* 9.30 is the liberty of a slave. It is therefore questionable whether Augustine would agree with Eriugena's conception of the substantial freedom of the will. But Eriugena tries to convince his readers by lumping the two, substance and free will, together. No one, including Augustine would say that Adam after the Fall is no longer the same substance, i.e. a human being. But this does not mean that the freedom of the will is therefore guaranteed; that is what Eriugena wants us to believe. In other words, does the 'inferior thing' that we have become after the Fall retain the freedom of the will or not for Augustine? Is Eriugena on this point in contradiction with Augustine, or could there be grounds for Eriugena to think that Augustine is on his side and that he is only interpreting or systematizing him?

What thus does Augustine mean when he says that the human being lost both himself and free will through bad use of the latter? On the face of it, this is one of the more intricate questions in Augustine, and it would take Rist the better part of his *Augustine* to answer.³⁷³ This is not the time nor place to embark on another full scale investigation of Augustine's oeuvre, so under Rist's lead I will try to make a shortcut and give the bare essentials in this paragraph. The statement in the *ench.* is made by the very mature Augustine, around 421, so it is the views of the mature Augustine which come to bear here. They are that Adam had an unfailing moral compass which allowed him not to sin (*posse non peccare; civ.* 22.30, *corrupt.* 12.33). However, he did, and the human being through that first sin lost access to the unfailing moral compass.³⁷⁴ In other words, the human being loosened his direct tie to the truth in which image he was created, so that after the Fall we are prone to take sensory images of things as the things themselves and produce fictions about them, misguiding our actions (*mor.* 1.21.38; 'we now see through a glass darkly' *trin.* 14.5.23). However it is far from the case that whenever we do see the truth, we act upon it. We may see the truth and decide and want the right course of action, but when push comes to shove not do it (*conf.* 8.10.22). And worse, we have come to want things or goals we ourselves know to be bad, so that we even have conflicting wills (*conf.* 8.9.21). The will in other words is no longer in our power (*civ.* 14.15). Therefore we have not only lost knowledge of the external world, but also have become partly incomprehensible to ourselves. Who (apart from God)

³⁷² transl. Albert Outler. *Sicut enim qui se occidit, utique vivendo se occidit, sed se occidendo non vivit, nec se ipsum poterit resuscitare cum occiderit, ita cum libero peccaretur arbitrio, victore peccato amissum est liberum arbitrium; A quo enim quis devictus est huius et servus addictus est (2 Petr. 2:19). Petri certe apostoli est ista sententia, quae cum vera sit, qualis, quaeso, potest servi addicti esse libertas, nisi quando eum peccare delectat?*

³⁷³ Rist (1994), 29-202.

³⁷⁴ idem, 130-1.

knows what we will do in the future? Our memory thereby lost coherence even further. Not only do we not know who we are by having conflicting wills in the present, but our memory can also no longer connect ('distend itself to') our past, present and future as it was supposed to.³⁷⁵ Our humanity as once created and our personal identity have thus been shattered, we do not understand ourselves anymore.³⁷⁶ We lost both ourselves and our will through the first sin. The wages of sin is death (*Rom.* 6.23), but before our death we have already been weakened considerably. The result of our ignorance of truth and our weak will is that we are ever liable to sin. We are in a state of concupiscence (*concupiscentia* in *civ.* 14).³⁷⁷ A sign of this is that the instrument that we were supposed to have full control over now takes on movements of its own. Our bodies have become partly autonomous from our souls, as can be seen in the involuntary male erection (*conf.* 10.28.39; *Gn. litt.* 9.10.18). As a result, in this life even for the saints it is impossible not to sin in at least some small measure (*non posse non peccare*). All our misery thus started out with our loss of access to the truth and willingness to act upon it. Real freedom thus is not to do what we please, but to be subject to truth, as Augustine already said in the *lib. arb.* 2.13.37.³⁷⁸ We are therefore more free in the measure in which we manage to overcome our inhibitions and limitations towards that truth (*civ.* 14.11), which we can only fully reach after our demise, so that we will not only be re-created into Adam, but into something better, for we will no longer be able to sin (*non posse peccare*).

Eriugena thus was certainly right when he claimed that Adam changed into something inferior, but certainly wrong with his implication that Augustine thereby meant that the human being kept his free will. Shattered and inhibited, the will limps along and is unfree to actually find truth and right action unless supported by grace.

5.2.3 Reading the *lib. arb.* through Eriugena's lens

Yet is it not possible to make a case for Eriugena's ideas on the basis of the *lib. arb.*? We have seen after all how much inspiration he takes from this text. It would not only prove to be

³⁷⁵ cf. *idem*, 139.

³⁷⁶ I know no better literary expression of this than Augustine's own *conf.* 10.16.25: 'Assuredly, Lord, I labour here and I labour within myself; I have become to myself a land of trouble and inordinate sweat.' *Ego certe, domine, laboro hic et laboro in me ipso: factus sum mihi terra difficultatis et sudoris nimii*. This quotation has been made 'famous' through Heideggers' use of it in *Sein und Zeit* 1.1.9.43-4.

³⁷⁷ cf. Rist (1994), 135-8, Bonner, 'concupiscentia', *AL*, 1116.

³⁷⁸ cf. Rist (1994), 132.

an indication yet again of the importance of the *lib. arb.*, but also show that Eriugena actually read other texts of Augustine through the lens (or rather his lens) of the *lib. arb.* I believe that a case for Eriugena can be constructed from especially the beginning of book three. The beginning of this book has special relevance for Eriugena since it discusses how the prescience of God does not necessitate the individual human will, what sinning and its effects are and how sinning souls fit in the order of the universe.

5.2.3.1 Does freedom mean control of the will?

One of the main points of the *lib. arb.* in this discussion, and in fact of the *lib. arb.* overall, is the idea that what we have most control over in our lives is our will itself, an opinion that Augustine would later abandon.³⁷⁹ Does this control imply a freedom of the will? That rather depends on the concept of freedom one adheres to. We have seen that Augustine's conception of freedom is 'free from limitations'. Augustine would thus answer negatively, since even in our greatest power the human being encounters limitations (Eriugena does not disagree with this). But Eriugena adheres to a different conception of freedom. Eriugena thinks of freedom as 'free from compulsion through an external cause'.³⁸⁰ Freedom for Eriugena means not being forced or motivated externally, being self-moved instead of 'bumped along' like a billiard ball colliding with other balls. And this kind of freedom disregards however broken or faulty we may be inside. Eriugena chose this different conception of freedom through his commitment to individual responsibility. That calls for this staunch defence of the freedom of the will that is being scrutinised here. It implies for Eriugena that God cannot drive the human being to thought or action. Neither to the bad through his foreknowledge, but then in equal measure also not to the good through grace.³⁸¹ If grace can sometimes seem a sufficient cause for good action or thought in the late Augustine, it has a much diminished causal efficacy in Eriugena, where it can only serve as a necessary but not sufficient cause. In other words, God can provide the individual

³⁷⁹ In similar, almost formulaic wording in: 1.12.26 *Quid enim tam in voluntate quam ipsa voluntas est?* and 3.3.7 *Quapropter nihil tam in nostra potestate quam ipsa voluntas est.*

³⁸⁰ 5.4.86-98, specifically 88-93: *Ubi intendendum est nullius voluntatis esse veram libertatem, si aliqua causa eam coegerit. Igitur si humanam voluntatem aliqua causa praecedat, qua eam invitam extorqueat ad bona malare vel cogitanda vel agenda, sequitur non solum non esse eam vere liberam, sed penitus eam non esse.* 'In this matter it must be understood that there is no true freedom of any will if some cause has imposed compulsion. Therefore if some cause precedes a human will which by force compels it, though unwilling, towards good or evil thoughts or actions, it follows not only that it is not truly free but that it is not free at all.'

³⁸¹ cf. Stanciu (2005), 60.

with all the grace he wants, if the wicked individual lacks his personal good will, the good is not going to happen. This makes for at least a weak explanation of the Fall, for it explains partly how Adam could have all the grace he could wish for but still sin (but not why he actually sinned).

If we return to the question whether internal inhibitions cause a loss of freedom of the will, Eriugena would answer that the individual human will can have all the inhibitions possible, but as long as it is not necessitated externally it remains free.³⁸² Since the freedom of the will translates itself into the freedom of movement of the individual will, as we will see in the next paragraph, this conception of freedom as ‘free from external causation’ really is a natural philosophical interpretation. In *lib. arb.* 3.17.48-9 Augustine makes clear that the human will is the starting point for his investigation into the cause of sin, and that asking for the causes of the will itself will lead to an endless regression, which for Eriugena can only mean a confirmation of his thinking the will as free, since in this natural philosophical conception of freedom the will is its own starting point of the movement of the soul. For Eriugena eventually this is but a more formal way of stating that what we have most control over is our will.

5.2.3.2 Concupiscence does not preempt free will

What then are the effects of the Fall in *lib. arb.* and what is the place of concupiscence, since the later Augustine attributes the shattering and loss of freedom of the will to this? Augustine does not employ *concupiscentia* as a technical term yet and only mentions it once as ‘carnal lust’ (*carnalis concupiscentia* 3.19.53, equivalent to the *carnalis consuetudo* in 3.18.52), although this is not yet to be seen as exclusively, or even predominantly sexual³⁸³, but here in the *lib. arb.* as the temptations of the delights of any of the senses. As the effects of the Fall it identifies *ignorantia* and *difficultas*, and *concupiscentia* is identified with the latter.³⁸⁴ This is how Augustine explains it:

³⁸² Moreover, paragraph 5.2.6, p. 132-3 will clarify that Eriugena means these inhibitions to take place on the level of the individual will (the individual movements of the will), not in the nature of the human will itself (the will as the cause of the individual movements of the will).

³⁸³ Bonner, ‘concupiscentia’, 1113 in *AL* vol. I, 113-1122.

³⁸⁴ *lib. arb.* 3.19.53 “*Si Adam et Eva peccaverunt, quid nos miseri fecimus, ut cum ignorantiae caecitate et difficultatis cruciatibus nasceremur et primo erraremus nescientes quid nobis esset faciendum, deinde ubi nobis inciperent aperiri praecepta iustitiae, vellemus ea facere et retinente carnalis concupiscentiae nescio qua necessitate non valeremus?*” cf. Rist (1994), 135-6.

‘This penalty for sin is completely just: Someone loses what he was unwilling to use well, although he could have used it well without trouble had he been willing. That is, anyone who knowingly does not act rightly thereby loses the knowledge of what is right; and anyone who was unwilling to act rightly when he could thereby loses the ability when he is willing.’³⁸⁵

According to Augustine, ignorance and the weakness of the ‘flesh’ to act upon what is understood as being right (*difficultas*) bar one from knowing what is right or acting upon that knowledge. Other than the later concupiscence, which is a permanent state of liability, *difficultas* here means, in Rist’s words, ‘trying and failing’ in actual cases of employment of the will.³⁸⁶ But does that impinge on -as Eriugena would say- the substantiality of free will? Augustine is unequivocal: ‘But to approve falsehoods as truths so that one errs against one’s will, and to not be able to hold oneself back from lustful actions due to the relentless and tortuous affliction of carnal bondage, is not human nature as originally established, but the penalty after being damned. When we speak of free will to act rightly, obviously we are speaking of it as human beings were originally made.’³⁸⁷ Augustine’s implication is, even in the work in which he is supposed to be the most optimistic concerning free will, that after the Fall the human being no longer enjoys free will. But Eriugena would say that these limitations do not provide external constraints on the will and therefore do not restrict the will in its movement. Moreover these limitations concern individual human beings, but not the nature of the human being, as created by God, whether before or after the Fall. From Eriugena’s standpoint we always enjoy our free will. It is just that after the Fall we need grace as an external factor as well in order to do good. When we act badly it is exclusively owed to our own free will. Yet however we act, our free will is the starting point of the action. And, more relevantly, Augustine himself is keen to point out that we can still employ our will to lift us from our state of sin -wherein he does show his optimism-: No human being has been deprived of knowing how to investigate advantageously matters of which it is disadvantageous to be ignorant, or the need to confess humbly his weakness, so that He Whose support is unerring and effortless support the person who

³⁸⁵ *lib. arb.* 3.18.52. *Illa est enim peccati poena iustissima, ut amittat quisque quod bene uti noluit cum sine ulla posset difficultate si vellet; id est autem ut qui sciens recte non facit amittat scire quid rectum sit, et qui recte facere cum posset noluit amittat posse cum velit. nam sunt revera omni peccanti animae duo ista poenalia, ignorantia et difficultas.* All translations from the *lib. arb.* are Peter King’s. The whole of this paragraph is key for Augustine’s description of the effects of the Fall in the *lib. arb.*

³⁸⁶ Rist (1994), 137.

³⁸⁷ *lib. arb.* 3.18.52 *Sed adprobare falsa pro veris ut erret invitus, et resistente atque torquente dolore carnalis vinculi non posse a libidinis operibus temperare, non est natura instituti hominis sed poena damnati. Cum autem de libera voluntate recte faciendi loquimur de illa scilicet in qua homo factus est loquimur.*

investigates and confesses.³⁸⁸ And so the will may not be able to bootstrap itself out of the swamp of sin unaided à la von Munchhausen or as the Pelagians would have it, but an effort of the will is still required on the part of the human being according to Augustine. Does that not require the will itself to have some measure of freedom even after the Fall in at least the choice to accept help or not? In Eriugena's framing of affairs: the human soul still needs to move itself, even if it receives help in moving in the right direction. Augustine starts 3.18.52 out saying that it should not be a surprise that we do not (after the Fall) have 'free choice of the will' (*arbitrium liberum voluntatis*). Eriugena agrees: we are hampered in our free choice (*arbitrium*) after the Fall through ignorance and difficulty. But even after the Fall the will (*voluntas*) itself, that one is free.

5.2.3.3 Persistence of the sinning soul

We have now seen two readings of the beginning of book three of the *lib. arb.* with which Eriugena can support his views on the substantiality of free will: the will as that over which human beings have most control and the effects of the Fall as external limits to the choice of free will, but not to free will itself. But there is a third reading that Eriugena could list as support. *Lib. arb.* 3.11.32-13.37 deals with the place of the sinning soul in the world and how it still has a place in the order and beauty of the universe. In this context Augustine discusses 'corruption' (*corruptio*) of natures in the most general of terms in 3.13.36 in order to show detractors that every nature (substance) as created being is good, even if corrupted. With a *reductio ad absurdum* Augustine shows that a complete corruption of the good created being is impossible. For a completely corrupted good loses all its goodness and thereby becomes incorruptible. This would mean that a nature would be rendered incorruptible by corruption. Augustine employs this argument in order to show that even the sinning soul is a good. But Eriugena would take from this, apart from the remaining goodness of a nature, especially a confirmation of the persistence of being of a nature throughout corruption, in this case the human soul. The human being loses something in the process of corruption, but needs to retain its substance. The example of the slave a few paragraphs earlier 3.11.34 takes on a new meaning: 'The rags of a condemned slave are vastly inferior to the clothing of a well-deserving slave held in high esteem by his master, yet the slave himself is better than any expensive clothes, since he is a human

³⁸⁸ *lib. arb.* 3.19.53 *Nulli enim homini ablatum est scire utiliter quaeri quod inutiliter ignoratur, et humiliter confitendam esse imbecillitatem, ut quaerenti et confitenti subveniat ille, qui nec errat dum subvenit nec laborat.*

being.³⁸⁹ Augustine uses this example to show that the soul retains a value, whether in a celestial or corporeal body, Eriugena can take from this that however much changed for the human being throughout the Fall, the soul as such remained, which in Eriugena's terms means that the human being's substance remained so that will itself is unchanged.

These three readings of the beginning of book three may be conjectural, but they show in which way Eriugena on his premises well felt supported by the *lib. arb.* and used it with gusto. Once one accepts that Eriugena and Augustine employ different concepts of freedom, i.e. 'unconstrained by necessity/self-moving' versus 'uninhibited', one can see how Eriugena is able to blatantly disregard Augustine's assertions of the loss of free will after the Fall, while still enlisting Augustine's support for his overall view of the human anthropology. Moreover concupiscence in the *lib. arb.* is not so much an inner failing or shattering of the will itself, but an external impediment, barring rightful function of the will, but leaving the will as being intact. This again is in accordance with Eriugena's conception of free will after the Fall. After reading the *lib. arb.* through this particular lens, Eriugena can consequently use the *lib. arb.* to interpret the rest of Augustine's oeuvre.

5.2.4 Motion of the will

There are several reasons why the soul for Augustine and Eriugena can be said to have motion, which will turn out to be tied together in order to make a neat theodicy. A first reason is that the soul is mutable (thus not divine), as was the young Augustine's argument against the Manicheans. This implies motion of the soul in itself. With this motion it can turn towards or from God. A second reason is that the prime function of the soul is to animate the body, thus provide it with automotion (in the traditional Aristotelian distinction between externally moved bodies and automotive bodies). This in itself does not provide the soul with motion. After all, if the soul may be compared to a hinge around which a door (the body) pivots, the hinge itself stays motionless.³⁹⁰ Yet the soul does not only serve the function of 'motivator' to the body. For the workings of the soul are self-reflexive. This can be seen in the other functions: the understanding can understand itself (or at least try, we are less optimistic now than Augustine,

³⁸⁹ *Pannosi quippe vestis damnati servi multo est inferior vesti bene meriti et in honore magno apud dominum constituti, sed ipse servus melior est qualibet veste pretiosa, quia homo est.*

³⁹⁰ *div. qu.* 8.

Descartes and Kant were) and memory can realise its internal space.³⁹¹ The soul thus also moves itself or, in other words, the will can will itself. Concomitant to this is the idea in (neo)Platonism that thinking itself is movement of the mind (*motio animi*, *motio mentis*). In a theodicy (as the *lib. arb.* and the *div. praed.* essentially are) these two grounds for motion of the soul can be powerfully combined: if the soul moves itself, God cannot be held responsible of the bad movements (evil will). Then God can only be held responsible for the bare fact of creating in the first place. And most people rather exist and live, even if unhappy, than not at all.³⁹²

Let us see how the motion of the will figures in Eriugena's text. But before we come to the human will I would like to take a short detour via divine will. As the human being is created in the image and likeness of God, so that we are in a way 'small gods', God is supposed to portray on a grander scale what goes on in the human soul. Eriugena's view of God thereby elucidates his argumentation for the human being. As goes for the human soul, God's being too is identical to willing.³⁹³ Reminiscent of *div. qu.* 28 and *Gen. adv. Man.* 1.2.4 Eriugena makes the argument that since there is no thing greater than God's will, there cannot be a cause to God's will (a cause being greater than the effect). In fact God's will is the cause of all that exists. Since God's will is such a special case in nature, its powers of creation themselves not being under any compulsion or necessity, Eriugena gives it a special aetiological name.³⁹⁴ He is not a 'necessary cause' (*causa necessaria*)³⁹⁵, or a compelling³⁹⁶ cause (*causa coactiva*), but the 'voluntary cause' (*causa voluntaria* 4.5.134-6; 5.5.108-12).

The human being also exhibits this voluntary cause.³⁹⁷ In this way the freedom of the will (both God's and the human being's) has to be understood as a special cause which stands outside of the normal natural order. But even if the wills of the human being and of God are similar, they are not equal. The freedom of the human will implies a mutability, since choices are made in the temporal universe, whereas God's will is not subject to change.³⁹⁸ This mutability of the human will means movement, so that the human 'voluntary cause' implies a motion of the

³⁹¹ *conf.* 13.11.12; *trin.* 10.10.13; *ibid.* 10.11.18; *civ.* 11.26, 11.28.

³⁹² And if you say you don't Augustine will call you a liar. *lib. arb.* 3.6.18. To disagree and commit suicide is either the highest blasphemy Augustine could think of, or an act committed out of error.

³⁹³ 2.1.17-20.

³⁹⁴ Given that we are here not in a natural philosophical world, but in an 'ethical', the term 'prime mover unmoved' would not do, albeit that it certainly conveys the same meaning.

³⁹⁵ i.e. he is not himself necessitated. He is of course the necessary cause for something else to exist. This naming is a matter of perspective.

³⁹⁶ *Coactiva* is placed opposite to *libertas*, e.g. in 5.7.144-5, so that the word 'compulsion' carries the right connotations.

³⁹⁷ 5.5.112-7.

³⁹⁸ 8.6.113-21.

human will.³⁹⁹ The freedom of the human will, i.e. not being compelled or necessitated externally, takes on the meaning: being self-moved.⁴⁰⁰

Eriugena's treatment of the motion of the will in 8.7-9, which falls in the context of the difference between nature and grace which will be treated in the next paragraph, is in its totality both an exposition of and a conversation with Augustine. First Eriugena has to argue more tightly that the human will is indeed self-moving. Could there be causes for external movement of the human will? If the cause is greater than the effect, the mover has to be greater than the moved. So yes, a greater being, i.e. God, could move the human soul, but an equal (human or angelic/demonic) or lesser (presumably an animal, or a lesser -i.e. less virtuous- human soul) could not. As far as God is concerned, Eriugena already established that if God did not create the will totally free, thus self-moving, there is no basis for God's judgment of the human being.⁴⁰¹ Madec here only reluctantly refers to *lib. arb.* 1.11.21.⁴⁰² But given both the similarity of the argument to the *lib. arb.* and the other instances of Eriugena's leanings on that text, there is no reason to hesitate. In Augustine the argument, of which 1.11.21 is but the conclusion and summary, is rather more extensive. *Lib. arb.* 1.7.16-1.8.18 Makes the human rational minds stand hierarchically above animal souls because of the human knowledge of being alive, 1.8.18-1.10.20 places virtuous minds which govern impulses above those governed by desire, and states that in a virtuous mind the desire to subjugate a peer would instantly make the mind less virtuous and thus lesser and incapable. 1.10.21-1.11.21 establishes that God is just and therefore does not enslave. Of this longer argument, Eriugena takes the conclusion, not the path towards it, but to me there is no question of his involvement in Augustine. Eriugena's 'tweak', so to say, consists of underpinning the argumentation with another principle. Augustine uses the principle that beings of greater power have more moral value (with the consequence that the human mind cannot be subjugated by lesser minds or will not be subjugated by better ones). But Eriugena applies the principle that the cause is greater than the effect to Augustine's argument (the will cannot be moved by lesser wills and will not be compelled to move by greater ones). In the Neoplatonic scheme of things, these principles are an expression of the same hierarchical universe. But this principle rather suits Eriugena better since is more suited to the natural philosophical context of the motion of the soul.

³⁹⁹ 5.5.112-3; 8.7.122-3.

⁴⁰⁰ 5.8.153-7; 8.7.122-3.

⁴⁰¹ 5.8.153-7; 4.3.

⁴⁰² Madec, 52. 'Ce raisonnement s'inspire peut-être d'Augustin'.

Thus Eriugena has now established that the motion of the human mind is an effect of the voluntary cause implanted in it by God.⁴⁰³ The motion the mind went through was first a turning towards God, then towards itself. The turning towards God and towards oneself is a familiar theme in Augustine, and can be found in, again, the *lib. arb.* (3.1.2). However, this latter passage seems significant for Eriugena and not only because it just is inches away from the ‘knocking on heaven’s door’ of 3.2.5 (which Eriugena paraphrases in this same chapter at 8.1.1 as we have seen). For here in the *lib. arb.* the turning of the soul towards or from God is explicitly connected with the voluntary motion of the soul. In 3.1.1-2 the discussion between Augustine and Evodius is about the difference between natural and voluntary motion. The downwards motion of a stone is natural and therefore not reprehensible, whereas the motion of the soul towards its own goods (by implication also downwards) is voluntary and thus to be judged. The interesting thing is that Eriugena also speaks of the ‘natural motion’ (*motus naturalis*) but then ascribes it to the human soul, so that its natural motion is the voluntary motion that is to be judged. This may be confusing, but Eriugena has to do this, since his chapter here is on the difference between natural free will and free will under grace. He cannot abide by Augustine’s distinction between amoral natural motion (of a stone) and voluntary motion which can be valued. But the conclusion is that he uses the same language as Augustine, and with the same meaning, but with a slightly different expression.⁴⁰⁴

As is Eriugena’s normal procedure from chapter 4 onwards when he started the apodeictic method, he includes Augustine’s authority to back his argumentation up. When treating the motion of the will Eriugena chooses to cite *lib. arb.* 2.1.3 for this.⁴⁰⁵ Right at the start of book 2 of *lib. arb.* Evodius asks Augustine why God gave free will, with which many sin, to the human being. Augustine gives three reasons, which provide Eriugena’s authority: 1) a person needs to have free will to act rightly 2) the purpose of free will is to act rightly, not to sin 3)

⁴⁰³ More exactly, in 8.7.144-6 Eriugena says that the motion of the human mind is due to two causes ‘one of which is a superior cause which all natures have in common, the other inferior, which is created in the human being itself’ (...*humanae substantiae motus naturalis...duplici causa effici persuasum est, quarum una superior quae naturarum communis est omnium, altera vero interior quae in ipsa humana substantia est constituta...*). The first, more general cause is the bare fact of existence.

⁴⁰⁴ While writing about the motion of the mind, it seems that Eriugena is trying to incorporate as much of his erudition of Augustine as possible. Right after analysing the cause of the motion in the human mind, he goes on to make the distinction between God’s motion, which is outside of time and space, the motion of the mind, which is inside of time but outside of space and the motion of the body, which is in time and place, which is strongly reminiscent of *Gn. litt.* 8.20.39.⁶⁵ It does not serve any purpose in Eriugena’s argument, already having established that the human mind is in motion and that it is automotive and therefore solely responsible. Moreover it could raise questions, for Eriugena seemed to have linked the motion of the human mind with the mutability of the human soul, concluding in *div. praed.* 8.6 that the liberty of the human soul means mutability, and directly treating the motion of the mind after. But it seems Eriugena had the knowledge (in his head or compiled), and felt it would be a shame not to use it.

⁴⁰⁵ verbatim, except for two small changes: ‘*Si enim homo esset*’ into ‘*est*’ and ‘*iniuste*’ into ‘*non iuste*’. cf. Madec, 54.

without free will there would not be ‘the good in accordance with which justice itself is praised in condemning sins and honouring right deeds.’⁴⁰⁶ Thus the point for Augustine is clear: no justice without free will. In this passage Augustine speaks about ‘to will’ (*velle*) and ‘free will’ (*libera voluntas*) and ‘free choice of the will’ (*libero voluntatis arbitrio*), but the motion of the will is not at all at stake. Augustine’s main point is very congenial to Eriugena’s overall reasoning, but Eriugena is therefore presented with a problem: how to read the motion of the will into this. Eriugena’s task at hand here is to make in Augustine’s text a distinction between his substance of the human being (soul, capacity of the will) and his motion of the will (in order to differentiate between nature and grace. The next paragraph will go into detail why he would want that) If anything, Augustine’s authority therefore rather muddies the water than clears it. After all, Augustine himself is only speaking about the reasons why the will has been given. Eriugena thus has to anachronistically force the distinction between motion of the will and substance of the will on Augustine. Augustine would probably not agree with Eriugena’s narrowing the substance of the soul down throughout his text to a substance of the will, even if Eriugena might be forgiven for this in the context of his polemic against Gottschalk. But Eriugena’s distinction between substance of the soul (will) and motion of the soul (will) serves to systematically separate the existence of the will from separate desires. Such an almost scholastic distinction cannot be discerned in Augustine. And in any case, if Augustine’s quotation is subjected to such a distinction, it is clear that Augustine here is speaking about the bare fact of the free will itself, thus the existence of it in the human being, not of separate desires. In Eriugena’s words, Augustine is speaking here ‘substantially’, about *voluntas*. Thus Eriugena has to interpret the quotation for the reader in order to manipulate him into Eriugena’s understanding in order to have Augustine buttress Eriugena: ‘In relation to those words we must see to it that no one confuses substance and motion when they hear the words “free will”, which is undoubtedly substantial. Our holy father Augustine, then did use such a mode of expression in saying free will for that which is the movement or choice of the free will, and we are in the habit of using it when by means of substantial causes we express their effects.’⁴⁰⁷ Other examples Eriugena gives are ‘foot’ for ‘walking’ and ‘reason’ for ‘reasoning’.

⁴⁰⁶ transl. Peter King. ‘*illud bonum, quo commendatur ipsa iustitia in damnandis peccatis, recteque factis honorandis*’.

⁴⁰⁷ ‘*In quibus verbis debemus intendere ne quis substantiam confundat et motum, audiens liberam voluntatem quae procul dubio substantialis est. Eo itaque locutionis modo sanctus pater Augustinus usus est, dicendo liberam voluntatem pro eo quod est liberae voluntatis motum sive arbitrium, quo solemus uti dum per causas substantiales earum significamus effectus.*’

This interpretation⁴⁰⁸ does not change the spirit of Augustine's thinking, since Augustine would concur that it is the way in which the will is used which incurs the judgment, whereas the free will itself is a *bonum*. But Eriugena does change the text, for what is at stake for Augustine is exactly the bare fact of the free will itself, not the use of it. But Augustine uses the right words to express the idea that free will precedes justice, an opportunity not to be passed on. Eriugena's explanation therefore is a blatant reinterpretation of the text with the same spirit but to another meaning of the text for his own purposes.

When looking at Eriugena's treatment of the motion of the will overall it shows that Eriugena had some systematising tendencies, trying to make a coherent distinction between a substance of the soul and a motion of the soul. To clarify such a distinction was never an issue for Augustine, who spent his energy arguing what kind of being the soul was, how it had free will and how the sinning soul fitted justifiably in a just universe. For Augustine the motion of the soul was a given, in its (neo-Platonic) mutability in turning to or from God and in its (Aristotelian) movement in time. And he could use it as a metaphor, as we have seen with the comparison of the stone. But he never explicitly and systematically identified what was the substance of the soul and what the motion. This is rather a 'substans-accidens' mode of thinking, which became popular in the 9th century through the study of the *categoriae decem* and which Eriugena applied very successfully in the *div. praes.*⁴⁰⁹ How Eriugena applied this thinking, and why he had to systematise the motion of the will versus a substance of the soul is the topic of the next paragraph on the difference between nature and grace.

5.2.5 The difference between nature and grace as exemplified by the Fall

In his overall argument against Gottschalk's view of double predestination Eriugena sees free will and a correct understanding of grace as the pillars of his apodeictic approach, since free will is the appropriate category to refute Gottschalk's Predestinationist side, and grace the Pelagian side. Eriugena's views on anthropology in the *div. praed.* are brought together in the relationship between these two. With his chapter on the difference between them, chapter 8, he

⁴⁰⁸ Reinterpretations of Scripture or Augustine play a major part in the whole of Eriugena's treatise. Another significant example of a reinterpretation is of Augustine's wordings *ad eorum damnationem quos iuste praedestinavit* ('for the damnation of those whom he justly predestined to punishment') in *Ench.* 26.100. In chapter 12.2.22-43 Eriugena explained that this had to be understood *e contrario*. Cf. 15.7.142-55 for Eriugena's explanation of the figure antiphrasis.

⁴⁰⁹ E.g. 8.2.; 16.5.

concludes the anthropological part of his treatise before setting of to describe how to understand God and predestination on his terms. His views on sin and punishment, albeit anthropological, are part of his description of evil. They will be the topic of the next paragraph. Here it will turn out that the difference between nature and grace lies in the difference between the substantial freedom of created will in being self-moving (nature) and the ability to control the movements of the soul (grace), which amounts to a difference between the substance of the soul and the quality of the soul. In order to explain this difference, and to explain how Eriugena used Augustine in making this difference, we will paradoxically have to go over much of the same ground as the previous two paragraphs (2 and 3). But we are going to do this from a slightly different perspective, since the focus will eventually be on the relation between substance and motion.

Before chapter 8, Eriugena already gives us a taste of his ideas in chapter 4 (4.6-8). This chapter, as we have seen, deals with the freedom of the rational will. As a last argument for his position that the freedom of will is part of the soul, the substance of the human being, and thus what it means to be human, Eriugena states that the Fall did not involve a loss of freedom of the will (as we have seen in paragraph 5.2.2, p. 124). What we lost instead is the ‘strength and the power of free choice’ (*vigor et potestas liberi arbitrii*). This power of free choice was not part of our nature, but was a ‘great gift’ (*magnum munus*) which we received through the ‘grace’ (*gratia*) of God. One might invoke again the idea of akrasia: the addicted person has the freedom of will to want to stop his addiction, but just not the strength to see his will through in an actual choice. But I do not think that this is the model that drives Eriugena to his statement. An analysis of chapter 8 will provide more insight.

The difference touched upon in paragraph 5.2.3.2, p. 130 between freedom of the will and freedom of choice is the cornerstone of Eriugena’s attempt to square his idea of our freedom of the will even after the Fall with the idea that we all sin in that life after the Fall. After all, sinning makes us unhappy, but our freedom of the will ensures that we all wish to be happy, so why sin? In short, the reason why we sin after the Fall is because we lost our freedom of choice even if we retained our inalienable freedom of will. Here the movement of the will becomes relevant, for Eriugena explains, sometimes with difficulties, that the choice of the will consists of movements of the will.⁴¹⁰ The freedom of the will is in our nature as human being, but what one actually wants, in other words, the movement of the will, is its choice. It is perhaps

⁴¹⁰ 8.6.113-6 *Quid enim aliud sentimus audientes liberum voluntatis arbitrium, nisi liberae voluntatis motum, quae omnia naturam humanae voluntatis exprimunt.* ‘What else do we understand when we hear of the free choice of the will except the motion of the will, all of which express the nature of the human will. Brennan’s translation with alteration.

not unreasonable to apply the Aristotelian distinction of potency and actuality, with the freedom of the will providing us with potential wills, but our choices representing the set of our actual wills. This is how Eriugena puts it: 'Into our nature too [our creator] introduced a cause by which we could ourselves move freely, reasonably, voluntarily, towards the pursuit of those ends to which it had been intended that we should attain. That motion is rightly called the free choice of our will because it is subject to our control. For we would be able, according to our judgement, to direct it on the right course; we would also be able to restrain it.'⁴¹¹ The cause that Eriugena mentions at the beginning of this quote is the voluntary cause that was spoken of in the previous paragraph, which we can equate here with the will. The actual will itself consists of the movement of the will, and is subject to our control. At least, so it was, until the Fall.⁴¹² As Eriugena has Augustine explain in chapter 4.7.202-5 through a citation of *persen.* 7.13 (and the first sentence of 14), after the Fall God wanted that man could only come to him and stay with him by grace. So that in Eriugena's terms, after the Fall our ability to control the movements of the will, our freedom of choice, is only to be had through grace. This is why it is not helpful to imagine Eriugena's model of will and choice with the idea of *akrasia*. *Akrasia* presumes an actual will, thus, in Eriugena's words, a movement of the will which is a choice. But subsequently the agent is not able to see its choice through because of an intervening carnal desire which conflicts with his will. But the will itself is already there. However, in Eriugena's model after the Fall we lost the freedom of choice already, so that our will could never independently arrive at a position where it wants to abstain from sin in the first place. This signals a further difference with Augustine's ideas of the effects of the Fall. For as we have seen on p. 126 and p. 129, Augustine did use the model of *akrasia* for his concept of *difficultas*, which he later 'radicalized' to the permanent state of *concupiscentia*. But in Eriugena's model there is less place for an internal moral struggle between good and evil wills, before the will inevitably gives in to the bad choice if not aided by grace. In Eriugena's world we are either uncomplicated sinners or uncomplicated saints.

At the basis of this crucial distinction between the freedom of the will and the freedom of choice lies Eriugena's use of the Aristotelian categories, as they were transmitted through the *Categoriae decem* and which formed an important analytical tool for the ninth century intellectual.⁴¹³

⁴¹¹ 8.7.150-6. *Nostrae quoque naturae inseruit [nostrum conditor] causam, qua nosmet ipsos possemus movere libere, rationabiliter, voluntarie, ad ea quae nobis sequenda fuerant assequenda. Qui motus merito vocatur liberum arbitrium nostrae voluntatis, quoniam potestati nostrae subiectus est. Possemus quippe pro nostro iudicio recto cursu eum dirigere, possemus cohibere.*

⁴¹² 8.7.136-7 states that Eriugena is describing the situation before the Fall, in which the human will was able to turn itself to God and not sin or turn away from sin, thus in short, to exert control with the freedom of choice.

⁴¹³ 8.2.28-33. For the *Categoriae decem*, ed. Minio-Paluello in *Aristoteles Latinus* vol. 1, 1-5 (Paris 1961). For their use in the Carolingian Renaissance's new attempt at philosophy cf. the seminal Marenbon (1981), esp. 12-30, for Eriugena's use of them in the *De divisione naturae* cf. Stock (1980), 85-104, esp. 93-6 and Marenbon (1980), 118-34.

The categories belong to the sphere of ontology and philosophy and language (they describe at once what exists and in what ways we can refer to beings). The first category of substance consists of all the beings, whereas the other nine categories (from quality and quantity up to action and passion) describe the accidents, that is, the way in which the beings manifest themselves. These categories therefore describe everything that exists, albeit that some of the beings are hard to ascribe accidents to, even though their substance is certain (this most notably counts for God). But this is not the case for the human being, however, to which all the accidents can be ascribed (Aristotle devised his categories for the human being and never meant for them to be applied to a God outside of reality, such as the Christian God). Eriugena's move in order to protect the freedom of the will (and thus the responsibility of the human being and the theodicy of God) is to grade the free will not as an accident, but as a substance.⁴¹⁴ In Eriugena's analysis the freedom of the will is therefore part of what it means to be a human being. Without it, we would not be the same substance, the same species anymore, but another thing, and it therefore cannot be what we lost after the Fall, on pain of Adam's descendants not being human anymore. Augustine does not operate on the basis of this Aristotelian idea of substance. He operates on a neo-Platonical understanding of substance, in which the substance of a humang being (or other thing) can be lessened by corruption or increased by turning to god, while remaining the same individual. However, if forced in Eriugena's way of thinking in fixed substances, Augustine would without a doubt keep the will (but translate it back to 'soul') as belonging to the substance of the human being, but downgrade its freedom to the status as accident, which can therefore be gained or lost. the point is that eriugena reads augustine with a different model of substance and can therefore force augustine to take a position on the persistence of the human being and free will that Augustine never meant to convey.

Eriugena firmly roots the freedom of the will through the categories in the sphere of ontology. But Eriugena's conception of the freedom of the will takes into account the sphere of natural philosophy as well. There are two sides to the will. After all, the will not only is a substance, but also a 'voluntary cause' which causes its own movements. Its freedom means that there are no external necessities operating on the will, that is, that the will moves out of its own accord. Thus, for Eriugena, we are indeed 'little Gods' able to start a causal chain. Eriugena's freedom of the will in this way serves for his anthropology as a bridge between ontology and natural philosophy. That is interesting because it is in terms of natural philosophy that Eriugena

⁴¹⁴ 8.2 for Eriugena's introduction of the categories; 8.3.51-3 for the assertion that the will is according to its nature substantial; 8.4.74-6 for the assertion that the will is naturally free since it is rational. Keep in mind that free will does not necessarily imply free choice of the will, since grace is the other necessary condition.

describes grace. For if these movements of the will are under ‘our own control’ we have freedom of choice and can act with a purpose, whereas when these movements are not subject to our judgment we lack freedom of choice and act as unguided missiles. This is the difference between nature and grace: nature ensures the automotion of the will but not the direction of the movement. Grace determines whether we can steer these movements or not. If we receive it, we are able to take control of our life, without it we are ships without a rudder, waiting to see where the current takes us. Grace is therefore not something which exists per se, but it is an addition to beings, making better what already exists.⁴¹⁵ To emphasize the difference between nature and grace, Eriugena is therefore careful to locate their origin in two different sources in 8.2: nature comes from God’s ‘goodness’ (*bonitas*), but grace from God’s ‘generosity’ (*largitas*).⁴¹⁶

The difference between nature and grace is therefore a difference between the existence of the will and the functioning of it. For Eriugena this merits the use of two different sets of conceptual tools to analyse the two different aspects of the will, namely its substance as opposed to its functioning (i.e. its movement). Eriugena describes the nature of the human being with the categories (i.e. substance and accidents), but grace in terms of causes and movement (movement is not an accident, and in fact, movement always had a tenuous place in the ontology of the Aristotelian universe). When the will is part of what defines the human being, it is a substance. When it is aided by grace, it is the cause which gives the motion to the soul and the human being. In this way Eriugena tries to benefit from the stability of being inherent in the Aristotelian category of substance for the freedom of the will, but at the same time from the mutability that motion and agency imply for the fickleness of grace.

Grace for Eriugena thus is the ability to take control of one’s life. As Eriugena says in 4.6.186-9 Adam had the gift of grace so that he could keep the commandment, but lost it so that we can only keep the commandment by the aid of grace. In other words, Adam had full control over his choice, but we after the Fall need the help of grace to have that control he had. But the difference between Adam and us is not as fundamental as it may seem, since apparently everyone

⁴¹⁵ 8.4.79-82.

⁴¹⁶ Augustine does not make this differentiation between the *largitas* and *bonitas dei*, with the *largitas* as the source of grace, in his works. In fact, the word *largitas* is only used approximately 190 times in the opera omnia (approximately, since it may have been used in the recently discovered sermons) according to the CAG database. However, one of these occurrences is of importance, since *largitas* and *bonitas dei* are mentioned side by side. In *persev.* 17.41 Augustine says *Sed mirabilior et fidelibus evidentior largitas bonitatis dei est, quod etiam parvulis, quibus obedientia non est illius aetatis ut detur, datur haec gratia.* ‘But the generosity of God’s goodness is even more admirable and manifest, in that this grace is given even to the little ones, who are not yet obedient because of their young age.’ Moreover, this sentence directly precedes the quote Eriugena gives of the *persev.* 17.41 in 11.7.173-81. This quote is very significant, since it contains the definition of predestination that Eriugena will use in chapter 12. It is therefore likely that Eriugena took this sentence and turned Augustine’s casual locution into part of the model he is building throughout the *div. praed.* If this is correct, it shows the systematizing tendencies Eriugena’s logical thinking bring to the quarry of Augustine’s texts.

including the first human being needs grace in order to exercise control.⁴¹⁷ The difference rather seems to be a gradual for Eriugena. Adam always had control, where we only sometimes have control. For Augustine the difference between Adam and the human beings after the Fall are larger. For him Adam was the archetype of the human race, created as a better human being, thus in his nature. He was not a human of general stock who simply enjoyed a privileged status while the rest of us are more equal than he was. This difference between Eriugena and Augustine is a direct result of Eriugena's effort to promote the responsibility of the human being by placing the freedom of the human will in the nature of the human being. The result is that the differences between Adam and us can no longer manifest themselves on the level of 'nature'.

Underlying these differences between Augustine and Eriugena regarding the human condition after the Fall (shattered will vs loss of freedom of choice) and the relationship between Adam and us may well be a difference in ontology. Augustine after all wrote in a Plotinian universe in which being is dynamic: the human being can gain more being or lose it according to the measure in which it turns itself towards its source. But the ontology that underlies the *Categoriae decem* is Aristotelian. Being is more a phenomenological category in this paradigm, and a being cannot change its (measure of) being as it can in the Plotinian paradigm on pain of becoming something fundamentally different. Eriugena's remark in 8.2 regarding the categories may well signal that he is operating on the basis of that latter ontology. This would support Eriugena in his claims that the nature (substance) of the human being has not been changed by the Fall. Although here is not the place, deeper research into the *div. praed.* needs to be undertaken, however, in order to be able to state this with certainty, since these six chapters (4-8 and 16) may not give enough material for this purpose.

Similarly this research may reveal something about Eriugena's use of the word *natura* in the *div. praed.*, relevant in the context of the overriding importance of this word in the *De divisione naturae*. There are two preliminary observations to be made here which may underline the potency of future research in this direction. In the *div. praed.* Eriugena uses this word generously throughout, as Madec's index shows.⁴¹⁸ In chapters 4-8 and 16 Eriugena uses *natura* in a few different guises. Examples are the nature of the world (4.5.155), there is human nature, set as we have seen in this chapter against grace, and rational nature (6.1.16-7) and a law of nature (5.8.191). What most of these variants share is the idea of the order and constitution of a being. The context seems to be the Creation as the nature of the human being is set against the special

⁴¹⁷ *Ac per hoc vigor et potestas liberi arbitrii non erat in primo homine ex substantia sed ex creatoris gratia.* vs. Marenbon (1980), 309 and Stanciu (2005), 63 but with Schrimpf (1982), 837.

⁴¹⁸ Madec 226-7.

gifts of God of grace. In combination with Eriugena's possible leanings to a more Aristotelian conception of being such a research may yield interesting results. The second observation is that the likelihood is very high that Eriugena took this usage of the word from Augustine's *lib. arb.*, whichever sources may be deemed relevant for Eriugena's conception of nature in the *De divisione naturae*. Augustine used the word with the meaning constitution, as in the 'nature of the body' and 'nature of the mind' (*lib. arb.* 2.18.48), or simply 'being', as in 'there is no nature which does not come from God' (*lib. arb.* 2.20.54). Moreover, these two last examples are cited by Eriugena in 7.2.40-1 and 7.5.112.

5.2.6 Sin and Punishment

In the previous paragraph we have seen the apotheosis of Eriugena's anthropology in the *div. praed.* The difference between free will as nature or substance of the human being, and the free will as the set of movements of the will, yielded Eriugena with his line of defence for the inalienability and goodness of free will. The Fall did not affect the substance or the nature of the human being, but merely the control we have over the movements of the will. This model of the human being provides different but intertwined questions. One question is what it is that changed and deteriorated after the Fall if the nature of the human being remained the same. Another is what it is that is punished and wherein our personal responsibility lies. In other words, what was the point of application of God's justice? When 'we' lost control over the movements of our will after the Fall, what is that 'we' if we supposedly are not to imagine some homunculus pulling the strings? These questions lead to the question what the human being as an individual is, as opposed to a generic member of his or her species. Chapter 16 deals with sin and punishment, so if Eriugena will give us any answer, this may be the place to look for it.

For Eriugena this chapter falls in the context of how God cannot predestine sins, given that the nature of evil is not a substance but only a privation, so that God cannot be held accountable for knowing sins in advance and thereby 'causing' them in some way or other. We have to keep in mind that Eriugena's objective with the *div. praed.* was to defend the persistence of free will after the Fall and personal responsibility, and the crucial difference arrived at in the previous paragraph between free will as nature and as movement will be instrumental in Eriugena's description of sin and punishment as well. As evil is only a privation, Eriugena is of the opinion that (created) substance is (created) good and therefore does not sin. God does not punish the human will as the substance or nature of the human being. Undoubtedly he was

driven to this position in no small measure to oppose Gottschalk's assertion, in line with Augustine, that human nature did deteriorate in the Fall.⁴¹⁹ In Eriugena's words 'no nature punishes nature' (*nulla natura naturam punit*) and 'But by what kind of justice creative nature will punish the natures it has itself created I cannot discover. Hence no nature will be punished; if not punished it will not be unhappy.'⁴²⁰ Unfortunately sin, punishment and unhappiness are around, so if it is not the will as substance which sins, is punished and subsequently unhappy, what is? It is indeed will in its other form as the actual motions of the soul.⁴²¹ Eriugena has Augustine explain in 16.5 in an extensive quotation from the *vera rel.* 20.38-9 that the sin of the will consists of wanting after temporal, carnal, sensible and lower goods instead of their higher spiritual opposites. And the punishment, as explained in the following quotation by Eriugena of Augustine's *vera rel.* 11.21-2, consists of finding a place among the lower, bodily and mortal goods. The pain of the deprivation of those lower goods that the soul (remember this is Augustine speaking, not Eriugena, who would undoubtedly have said 'will' instead of 'soul') wants after directly is the punishment. Moreover, this punishment is inescapable since these lower goods are mutable, and therefore will be absent at some point in the future even if enjoyed in the present. This idea of an 'automatic' punishment which does not involve a direct action of God is underscored by another quotation of Augustine, this time from *en. Ps.* 7.16. However, Eriugena could not be content with the idea of a universe that only balances its books in the due course of time. Whether out of the idea that a causal process cannot afford an inert temporal interval or out of a desire for maximum justice, he at length asserted that even if the punishment may find its completion in the next life it arises simultaneously with the sin, presumably therefore also in earthly life.⁴²²

This description of sin and punishment has two effects. By asserting an impersonal mechanism behind the punishment for sin, God cannot be held responsible for meeting it out, however justly. God is not one to dole out retribution himself, but as a benevolent architect constituted this mechanism behind sin and punishment, and by implication behind virtue and happiness as well (virtue instantly leads to happiness, even if only in 'secret' (*occulte*) since it is

⁴¹⁹ Lambot, 185-6. Cf. Stanciu (2005), 26.

⁴²⁰ 16.1.28-31. *Creatrix autem natura quali iustitia punit sit naturas quas ipsa creavit, non invenio. Nulla debinc natura punietur; non punita non erit misera.* With a nice anticipation of the *Periphyssion* with the distinction of God as creative nature and universe as created nature.

⁴²¹ 16.3.92-6: 'Accordingly, in no one is nature punished, because it is from God and does not sin. But the motion of the will wantonly misusing that good of nature is deservedly punished, because it transgresses the law of nature, which beyond doubt it would not transgress if it were substantially created by God.' *Proinde in nullo natura punitur, quia ex deo est et non peccat. Motus autem voluntarius, libidinose utens naturae bono, merito punitur. quia naturae legem transgreditur, quam procul dubio non transgrederetur, si substantialiter a deo crearetur.*

⁴²² 16.6.236-9 and the whole of 16.7, containing a description of the same process -but *e contrario*- for the reward of happiness for virtue.

disguised as ‘suffering’ (*labor*) in the temporal world. The sinners in fact punish themselves, God is removed from the process.⁴²³

Secondly, we now have as full an answer as we will get from Eriugena in the *div. praed.* what it is that sins and is punished, and by implication where our individuality lies. It is an actual or activated will, a movement of the will that seeks after the temporal and therefore sins.⁴²⁴ The (moral) core of the human being, that which makes it an individual and therefore justifiably punishable, is the set of all actual movements of the will. Yet the definition of the human being as encountered in 5.2.1, p. 121 ‘The human being is a rational substance receptive of wisdom’ (8.4.73-4), uses the will as nature or substance of the human being, thus the potential will. This definition may therefore tell us which nature we have and to which species we belong, but it does not account for what we are as a person. This brings a nice touch to the question of our identity: our ‘I’ is not something stable, but something in movement and developing⁴²⁵, and we will only be able to totally say what we are at the end of our life, when our choices have all been made. This is however a clear departure from Augustine. Except for his very early works, he considers the body as a fundamental part of the individual human being. Eventually, with the use of the word *persona* in *ep.* 137.3.11 (411) he stressed the union between the material substance of the body and the substance of the soul.⁴²⁶ And as we have seen, the body therefore is part of what has deteriorated, since it after the Fall ‘lusts against the spirit’ and takes on autonomous movements of its own. Augustine himself therefore had no qualms to speak of faults in or

⁴²³ cf. Marenbon (1980), 310. He also sports a nice classification of punishments for the sinner: 1) knowing that the sinner himself is unhappy 2) deprivation of knowledge itself 3) prevention of fulfilling perverse desires.

⁴²⁴ cf. Marenbon (1980), 313-4 and 319-22 for the changes he tried to apply to the theory of punishment in the *Periphyseon*.

⁴²⁵ Ontologically speaking our individuation principle is the motion of our will, thus our actual choices. Both our body and our free will are part of our nature, which is common to our species. What makes us individual human beings is thus something very fleeting, vs Schimpf (1982), 842-3, 845, who rather credits Eriugena with the distinction between our ontological identity (as member of the species) and our ethical identity. Marenbon (1980), 312-4 however agrees more with Florus’ and Prudentius’ critique that one cannot separate the will from the individual.

This conclusion which is made in this chapter on the basis of the anthropology is in accordance with an observation Marenbon ‘John Scottus and the “Categoriae Decem”’, 128 makes in the context of Eriugena’s use of the term *ousia* in the *Periphyseon*: ‘There is no difference, he [Eriugena] argues, between what is *said of* a subject [e.g. ‘man’] and the subject itself. Thus Cicero, the individual subject, and Man, which is *said of* Cicero, are one and the same. The species is “whole and one in its numerous members, and these members are one individual in the species” (DDN 470D-471A; I, 102.11-21). The only way I can see of making sense of this position is to suppose that Eriugena meant by the individual of such and such a class simply the such-ness, by which he belongs to that class. He would distinguish implicitly between the particular man, as he might be perceived, differentiated from every other man by an innumerable variety of accidents, and the individual member of the species, Man, who is simply that man-ness, on account of which he is a man. Such individuals would, in a sense, be indistinguishable from their species.’ *Ousia* is not yet used in the *div. praed.*, where Eriugena rather chooses the word *substantia*. Marenbon (1980), 323 himself argues for the following in the context of the theory of punishment: ‘...and Eriugena’s own later work is closer in important respects to the concerns and arguments of the *De Praedestinatione* than its parade of citations and terms from the Greek Fathers would suggest.’

⁴²⁶ cf. Rist (1994), 98-101.

deterioration of natures (not meaning just bodies) in *civ.* 14.11. But Eriugena trims this anthropology down to one dynamical aspect of the soul, in line with his polemical needs against Gottschalk.

However, it also leads to some awkward answers. When we lost control over our will in the Fall, there was apparently no separate faculty or institution responsible for our will. We are what our will is, so that our will was self-controlled, but it lost that capacity. Yet how can a set of movements exert control over itself? And, conversely, if a sin automatically leads to its punishment, how can a movement of the will be punished?⁴²⁷ By reducing our personality, our individual identity to a set of movements of the will, Eriugena succeeds in quarantining off God's creation from our sins and the punishments and deterioration which accompany these sins. God indeed does not punish what he himself made and can furthermore not be held responsible for the way in which individuals bring themselves down without God's further interference. It is just the way the universe works, no more and no less. However, the cost is rather large. Our existence, not as members of the created human species, but as human individuals confronting God through the moral choices we make in life, has a tenuous existence. Being no more than a set of movements of the will, our personalities have no stable base to rest on, as they had in Augustine's immaterial substance of the soul.

Apart from these general analytical remarks about Eriugena's views on sin and punishment, there are three remarks to be made on his use of Augustine in this chapter of the *div. praed.* A first concerns the term *concupiscentia*, or rather its absence. In discoursing on sin and punishment in a text so influenced by Augustine one might expect to encounter this word.⁴²⁸ However, neither in this chapter under consideration, chapter 16 on sin and punishment, nor indeed in the whole of the *div. praed.* is the term to be encountered, if Madec's indices are to be trusted. We do, however, encounter the word *libido* in the following passage which contains a definition of *libido* in 16.4.97-102: 'Hence the clear conclusion is that in the wicked it is not what God has made that undergoes punishments, but what pride has corruptly devised. Indeed the lust (*libido*) of a perverse will is tortured when it is not allowed to have those things which it evilly or unworthily strives after; for by this name, that is 'lust' (*libido*), the generality of all the vices is

⁴²⁷ Marenbon (1980), 320. Marenbon argued that this was also Florus' and Prudentius' critique.

⁴²⁸ And should one read the translation, one would not be dissatisfied. Brennan, 104 translates Eriugena's 2 occurrences of *libido* in 16.4.98 and 101 first as 'passion', then as 'concupiscence', while Eriugena in my view deliberately used *libido* instead of *concupiscentia*. I will argue in this paragraph that Eriugena planned to stay away from this term.

understood'.⁴²⁹ The choice of *libido* here instead of *concupiscentia*, which would have fitted just as well in its place, seems a deliberate choice to ignore an elephant in the room. In Augustine's writings the term *concupiscentia* did go through a development.⁴³⁰ Whereas the young Augustine would think of concupiscence as a (usually) perverse will, as in the triple concupiscence for bodily pleasure, power and curiosity, the later Augustine (as we have seen in paragraph 5.2.2, p. 126-7) sees concupiscence rather as a disposition, a liability to sin. Both meanings of the term would have fitted well in Eriugena's thought. Concupiscence as 'lust' could have been used for the passage above, and generally speaking, what better term than 'concupiscence' would there be for Eriugena to describe the loss of self-determining ability and power of the free will after the Fall (the loss of free choice)? This question can only be firmly answered if one investigated the usage of the terms *concupiscentia* and *libido* at the time of Eriugena. There is no place for this in this context, but I wish at least to suggest here that Eriugena's silence on this account is caused by the bodily overtones of the term 'concupiscence'. Concupiscence was not exclusively sexual for Augustine, but Eriugena may have wanted to stay away from these connotations which would place the desire not only in the will, but in the body as well, as readers would have Paul readily in mind (partly thanks to Augustine): 'The flesh lusts (*concupiscit*) against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh' (*Gal.* 5.17).⁴³¹ We should remember that in the work most relevant for Eriugena's anthropology in the *div. praed.*, the *lib. arb.*, concupiscence was the *concupiscentia carnalis* (3.19.53). *Libido* as alternative would have been readily suggested by *civ.* 14.⁴³² This term may have been equally sexually loaded⁴³³ but would place the burden of guilt more on the will and less on the body. The body, as part of God's good creation fell under Eriugena's protection and could not be indicted with error.

The second remark deals with the transmission of original sin. The whole of Eriugena's intricate anthropology could make us forget that the reason why the ontological treatment of the soul became relevant for the predestination question is the transmission of original sin, with Gottschalk in his *Quaestiones de anima* clearly taking the side of the traducianists against the creationists, with all its materialistic implications. Eriugena has to account for this transmission

⁴²⁹ Brennan's translation with changes. '*Hinc aperte colligitur in impiis supplicia non perpeti quod deus fecit, sed quod superbia vitiose invenit. Libido siquidem perversae voluntatis cruciatur, dum ea quae male aut indigne appetit habere non sinitur; hoc enim nomine, videlicet libidinis, generalitas omnium vitiorum comprehenditur.*'

⁴³⁰ As documented by Bonner's lemma 'Concupiscentia' in the *AL*, 1113-20, cf. Rist (1994), 102.

⁴³¹ even if the body cannot have a desire without the soul, e.g. *Gn. litt.* 10.12.20.

⁴³² not quoted or paraphrased in the *div. praed.*, but given the use of many of the other books of the *civ.* probably well read by Eriugena.

⁴³³ *civ.* 14.16: *Cum igitur sint multaturn libidines rerum, tamen, cum libido dicitur neque cuius rei libido sit additur, non fere adsolet animo occurrere nisi illa, qua obscenae partes coporis excitantur.*

as well, seeing how the Fall plays an important role in his explanation of a distinction between nature and grace. As to be expected, he did not side with Gottschalk on this question, but he did not choose creationism either. Seeing how Eriugena is overall little engaged with Augustine's ontological discourse of the soul, he chooses an option which altogether sidesteps this traditional problem. From 408 onwards, and increasingly so during the Pelagian controversy where the transmission of original sin was important, Augustine came to a theory of a 'double life' of the soul, i.e. that the human soul has an individual life, but also partakes in a communal part.⁴³⁴ This communal part of our souls lives in Adam. Adam therefore not only is our 'archetype', but he continues to live in us, or, more accurately, we in him. Yet there is not only a Neoplatonic element in Augustine's thinking, but also an historical. We lived communal life of the soul in the historical Adam, whereas our individual life begins at or sometime after our conception.⁴³⁵ And during our communal life in Adam we sinned and died, so that the original sin still affects and weakens each individual human being.⁴³⁶ In *civ.* 13.14 Augustine would say: 'For God, the author of natures, not of vices, created man upright; but man, being of his own will corrupted, and justly condemned, begot corrupted and condemned children. For we all were in that one man, since we all were that one man, who fell into sin by the woman who was made from him before the sin.'⁴³⁷

This solution for the transmission of original sin, i.e. our sin in Adam, was the option that Eriugena chose. In 16.3. he used a partly paraphrased *civ.* 13.14 in his assertion that in Adam the universal nature of the human being was made in which we all sinned and consequently are justly punished.⁴³⁸ Through this choice Eriugena was not forced to choose between creationism or traducianism, with all the dangers involved. In this chapter on sin and punishment, however, Eriugena's mission is not merely to show that God's punishment for original sin is just. It is rather to underscore his differentiation between will as human nature and the movement of the human will (the choice of the will) as the core of responsibility in the individual. That after all fits in his overall scheme to vouchsafe the freedom of the human will as nature of the human being

⁴³⁴ cf. Rist (1994), 123-9.

⁴³⁵ *ep.* 98.1.

⁴³⁶ as Paul says in *Rom* 5:12 'Wherefore as by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.', which was avidly quoted by Augustine in later life.

⁴³⁷ *Deus enim creavit hominem rectum, naturarum auctor, non uitique vitiorum; sed sponte depravatus iniqueque damnatus depravatos damnatosque generavit. Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum, quae de illo facta est ante peccatum.* Another place for the formulaic *omnes in illo fuimus* can be found in *en.* Ps. 84.7.

⁴³⁸ 16.3.68-72: *Cum itaque omnium hominum universam naturam in primo homine deus condiderit, adhuc enim, ut ait Aug<ustinus>, ille unus omnes fuit, quod in ipso naturaliter creatum est nullo modo potuit naturalem legem creatoris transire.* my italics. Since, therefore, God created in the first man the universal nature of all men, for as yet, as Augustine says, that one man was everyone, that which in him was naturally created could be no means transgress the natural law of the creator.'

against the punishment of original sin, so that it can still be operative in the human being after the Fall, enabling the responsibility for one's own sins. How did Eriugena then use this theory of a 'double life' of the soul to underscore this difference? How could we all be in Adam and how did we sin in him? For Eriugena, as we have seen, our individuality rests with the movements of our will, and everything else is part of our God-created nature. Since God does not punish his creation, this communal life we had in Adam, everything we share with him and each other, is out of bounds for God's punishment. Adam's universal nature therefore cannot have been that which sinned. The implication Eriugena teases out is that we not only partake in (or: have) a communal life in Adam, but must have an individual life with individual wills in Adam as well, which consequently sin and are justly punished.⁴³⁹ This is the only form in which the theory of a 'double life' of the soul is consistent with Eriugena's anthropology, but it is a departure from Augustine's theory. Augustine after all believed individual human life to begin with our individual presence on earth, not before that, since that would violate *Rm* 9.11 ('For when the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil') which served as his safeguard against his early ideas of a Fall of the soul into the body.⁴⁴⁰ Augustine's premise, that God created nature perfect, to which Eriugena strictly adhered, in the case of the 'double life' of the soul thus led to opposite consequences. For Augustine it made an individual life before embodiment impossible (after all, the body is created good so that it cannot serve as a prison for punishment), for Eriugena it necessitated an individual will in Adam (since our perfect communal nature cannot have been that which sinned). Eriugena had created this room for himself by ignoring Augustine's discourse on the origin of the soul. His choice to use Augustine's dynamic discourse on the soul instead of his ontological discourse, kept him safe from harm. Eriugena had removed the historical element out of the theory of the 'double life' of the soul by making our communal life and our individual life co-temporal. In effect he 're-corrected' Augustine's theory back to a more Plotinian stance on the relationship between the individual soul and the hypostasis of the Soul.

The final remark is on the use of authority overall in this chapter on sin and punishment. Almost half of this chapter consists of direct quotations. So far all direct quotations were taken from Augustine (disregarding Scripture that is), but in this chapter we encounter two other authors. The first is Prosper of Aquitaine, whose *Responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Vincentianarum*

⁴³⁹ 16.3.74-96.

⁴⁴⁰ *Gn. litt.* 7.25.36; 10.7.12.

(here *obiect.* 3) is misattributed to Augustine.⁴⁴¹ The quotation contains the differentiation between vice and (human) nature in line with Augustine (e.g. *lib. arb.* 3.14.38-15.42)⁴⁴² and serves as a point of departure to keep our communal nature in Adam free from indictment. The second is Gregory the Great who has the honour to close the chapter with a lengthy quotation taken from his *Moralia in Iob* (11.9).⁴⁴³ The function of the quotation is to drive the point home that punishment is instantaneous, so that the sinners suffer here on earth, in their own conscience and consciousness.

The quotations which take their provenance in Augustine are very well chosen. They come from *Gn. litt.* 11.21.28-22.29, *en. Ps.* 7.16 and *vera rel.* 11.21-12.23; 20.38-9 and 54.104-5. They show how evil is not a substance but an evil will, starting with the devil and tempting human beings, who love lower goods and therefore take their place among those lower goods so that the sinful delights become the instruments of punishment. The *lib. arb.*, however, is absent in this chapter. This may be explained by the fact that the part of it which treats original sin (3.20.56-22.63) does so in the context of the problem of the origin of the soul from which Eriugena wanted to stay away. Other parts would have been useful, but he evidently found enough in the *vera rel.* It is not strange that this work should take a prime position, since it has an anti-Manichean agenda and thus denies the substance of evil, attributing sin instead to our own will.

Conclusion

With Eriugena's stress on the inviolable 'nature' (*natura*) of the will and the application of the natural philosophical concept of freedom as freedom from externally caused motion, he makes a distinction between the being of the will and its functioning. For Augustine this distinction would be faulty, as the will is no separate thing from its function, so that a conflicting will is a shattered will. What Augustine argues for is the existence of the soul in his ontological discourse on the soul, and the workings of, among others, the will in a rather separate dynamical discourse. Eriugena of course can claim that he is totally following the master. After all, Eriugena

⁴⁴¹ 16.2.60-7. There are not many misattributions (to Augustine) in the *div. praed.* Another one is Bede's *De natura rerum* 1.1 in *div. praed.* 3.7.222-4. About this misattribution cf. the learned Stock's 'In search of Eriugena's Augustine', esp. 86-8. Another sizeable one is *Hypomnesticon* 6.2.2; 6.5.7; 6.6.8 in 14.4.134-55. The *Hypomnesticon* was also taken as originating from Augustine by Hincmar and possibly supplied by Hincmar to Eriugena.

⁴⁴² Madec, 95.

⁴⁴³ to spite Gottschalk, who had used Gregory's *Moralia in Iob* for his *Confessio brevior*? Lambot, 54 line 7-8, cf. Stanciu (2005), 31.

too states that the soul consists of the Trinitarian structure of memory, will and understanding, which is the soul. But for Eriugena this only serves as the first step to set himself up in the argument which we have been following in this chapter. For all intents and purposes the soul in the *div. praed.* is narrowed down solely to the will, so that Augustine's difference between the soul as an immaterial being and the will as its agency is changed into Eriugena's difference between the nature of the will as substance and the function of the will as voluntary cause and automotor. Augustine talks about the being of the soul as an immaterial and eternal being in some texts (e.g. *sol.*) and about its Trinitarian structures and workings in others (e.g. *trin.*), but these two discourses never really come together even in the works in which he treats both (e.g. *conf.* and *civ.*). Yet Eriugena makes both the being of the soul (as nature of the will) and the working of the soul (as motion of the will) two equal building blocks to drive the same point home: that the will of the human being is free. Through Eriugena's argument the will acquires a pivotal function: the same will explains both what the human being is, using one set of concepts, and what it does, using another set. One might almost make this sound scholastic when put as Eriugena's will *qua* being of the human being and will *qua* automotive cause.⁴⁴⁴ Through this focus on only one element of Augustine's traditional psychology of memory, will and understanding, Eriugena achieves a unification of the human being which has been shown neither in Augustine's texts nor in the texts using and adapting Augustine as researched in this thesis. The cost of course involves neglecting the other two psychological elements of memory and understanding, but given that Eriugena wrote his *div. praed.* in the context of his polemic against Gottschalk and did not purport to write a *summum* this can be forgiven. It only serves to underscore the apologetic nature of the text. Moreover, in some way this cost is small considering the pay-off.⁴⁴⁵ By promoting the will to the substance of the soul, in one swift stroke Eriugena cuts his vision of predestination loose from the traditional question concerning the ontology of the soul relevant for the predestination debate. Thus, he declares the question of the origin of the soul (traducianism vs. creationism) and the possible issues with the materialism it involves, as seen in Gottschalk, as being irrelevant through his utter silence on these topics.

The use Eriugena made of Augustine in his anthropology of the *div. praed.* has many faces. Eriugena stayed true to Augustine's fundamental tenets, such as that creation is good. The ample quotations he offers from Augustine, which are normally identified, reinforce the image of mastership of (even ownership over) Augustine. Sometimes Eriugena's own text amounts to

⁴⁴⁴ Schimpf (1982), 864.

⁴⁴⁵ For the consequences regarding the notion of the individual see above p. 136.

little more than a few sentences connecting and interpreting the various quotations of Augustine (this does not count for the first three chapters). The unaware or unschooled reader might be tempted to think that they must then also be in line with Augustine. But as we have seen, this is not the case. Eriugena is ready to quote selectively, deliberately misinterpret and on points flat-out contradict Augustine in line with his own agenda.⁴⁴⁶ Brian Stock has shown how Eriugena's Augustine is multi-layered, consisting of an interplay between Augustine, texts from Bede's *De rerum natura*, and the *Categoriae decem* which Eriugena all attributed to Augustine.⁴⁴⁷ From the analysis in this chapter something of this can be gleaned through Eriugena's use of the categories. Eriugena's use of pseudo-Augustine's *Hypomnesticon* (a mid-fifth century work against the Pelagians following a 'moderate' Augustine)⁴⁴⁸ does not seem to have had a major impact on Eriugena's anthropology in the *div. praed.*, although a further search in this direction might prove interesting. On the foundations of Augustine a new program for the soul arises. Due to the polemical necessities it is sleeker than Augustine's, not caring about the ontological questions of the soul (deliberately ignoring the origin of the soul) but purely looking at one aspect of the dynamical discourse, i.e. the will. Yet, due to the application of pseudo-Augustine's *Categoriae decem* and an almost scholastic mode of thinking that differentiates the notion of 'will' into its aspect of nature/substance and into its aspect of movement, it is able to connect the ontology of the soul with the working of the soul, something that Augustine never did. It does lead, however, to some awkward questions concerning our individuality. What becomes clear through this analysis of the anthropology in the *div. praed.* is that Eriugena conceptualizes reality through model building. He is carefully analyzing his ideological needs, creates differentiations which support those needs and thinks the implications through systematically, much more so than Augustine is wont to do. He is careful not to transgress the boundaries of orthodoxy, but through this *modus operandi* comes to highly original positions. His relationship with Augustine in his thinking is varied. Augustine serves as anchor for Eriugena's orthodoxy and as authority for its confirmation. But he also serves as inspiration for Eriugena, from which he can start off his model building to arrive at positions which run against Augustine's original thought. Yet

⁴⁴⁶ cf. Stock (1980), 97-8, on the *Periphyseon*: 'He [Augustine] is rarely quoted in isolation. His views are accepted, modified, or opposed as the situation requires. Nor is his presence always most clearly perceived through direct citation' and 'Yet, as important as Augustine is as an interpreter of previous authorities, at critical moments in the *Periphyseon* he too must be interpreted.' In the *div. praed.* Augustine's quotations have to speak for themselves somewhat more often.

⁴⁴⁷ Providing Eriugena with his interpretative scheme of the *quadriformis ratio*. Perhaps Eugippius is partly responsible for this with the attention he gave to the four *rationes* of the *Gn. litt.* Stock (1980), 86-96.

⁴⁴⁸ CSEL 10.

Eriugena does not hesitate in these instances to fortify his position with Augustine too as much as possible through deliberate (mis)interpretation.




figure 1. Eriugena's model of the human being as developed in *div. praed.*

Conclusion

1. Use of Augustine

In the previous chapters, a survey has been made into varied authors across varied genres of the sixth and the ninth century concerning their ideas on the ontology of the soul. All these authors owe a considerable debt to Augustine for the formation of their ideas in this area, and some too for their formulation. The most extreme case is Eugippius, whose personality as a scholar, and whose relationship with Augustine's ontological discourse on the soul has to be reconstructed through careful consideration of his copy-pasting of Augustine's texts for his florilegy. All of the authors in this thesis were widely read in Augustine, but they also exhibit personal choices which works of Augustine to use for their own. Augustine develops the foundations of his ideas on the ontology of the soul in the early dialogues but these are not the primary texts these later authors went for. An exception to this rule is the *an. quant.* which was employed by Cassiodorus to good effect and by Gottschalk for his all-important separation of the centipede to 'prove' traducianism.

The *Gn. litt.*, especially book 7, provides an interesting case. This book is a crucial text in regard to Augustine's ontological discourse of the soul as it delves deeply into the technicalities of the creation of Adam's soul. Especially since it is part of Augustine's exegesis of *Genesis* one would expect reverberations of it throughout all the authors treated. But this is far from what has come to light. In fact, the only author to use *Gn. litt. 7* was Cassiodorus. For the other authors there were different reasons not to use this text. Eugippius did use a lot of the *Gn. litt.* (we have looked at his use of especially books 6 and 10 in his chapter) but he avoided book 7 since he did not want to show an analytical and speculative Augustine on the origin of the soul, but an agnostic one. Eriugena had special polemical reasons to stay away from the *Gn. litt. 7* (and 10), since he wanted to ignore any traditional treatment of the origin of the soul or material of the soul (but he did use much of the rest of the work). Instead he stressed the will as an altogether different substance of the soul. Gottschalk is the only one who might have included *Gn. litt. 7* in his deliberations about the soul, had he taken or been granted the opportunity to expand on his letter and produce a fully-fledged *de anima* out of it. As it stood, it is not a

congenial text to prove traducianism and since the historical circumstances of the letter are uncertain, Gottschalk may not have had the *Gn. litt.* ready at hand when composing his letter. The lack of use of *Gn. litt.* 7 did mean that questions such as the existence of a precursor to the soul, or how the interplay between body and soul works, did not figure on the radar of the authors. Moreover the style of writing of *Gn. litt.* 7, or indeed the whole of the *Gn. litt.* was not used by the authors in this thesis. Augustine had the intellectual power, dare, and stature in the *Gn. litt.* to go forth by asking probing questions, hypothesizing and analyzing, and not always reaching an answer to his own questions. The constraints of the genres, polemical needs and perhaps intellectual capacities prevented the authors from doing so. Eugippius did not write himself (this florilegium at least) and Gottschalk and Eriugena needed to confirm positive statements. Cassiodorus might have adopted such an attitude towards his material should his intellectual powers have given him the option.

Overall, there is no single text or corpus of texts that all these four authors employed. They used texts from several genres in which Augustine wrote and from all the time periods of his career, such as his early philosophical dialogues, his exegesis, his letters and works such as the *Conf.* and the *civ.* What the authors sought in these texts was the truth as Augustine had seen it, or at least the confirmation and authority of Augustine for their own position. Results and conclusions mattered more than Augustine's sometimes long-winded argumentations that buttressed those conclusions. Whenever an author engaged with Augustine's texts, he did not perform a close reading in order to reconstruct the context of an insight and thereby establish the scope or value of a statement, but rather lifted the statement as truth from Augustine's text and combined it with other statements of Augustine in order to provide more forceful buttress for their position. Cassiodorus' quotation of Augustine springs to mind, in which he combines half a sentence from the *ord.* and half a sentence from the *an. quant.* Many examples can be gained from Eriugena's chapter, in which it is shown how in the *div. praed.* Eriugena sometimes used an explicit quotation of Augustine which flat-out contradicts what Augustine actually wanted to say. This leads to two considerations. First this makes clear that Augustine's texts do not present these late antique and early medieval authors with a historical figure who went through a deep intellectual development during his long career. Augustine's texts present a quarry which can be mined for diamonds, which are too hard for the (potential) opposition to break. A sign of the different attitudes between modern scholars and the authors in this thesis can be their treatment of the *retr.* Modern scholars love to read and cite the *retr.* in order to gain information on Augustine's later views of his earlier works. Together with the *Conf.*, there is no other work in Augustine's oeuvre more suitable than this 'meta-text' for realizing that Augustine

went through a long development. The only author to use the *retr.* was Eugippius, in his important excerpt 372 *De animae quaestione*. But tellingly Eugippius does not use it to see how there may be a distance between the old Augustine and the ‘earlier’ ones, but to reinforce Augustine’s agnosticism on the origin of the soul almost into the ahistorical position that it is not for the human being to gain knowledge on this point.

Secondly the abuse of quotations of Augustine by the authors in this thesis cannot be taken for a lack of understanding of Augustine on their part, but rather shows a conscious and considerate use of Augustine. Their intellectual commitments, whether it be solving the problem of the origin of the soul (Eugippius, Gottschalk), safeguarding the responsibility of the individual (Eriugena) or combining Stoicism with Augustine’s ideas (Cassiodorus), guided these authors into what to take from Augustine and how to use it. Sometimes that led to the distortion of the meaning of the quotation, i.e. of what an audience had to take from it, to a high degree. Indeed it rather seems, especially in Eriugena’s case, that the quotation of Augustine which is used to force Augustine to a position or even contradict himself is the more deliberated. This last point in no way wants to suggest that the authors in this thesis had their own preconceived notions and only went to Augustine’s texts to bolster their point with his authority. Every author in this thesis was fundamentally formed through the reading of the texts of Augustine that he thought he needed for his own text, even if prior intellectual development or commitment meant that he (deliberately) changed some of Augustine’s points. This even goes for Gottschalk and Eriugena, who diverge much more from Augustine than Cassiodorus and of course Eugippius are wont to do. Gottschalk comes to his insight of traducianism and thereby makes a much stronger claim than Augustine would be willing to allow. But his starting point, the premises from which he draws his implication and from there on went his own way, are all Augustine’s. Eriugena sometimes uses Augustine to contradict Augustine, and has a different conception of freedom, substance, and the Fall, all aiding him to state that the soul actually only consists of free will. But he stays true to Augustine’s intentions in stating that the human being has lost the freedom of choice, and without grace will not be able to self-direct himself in the only right direction, i.e. towards God. And in identifying the substance of the soul with the will, Eriugena, other than Cassiodorus or Gottschalk, keeps the soul a hundred percent immaterial.

2. Genres

The research in this thesis has purposefully taken place with texts from different genres: Eugippius' massive florilegium, Cassiodorus' traditional *De anima*, Gottschalk's letter, and Eriugena's long apologetic tractate. One of the questions was whether the constraints of the genre would lead to different kinds of reception of Augustine's texts. Form most definitely dictates content in a general way in the case of Eugippius (a work built up exclusively from quotations), Cassiodorus (having to write about the traditional topics of a *De anima* such as the quality and quantity of the soul), and Eriugena (having to write against Gottschalk). Yet studying the source texts through close reading shows that the intellectual commitments of the author are a far more important factor for his use of Augustine. This can most clearly be seen in Cassiodorus' case. Cassiodorus is perhaps the author who was most guided in his use of Augustine by his genre. A *De anima* after all asks of its author to explain what the soul is, what its quality is ('how it is'), what it does, where it comes from and where it is going. Cassiodorus therefore 'naturally' turned to some of the texts of Augustine, most notably the *an. quant.* and the *Gn. litt.* 7. But the task of synthesizing Stoicism and Augustine that Cassiodorus set himself, led him to taking advantage of the Neo-Platonic young Augustine, stressing the reasonable part of soul and judgement over the will, only reserving the will to account for the negative mutability of the soul. This fundamental choice of Cassiodorus, which guided his use of Augustine in for example ignoring Augustine's whole trinitarian discourse, was not dictated by the genre he was writing in.

3. Origin of the Soul

A red line in this thesis has been the way in which the interest of the authors in the ontology of the soul has been formed by their involvement in the predestination debate. Cassiodorus is the exception. Even though his *De anima* has a section on the origin of the soul, he does not engage in the predestination debate at all. It is fitting with the idea of a conservative and rather backward looking scholar to want to display his knowledge on the soul in a traditional way without getting involved in contemporary debates. At the same time also his temperament as politician, and the point in his intellectual career in which he wrote his *De anima*, i.e. as a fairly

recent convert, may have precluded him from going headlong into the debate. But the other three authors connect the ontology of the soul with the predestination debate. This may not come as a surprise with Eriugena, since the text under scrutiny is the *div. praed.* But in Gottschalk's case it is even likely that he came to his insights in the ontology of the soul because of his engagement in double predestination. The reason why the ontology of the soul is relevant for the predestination debates is that the question of the origin of the soul has a bearing on the universality of original sin. The universality of original sin, which is the pivotal point in both a theodicy and an explanation why the human being should turn himself to God, became orthodoxy in the fifth century, but its consequences remained contested during the predestination debates which heated up from time to time without ever reaching a satisfactory conclusion. The ontological question of the origin of the soul became burdened with the task to technically explain how original sin was universalized. Out of Augustine's options of creationism, traducianism and pre-existence of the soul, the first option would be preferred by the hard core Pelagians, who state that every soul is created free and unmarred by original sin. Already during the time-frame of the authors of the sixth century in this thesis, this position was no longer taken up. The option of traducianism is most congenial to intellectuals who want to have an easy way to grasp how original sin is universalized, in order to strengthen their defense of the necessity of grace.

Gottschalk, who drew his implication of a 'negative' predestination to hell if there is a positive predestination to heaven, chose this as his answer to the question of the origin of the soul. But Augustine was right to mistrust this option, since he could not imagine one soul being borne by two parents. In his text the technical troubles that Gottschalk encounters once he has chosen that option become clear, and I hope some of it has been explained in the chapter on Gottschalk. It led Gottschalk to an almost materialistic conception of the soul, and for Augustine the immateriality of the soul was much more fundamental than any answer to the question of the origin of the soul. In other words, for Augustine the question of the substance of the soul ('what' the soul is) has priority over the question of the origin of the soul (after all answering this question was a fundamental step in Augustine's own conversion). Perhaps Gottschalk would have agreed if he had approached the question from the side of the ontology of the soul instead of the predestination debates.

Eugippius and Eriugena both have very original answers to this question, although from very opposite motivations. Eugippius did not want to inflame the debate further, and tried to find a 'third' way between creationism and traducianism (it seems the pre-existence of the soul had become an irrelevant option in terms of the predestination debate). He tried to relieve the

soul of the burden of spreading original sin and instead assign it to the *rationes seminales* of the human being. The modern (and I daresay correct) understanding of Augustine sees the *rationes* only operating in the coming into being of the human body, seeing how Augustine had argued against any precursor to the soul in *Gn. litt.* 7. But Eugippius does not seem to have shared that understanding, so that his *rationes seminales* apply to the whole composite of the human being, body and soul. However, due to the implicit nature of Eugippius' way of arguing for this option through the copy-pasting of a florilegium, it is unclear how many readers may have recognized this option in the first place (perhaps his personal instruction of his most advanced pupils would have made such points much more obvious). What is clear is that Eugippius left a lasting impression with his forceful statement of Augustine's agnosticism on the origin of the soul. For Cassiodorus the question of the origin of the soul was moot, since Augustine did not know the answer himself. The likelihood is very high that this is directly coming from Eugippius' framing of affairs, cutting out all the analysis of the question in order not to provide potential ammunition in a predestination debate. Gottschalk in his turn had read Cassiodorus' *De anima* for his letter and it is tempting to state that his positioning of the agnostic Augustine would be of Cassiodorus' provenance. It may be the case that Cassiodorus and perhaps Eugippius guided him in this recognition, but Gottschalk was an avid reader of Augustine himself too, and this is shown by the fact that he laudably shores up Augustine's agnosticism with original quotations and a description of the history of the *an. et or.*

In opposition to Eugippius, Eriugena did not want to keep the peace, but took the commission to detract Gottschalk. He tried to break through the problem of the origin of the soul and how this technically ensures the universality of original sin (a dogma he shared with Gottschalk) by making the question totally irrelevant. Eriugena, as only author in this thesis, approaches the question from the totally different perspective of Augustine's dynamical discourse on the soul (the activities of the soul of remembering, knowing, and willing). By explaining how the human being may not have lost his free will, but was universally affected by losing free choice, he deftly sidestepped Augustine's -and everybody else's for that matter- conundrum. Eriugena simplified the whole matter. Where everyone else wanted to explain the loss of free will technically through the more fundamental layer of the ontology of the soul, Eriugena stated that this ontological layer consisted of the will. In a way Eriugena stated that the symptom was the disease itself, so that no further complicated search was necessary. But the side-effect of his cure for the question of the origin of the soul is that the notion of individuality becomes hard to explain.

4. The sixth century and the ninth

As far as a diachronic element is concerned, the authors in this thesis have been chosen from two distinct historical periods, the sixth century and the ninth. The intellectual climate between these two centuries is very different. Although even late antiquity was drawing to an end in the sixth century, Cassiodorus had had a classical education and curriculum and after his conversion could still entertain the dream of establishing a classical, albeit christian, university. Gottschalk and Eriugena were both members of a frankish culture, who as intellectuals were engaged in conserving and developing their roman christian heritage. Eugippius, as a sixth century monastic educated refugee from the fringes of the Roman empire, may form a bridge between these two positions. But they also had mutual intellectual concerns. Most broadly one may state that they were all concerned in their own way with saving humanity from doom, be it by converting to the true faith and establishing monasteries in order to save the soul in the afterlife (Cassiodorus), be it by trying to keep the moral community from shattering even if the political community had (Eugippius), or be it by saving humanity from future but also very much from contemporary turmoil through a proper insight into predestination (Gottschalk and Eriugena). More specifically predestination formed an intellectual topic with which the authors, Cassiodorus excluded, engaged. But in their approaches to predestination and the soul at large, there are also two interesting intellectual differences between the authors of the two periods.

The first difference is that both Gottschalk and Eriugena have a systematizing tendency which is not exhibited in Eugippius or Cassiodorus. This is most visible in Eriugena. Through close reading his text, it becomes clear that Eriugena has a very clear abstract model of the human being which he uses to shape his arguments against Gottschalk. Assuming for the moment that the figure I have drawn of that model is correct, its simplicity is due to the conceptual clarity in Eriugena's head and his way of thinking things through. Gottschalk has much less of such a conceptual clarity in the text under scrutiny in this thesis (and it may have been much quicker in the composing), but he shows an intellectual and systematic rigour in thinking through the implications of the option of origin of the soul he has chosen. In contrast with this Cassiodorus and Eugippius are not drawing implications and systematizing, but rather collecting and choosing, even if very skillful at times at that.

The second difference is that both Gottschalk and Eriugena have a stronger engagement with the individual. Gottschalk shows this strongest, by positing a special divine volition for the coming into being of every individual human being. What differentiates humanity from the rest of creation in Gottschalk's eyes is that every individual member of our species has been brought

about by God's special attention. Eriugena also spends thought on what the individuation principle is for the human being. What separates our individual soul from any other soul is not some divine volition, or our potency to choose and act, but the actual choices we have made in our historical lives. Stated this way it may not seem so strange that Eriugena was made out as a Pelagian, if Eriugena also had not stressed the absolute need for grace for free choice of the will.

The method of close reading which has been applied in this thesis (hopefully) leads to an assessment and appreciation of every individual author. But it also has its drawbacks. For one, it limits the amount of source text one can go through so that the number of authors in the investigation had to be limited. It also leads to a focus on differences, differences between Augustine and the author, and in this conclusion differences between the authors' reception of Augustine. More texts will have to be studied and more similarities have to be noted if one wants to chart a tradition or culture. But at least with the engagement in the predestination debates in which three of the authors in this thesis had engaged, I hope to have shown some of the iterations and alterations on a topic that led to the formation of an intellectual tradition.

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1. Two models of change for the soul in the young Augustine

1.1 mutability of the soul

Not long after the Cassiciacum period –as Cary points out-, from the *mor.* and the *an. quant.* onwards (387-389), Augustine would reject the divinity of the soul.⁴⁴⁹ This fits in with the anti-Manichean polemic, since the Manicheans claim that God and the soul are of the same substance.⁴⁵⁰ Augustine rejects this, pointing out that, although the soul is not mutable in space, it is mutable over time.⁴⁵¹ In the previous paragraph, the mutability of the soul had already been mentioned briefly. The soul is after all mutable since it is now stupid, then wise.⁴⁵² Yet this mutability of the soul is not only intellectual, but at the same time moral.⁴⁵³ The change of the soul has a definite direction for Augustine: it improves or deteriorates, it turns itself towards the life of reason or towards the life of the senses. The soul thereby undergoes a change over time, with which it takes a middle position between the divine, which is immutable per se, and corporeal nature, which is mutable in place and time.⁴⁵⁴

In explaining how the soul is mutable, Augustine needed to steer clear from positing a change that affected the soul too much, since the soul has a definite position in the order of creation from which it cannot verge. But at the same time Augustine was of the opinion that the change that the soul undergoes is of crucial importance for the human being. In his early period, especially the *imm. an.*, Augustine tried to clarify the mutability of the soul using two models, one of Aristotelian and one of Plotinian origin. However, these models do not go together well

⁴⁴⁹ Cary (2000), 111.

⁴⁵⁰ e.g. *c. Fort.*, 11; cf. O'Daly (1978), 32.

⁴⁵¹ *div. qu.* 19.

⁴⁵² e.g. *div. qu.* 54.

⁴⁵³ cf. O'Daly (1978), 32.

⁴⁵⁴ *ep.* 18.2; cf. *div. qu.* 19.

because of their different metaphysical backgrounds. It is therefore not surprising that in the later Augustine one mode of explanation suppressed the other.

1.2 two models of change: the model of Aristotelian origin

As an introduction Augustine speaks in the *imm. an.* 5.7 of two kinds of change in the soul: first by the fact that the body affects the soul (*secundum corporis passiones*) for example through age and sickness, and secondly by its own affections (*secundum suas passiones*) such as desire and fear.⁴⁵⁵ He does not go further into the relationships between the two kinds of change, since what is important for Augustine in that paragraph and the next is to show that there is no change of the soul whatsoever that entails a change in the nature of the rational soul. Just as he would later argue in the *Gn. litt.* 7.10.14 that the human rational soul can never deteriorate so much as to become an animal soul.⁴⁵⁶ The first explanation of this occurs in *imm. an.* 8 and 9. In these paragraphs Augustine distinguishes a ‘minor’ change (*aliqua mutatio*) from a ‘radical’ change (*tanta mutatio*). In the minor change some of the properties ‘in’ the subject (*in subiecto*) may change, without the whole subject changing. Yet if the change is so great that the subject itself changes, then none of the properties of the subject remain unaltered. The subject itself changes when we are compelled to give the product of the change a different ‘name’ (*nomen*), so that the definition of the subject is changed. In order to clarify this explanation he chooses wax as an example: wax may change its physical appearance such as shape or colour, but remains wax. Yet when the wax is consumed by the flame, e.g. of a candle, so that it melts and disappears, it will no longer be wax.⁴⁵⁷ In that case none of the properties can remain in the wax.⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵⁵ cf. O’Daly (1978), 34.

⁴⁵⁶ cf. Plato, *Timaeus* (trans. Donald Zeyl) 91d-92c.

⁴⁵⁷ cf. *sol.* 2.12.22.

⁴⁵⁸ It is a question where Augustine derived his wax example from. Numerous mentions of *cera* are given by for example the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford 1982), p. 300, yet an –at least superficial– survey does not yield a relevant source, although all the examples together eventually list the accidental properties of the wax that Augustine mentions. Rolf Hirschmann in *Der neue Pauly* (Stuttgart 1997) vol. 2, 1069 mainly refers to Pliny’s *Natural History* books 11 and 22. In their own lemma on wax, Büll’s and Moser’s supplement to Pauly’s *Realencyclopädie* vol. 13 (Stuttgart 1975), 1347-1416 speaks, apart from the uses of wax and similar topics, about the development of the symbolism of light and its use in liturgical candle burning such as the Easter candle in the Christian church, a development contemporary with Augustine. Yet, although it might be tempting to read Christian symbolism into this passage, there really is no lead to do so. Büll and Moser do not offer a reference for the use of wax as an example for change. The author admits that there is as yet –in 1980– no systematic treatment of the sources on wax.

This model of change can be traced back to Aristotle, whose *Categories* Augustine had read when young.⁴⁵⁹ In the *Categories* a difference is made between what pertains to the definition or the substance of a subject and what can be found ‘in’ the subject.⁴⁶⁰ Every property which determines a subject to be what it is, belongs to the definition, as ‘reason’ for example –along with other properties- determines the human being. Yet other properties, such as colour, merely qualify the subject, for example as a white specimen. These properties have come to be called respectively ‘substantial’ and ‘accidental’ properties. On this model of change a subject can thus change with respect to its accidental properties while remaining what it is, keeping its definition. Yet when the substantial properties are altered, then the substance changes. Augustine either through the translation in which he read the *Categories*, or through his own devices, alters the way in which he speaks about this model. He violates the Aristotelian use of ‘in’ by claiming that all properties, thus also the substantial, are found in the subject. However the wax-example makes it clear that the accidental-substantial distinction underlies the juxtaposition of ‘some change’ and ‘great change’. All the examples which Augustine gives of ‘minor’ change, such as colour, shape and temperature are accidental properties of the wax, whereas the ‘great change’ during the burning affects the substance itself. The fact that Augustine has his wax burnt in the example is very interesting for two reasons. First of all it intends to clarify the principle that through substantial change no property can remain in the substance. Nothing of the wax is left after the burning for the properties to adhere to. Supposedly Aristotle would not concur on this principle, since at least two properties persist if one would construct a red wooden chair from a red wooden table. This also brings out the second reason why the burning is interesting. If Aristotle speaks of substantial change, he would have one thing changed into another thing, so that another definition applies. Yet with the burning of the wax Augustine implies that after the substantial change nothing is left. This is partly warranted, since after a substantial change at least nothing is left of the substance before the change. However, in my view, Augustine’s motivation for this ‘change-into-nothing’ is to have this model of Aristotelian origin converge with the model of Plotinian origin that will be treated in a moment.

The principle that during substantial change no property persists is important for Augustine, since it entails that the soul cannot undergo substantial change if there is at least one property which remains throughout all possible change of the soul. For Augustine reason turns out to be this persisting property, thereby barring the soul from substantial change. The soul will

⁴⁵⁹ *conf.* 2.48; cf. O’Daly (1978), 36. He rightly points to Aristotle, *Categories* 2 1a20 ff, and gives in n. 89 literature about the question in what form Augustine read this work; cf. Cary (2000), 102-103.

⁴⁶⁰ e.g. *Cat.* 5.2a34-2b7.

thus never cease to exist, and is therefore immortal. For Augustine this explains why the soul, as the principle of life, cannot die. On Augustine's understanding this model of change thus states that a change in the accidental properties of a subject are 'minor' (*aliqua mutatio*) and the subject persists. While a 'radical' change affects the substance (*subesse*) and definition (*nomen*) of the thing itself, destroying all the properties along with it. O' Daly thus states: 'Now it is precisely qualitative change that Augustine wishes to attribute to soul; what is 'in soul' as in a subject may (but need not necessarily) change: that is to say the soul's affections, its will, or its moral and intellectual condition may alter. These changes do not, however, affect the substantial identity of the soul.'⁴⁶¹ For the unity and continued existence of the soul is precisely what ensures these possibilities of accidental change. According to this explanation the moral state of the soul is therefore unconnected to the ontological status of the soul: however deep the human being (and thus its soul) may be morally deteriorated through involvement in the life of the senses, the soul gives form or species to the body and can never (totally) cease to engage in rational activity, since the rational soul remains to be what it is. The wretched man and the saint thus have essentially the same soul. According to this model of Aristotelian origin the moral state of the soul is therefore unconnected to the ontological state, since the moral change is only accidental.

1.3 the model of Plotinian origin

Yet this division between the moral and the ontological state of the soul seems strange if we look at the second way in which Augustine speaks about the mutability of the soul. The second model of change, which has its roots in Plotinus, is given by Augustine in 7.12 and 8.13 of the *imm. an.* when he discusses the dangers for the immortality of the soul. If, as we have just seen, reason ensures the immortality of the soul, does this not mean that turning from reason towards the senses undermines this immortality? Augustine tells us that the soul which turns to reason and wisdom exists more fully, while the soul that turns from reason and truth to foolishness does so at its own cost of a lessened being (*esse minus*). Through the defect of turning from reason, the soul tends towards nothingness since all defect 'tends towards nothingness' (*tendit ad nihilum*). This lessening of the being has to be understood as becoming 'more deformed' (*deformius*), thus a lessening of the species of the being, and thereby the soul becomes 'uglier' (*foedius*). However this privation of form can never be said to be so great that the soul totally

⁴⁶¹ O' Daly (1978), 37. He, however, does not note that Augustine talks of all the properties being 'in the subject'.

ceases to exist. Augustine finds it hard to explain why, but compares this lessening with the cutting in half of a body. As a body can be cut into half infinitely, yet never reach nothing, so the soul will never cease to exist totally. This second model regards the being not as its form (*species*). It seems that this second model also admits of two types of change, but we will see that it does not really. In a 'minor' change, the form of a being can be more or less present, providing the being with more or less beauty and being. However, throughout this 'minor' change, the being remains the same being since the form is still there. A 'radical' change occurs when the form totally dissolves, thus when the being has a total privation of form (*privatio*). Then the being ceases to be that particular being. Although it thus seems as if there are two types of change, there is really only one kind of change. For in this model, every change has to be seen as shift on a continuous spectrum of presence of form, where the total absence of the form and the death of the being only constitutes one of the extremes of the spectrum. But, for Augustine, the extreme at the low end will never be reached by the soul.

This model is derived from Plotinus, who explains how the soul deforms itself and tends towards nothingness through its involvement in the material world. It is therefore his views on matter and the generation of matter by soul which most probably are Augustine's source for the second model of change. Plotinus explains his views on soul and matter mainly in *Enneads* I.8, II.4 and III.9. It will of course always be the question whether Augustine read these precise parts of the *Enneads*, yet there is no doubt that Augustine was in no small measure influenced by Plotinus and these parts specifically clarify Augustine's second explanation. In my explanation of Plotinus I follow closely Dennis O'Brien's interpretation in his succinct 'Plotinus on matter and evil'.⁴⁶² This will take some space, yet I believe it is useful for understanding Augustine. It is perhaps most clarifying to start with O'Brien's conclusion that matter serves as the theodicy, since it explains the presence of evil in a reality which is dependant on the good principle of the One.⁴⁶³ Matter thus has to be evil and has to stand in some kind of opposition to the One. Yet at the same time it cannot be the absolute opposite to the One. In that case there would two principles governing reality, and the production of reality would not be guided by necessity, but by the chance in their relationship.⁴⁶⁴ Although matter is therefore evil and opposite to the One, in Plotinus' hierarchy of reality, it is still the utter last stage of production coming from the One. Here the soul comes into play, for it is the universal Soul which is responsible for the production of matter, as agent of the One. This Soul produces the cosmos, whereas individual 'partial' souls

⁴⁶² Dennis O'Brien (1996).

⁴⁶³ O'Brien (1996), 171, 189-190.

⁴⁶⁴ Plotinus, II.4.2.9-10; cf. O'Brien (1996), 181, 187. Plotinus would not permit two principles governing reality, from which his polemic with the Gnostics stemmed.

produce the bodies in it through the power of growth of the vegetative soul.⁴⁶⁵ There are thus two closely interrelated questions. How do the individual souls produce and engage in this evil matter, and in what opposition does matter stand to the One?

1.4 matter as form of non being; the participation of the soul in non-being

Let us start with the second question. The One is the first principle and as such it is not only good, but also complete being and the source of being. If matter would be the absolute opposite of the One, it would represent absolute non-being. Yet Parmenides showed that it is impossible to speak or even conceive of non-being per se.⁴⁶⁶ Plotinus, however, did not oppose matter (ὕλη) to being (ὄν), but to substance (οὐσία). The difference is that matter is not opposite to existing, but to the forms (λόγοι/εἶδη) which are the substances.⁴⁶⁷ Plotinus explained this by taking the Aristotelian concept of privation. Privation is absence of form, and in Aristotle's view when the form arrives, the privation of that form is negated and annihilated. Hereby Aristotle could explain the change, or coming into being, of one thing into another, while denying the idea of creation from nothing, which would have to be admitted if the form would come into the body without 'preparation'. This privation was attributed to the underlying matter, which served as a continuous substrate throughout the whole process. One body thus comes into being from another through filling the privation for the form that the matter of the previous body has for the form of the new body. In effect the forms thus get replaced in the matter and the privation for the new form is removed. Plotinus adapted the concept of privation (στέρησις). On his version of the concept, matter is identical with privation, since the substance is already made up by the form.⁴⁶⁸ Moreover, when the form arrives in the matter, the privation is not removed. Throughout change, privation is thus persistent for Plotinus.⁴⁶⁹ Form is what defines the being (οὐσία), and it is in this way that matter as privation is the 'form' of non-being.⁴⁷⁰ The implication is thus that form cannot really be combined with matter, since the form as definition

⁴⁶⁵ Plotinus, III.9.3; III.4.1; O'Brien (1996), 181.

⁴⁶⁶ O'Brien (1996), 172. This is a second reason why matter cannot be taken as the absolute opposition to One, apart from the idea that it would otherwise constitute a second principle of reality.

⁴⁶⁷ Plotinus, II.4.16.1-3; O'Brien (1996), 173.

⁴⁶⁸ Plotinus, II.6.1.8-9.

⁴⁶⁹ Plotinus, II.4.16.

⁴⁷⁰ Plotinus, I.8.3; O'Brien (1996), 176-177.

of the being cannot be combined with the privation of the form. On this view there is just no underlying substrate which can really bind form and matter as opposite to form together.⁴⁷¹ If matter thus is the form of non-being, then it is evil. For form gives definition and measure and is therefore good and beautiful. Matter as the contrary is ugly and bad.⁴⁷² Matter thus stands not in absolute opposition to the one as non-being. But it is the form of non-being that every body needs in order to change into another body. Every body thus has a certain unmeasuredness, ugliness and evil to it, since it eventually changes into another.

The first question was how the individual soul is engaged in evil matter. In Plotinus' scheme of reality every stage is produced by the previous, and the individual soul thus produces the matter of the bodies. Yet, contrary to 'ordinary' production in Plotinus, the soul diminishes itself when it does produce a body. It is only directed to itself and wishes to be self-sufficient and to produce an image of itself, instead of directing itself to its own source. The soul is the definition of a being, and when the soul produces the image of itself (i.e. the body), it becomes less defined. It creates something 'non-existent'.⁴⁷³ The soul thus participates in the non-being and loses form.⁴⁷⁴

Returning to Augustine and his second way of explaining the mutability of the soul, it is now understandable how he comes to talk of the soul 'tending towards nothingness' and becoming more 'ugly' in *imm. an.* 7.12 and 8.13. For with the moral deterioration, the soul loses its form and is thus lessened in measure and order. Recapitulating, this model of change thus locates both the 'minor' and the 'radical' change in the form of the soul. In this model it makes sense to speak of proportional or gradual change, since the soul can be more or less present, or existent, depending on the question whether it is engaged in the spiritual life of reason or in the material life of the senses. Thus according to Augustine the soul can be infinitely lessened, although not cease to exist. A minor caveat has to be made here, since Augustine did not copy Plotinus' ideas on matter. Where he may have been more negative about matter at the start of his Christian career than at its end, he never thought about matter, as part of the intrinsically good creation, as the absolute evil and absolute privation.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷¹ Plotinus, I.8.6.54-9. O'Brien (1996), 176.

⁴⁷² Plotinus, I.8.3; I.8.10.

⁴⁷³ Plotinus, III.9.3; O'Brien (1996), 182.

⁴⁷⁴ Plotinus, I.8.4. At least, there is discussion over this. Rist (1967), 122 will claim that the act of creation by the individual soul is cause of its diminishment, since they cannot resist their creation. O'Brien (1996), 186 claims that it is the soul who is 'too eager' to engage in the material world, after the creation will be evil. What combines the two interpretations is the attitude of the soul towards the matter: can it turn from it again, or does it get tied down? For present purposes it is not necessary to go into this debate.

⁴⁷⁵ e.g. *vera rel.* 21.

On the surface Augustine combines the two models. The two models do converge in the idea that a thing can change without changing ‘radically’, thus without changing its nature or definition. And both models seem to involve a receding into nothingness, since Augustine has his wax sample burnt in the first model. Yet this convergence of models is only superficial. In the first model of Aristotelian origin a minor change is effected by a change in the accidental properties, in the second model of Plotinian origin it is effected by more or less presence of the form. Yet the models as Augustine used them differ in what is affected through such a ‘minor’ change. In the first model the locus of change is the accidental properties, which are in no way tied up with the being or definition of the thing. But it is exactly the being or definition which is the locus of change in the second model. The two models are contradictory in this point: in the Aristotelian model accidental change is a different change from substantial change, in the Plotinian model it is the same change, but the difference is in the degree of the change. This superficial convergence of the two models can be only superficial, since the metaphysical assumptions behind the two models are contradictory. The first model takes the being for granted and revolves around the question whether one can apply the name or the definition to the being or not. In other words, the assumption is that it is either this being, or it is not. Being can therefore be thought of as ‘binary’, it has a discrete value of 1 or 0, True or False. According to Aristotle in the *Categories*, it is nonsense to speak of ‘half a man’ since being does not admit gradation.⁴⁷⁶ Yet the second model exactly does admit gradation of being. The form can be more or less present, there can be more or less being to the subject, since for Plotinus substance is attached to the form which can diminish or increase. The assumption is that being has a measure, and the actual subject is measured to the ideal in the case of the full presence of the form. Being can be thought of as ‘analogue’, it has a continuous value between 1 or 0, between total presence and total privation of the form.

1.5 implications of the models for the moral state of the soul

This deeper contradiction between the models of change can only come at a cost. Augustine pays by having very different implications of the models for the mutability of the soul.

⁴⁷⁶ Aristotle (trans. Harold Cooke), *Categories* 5.3b34-4a9. This idea does not only count for the comparison of substances of the same species, e.g. two human beings, but also for the comparison of different substances, say a man and a horse. In Aristotle’s view a human being ‘is’ just as much as a horse. While in the ordering of the universe according to Augustine, a human being ‘is’ more, has more being than a horse. The form, measure and being are hierarchically placed in the divine ordering of the cosmos.

In connection with his search for the origin of evil, Augustine was most interested in the change that the soul undergoes in its moral state. In the first model of change, the change that the soul undergoes never affects the core of the soul. All change is accidental, thus that most important of changes, namely moral change, is accidental too. This first model thus entails a definite divide between the ontological status of the soul and moral change, since the moral sphere in no way affects the being of the human. Whatever happens, the most wretched human and the saint have in essence the same soul, since the definition ‘soul’ is applicable to both. Choices of the individual human therefore do not affect the being of the human soul. The soul has a very stable core and in the context of the *imm. an.* this very forcefully explains that despite the accidental moral mutability of the soul, the soul is essentially immortal. A danger lies therefore in diminishing the importance of moral change for the soul. No matter what happens and which choices you make, your soul is safe to live on. But Augustine was not inclined to diminish the relevance of the moral status for the soul, and introduced the second model of change (7.12-8.13) a few paragraphs after the first model (5.7-9).

In the second model, the consequences for the influence of the moral sphere on the being of the soul are remarkably different. The moral circumstances of the soul affect exactly that which is supposed to ensure the continuity throughout the change, since they affect the form of the soul. Better men have more form to their soul, and therefore more measure, beauty and being. Although the moral circumstances may be barred from delivering the ultimate capital punishment of death to the soul, it is clear that there is a strong tie between the ontological and the moral spheres. Being comes in degrees, and in the case of the soul the moral state can be seen as the setting for the actual degree. The individual choices thus have a great effect for the way in which the human being realizes itself. The form of the soul, that continuing element which ensures the identity of the soul, is very flexible and mutable, and is affected in many ways. In this more pessimistic view of the soul it seems more a miracle than a necessity that the soul does not pass away at all. Yet it does not, and this is what ensures its immortality.

1.6 survival

The question looms large why Augustine would be inclined to have these contradictory models of change. Right where it counts, in their explanation of how the soul experiences a ‘minor’ change, thus where the soul is mutable but stays soul, these models are contradictory. Augustine may or may not have realized the contradiction, but it is clear that only one of the

models of change survived in Augustine's mature thought. When we will have a look at which of the models survived, we will get an indication towards Augustine's motif to use two models. The Aristotelian model is best characterised by the term *in subiecto*. This term is used not only in the *imm. an.*, but also in the *conf.*, where Augustine explicitly connects the term with Aristotle's categories, when he explains how wrong it was to try to apply the categories to God.⁴⁷⁷ The observations then are that the phrase is certainly used by the mature Augustine, although not that much and that he uses the term more Aristotelian, by only having the term refer to the accidental properties.⁴⁷⁸ And in *ep.* 162.4, written 414 or 415 he used the term to explain Evodius and his brothers how dreams are dependant on our minds but do not subsist of themselves. The term is thus later used to distinguish that which can exist on its own from that which cannot, but is never more connected to the mutability of the soul.

This is not the case for the Plotinian model of change. In the *vera rel.*, written just before and at the time of the consecration of Augustine as priest in 391, Augustine describes in 11.21-12.24 the evils of the soul and the return to God. In these paragraphs he clearly uses the second model of change. 'The life that through a voluntary defect defects from him who made it, and whose substance it enjoys, yet wishing against God's law to enjoy the bodies, at whose command God placed life, verges to nothing.'⁴⁷⁹ 'For which reason the life, which delighted at the enjoyment of the bodies neglects God, inclines to nothingness, and that is perversion.'⁴⁸⁰ Augustine can thus speak of the death of the soul as a metaphor when it turns from God as the source of being towards nothingness.⁴⁸¹ 'But death does not belong to life, if not as perversion (*nequitia*), which is said of what is not some thing; and that is why exceedingly perverted people are called "people of nothing".'⁴⁸² It is impossible to speak of a metaphorical death of the soul using the model of Aristotelian descent which compartmentalizes the change of the soul to the accidental properties. But in the Platonist tradition, the soul as form cannot die and at the death of the body will recede. This is exactly the idea that Augustine uses, although the moral death

⁴⁷⁷ *conf.* 4.16.29.

⁴⁷⁸ apart from the just mentioned *conf.* and soon to be mentioned *ep.* 162.4 are the *trin.* 7.10; 9.5; 10.15; *c. Iul.* 2.37; 4.19; 5.51; 6.62 with a very clear definition of that which is reified (*reatus*) is a subject or substance and that which is *in subiecto* is dependant.

⁴⁷⁹ *vera rel.* 11.21: *vita ergo voluntario defectu deficiens ab illo, qui eam fecit et cuius essentia fruebatur, et volens contra dei legem frui corporibus, quibus eam deus praefecit, vergit ad nihilum.*

⁴⁸⁰ *vera rel.* 11.22: *quapropter vita, quae fructu corporis delectata negligit deum, inclinatur ad nihilum, et ista est nequitia.*

⁴⁸¹ *Gn. litt.* 7.28.43; O'Daly (1978), 35.

⁴⁸² *vera rel.* 11.21: *mors autem vitae non est nisi nequitia, quae ab eo quod nequiquam sit dicta est, et ideo nequissimi homines nihili homines appellantur.*

will never provoke the physical death. The model of change of Plotinian origin thus suppressed the other model for explaining the mutability of the soul.⁴⁸³

It is therefore not enough to claim, as O'Daly does, that Augustine wanted to attribute 'qualitative change' to the soul.⁴⁸⁴ I do not believe that Augustine after the *imm. an.* ever thought of the mutability of the soul in terms of accidental-essential. More precisely, it was for him exactly the essence of the soul which is mutable, although in measure and not in definition. But to come back to the question why Augustine would have used two incompatible models, how can the survival of only one of the models give us information about the motives of the younger Augustine to use the two? In order to answer this question we have to look at a change in Augustine's theory of soul, with which the Plotinian model fits better than the Aristotelian.

1.7 divinity of the soul? -encore

An explanation why Augustine might have used the two models of change may be found in the confusion described earlier, about the divinity of the soul. The Aristotelian model of change is very suitable if one wants to stress the continuity of the human soul. In this model reason is an essential and thus inseparable property of the human soul.⁴⁸⁵ The stability of the truths found, or even constituted by reason in this model is the safeguard against the mortality of the soul and a possible starting point for arguing the divinity of the soul. Truth, for example in a mathematical reasoning is either there, or not. It is just not possible for the truth of the statement ' $1 + 1 = 2$ ' to be more or less present. The first model is therefore very suitable for claiming that the soul has a divine stability to its essence. The second model is much less suitable for such a line of thought. It is harder to claim the divinity of the soul when it is mutable exactly in the measure of its being. When Augustine reached certainty on this question, it is therefore not surprising that the Plotinian model became the only one to be used in his thinking. This model coheres with the idea that there is a dynamic to the dependency of the soul on God, a result from the creation from nothing.

⁴⁸³ This point is in accordance with Cary's general idea that Augustine, instead of losing Neoplatonist influence, actually became more Plotinian. Yet I am wary of stressing this idea too much, since I also believe that the biblical influence in Augustine gained a much larger place after c. 390, in accordance with Rist's second 'signpost' of the ordination of Augustine to priesthood.

⁴⁸⁴ O'Daly (1978), 37.

⁴⁸⁵ *imm. an.* 6.11.

1.8 the change of motion (reason, will)

With respect to the survival of these models of change it is interesting to see that there is also change in Augustine's stress on what moves the soul.⁴⁸⁶ In the previous paragraph, it was shown that in the very early Augustine reason is a motion of the soul. Through the prominence of reason in Augustine's early works, it was reason that received the stress as the inalienable motion of the mind. In my view the idea of reason as motion can be given a further context if we look at the following passage from the *imm. an.* 3.3:

'There is a certain power in what remains fixed, and all that remains fixed is unchanging, and every power can perform some action, and precisely when it performs the action it is a power. Now every action is either the result of movement or itself produces movement. So, then, either not everything which is the result of movement or certainly not everything which causes movement is changing. But everything which is moved by something and itself does not cause movement is something mortal, and nothing mortal is unchanging. Therefore we can conclude with certainty and without any exceptions that not everything which causes movement is changed.'⁴⁸⁷

(trans. Gerard Watson)

What Augustine talks about here, is how the soul as a 'fixed' (thus immortal) being moves a body without itself being moved or changed and thus is the *virtus* of the body.⁴⁸⁸ He thus juxtaposes the soul and the body. However, I propose to take the first more general statement out of its immediate context and apply it to reason and soul. At this moment I see no better warrant for this but the fact that it is a general statement that serves as a kind of general introduction to the argument that the soul moves the body without being moved itself. Moreover, I believe this is warranted, since as the soul serves as a fixed and immutable point of reference for the mutable body, so reason serves as a fixed and immutable point of reference for

⁴⁸⁶ I do not want to claim that reason is the only motion of the mind. As the *imm. an.* 5.7 says, the mind can change under the affections of the body and of itself. For example emotions are also motions of the mind. Especially these motions have to be governed by reason in *gn. adv. man.* 1.20.31.

⁴⁸⁷ *imm. an.* 3.3: *Quaedam constantiae virtus est et omnis constantia immutabilis est et omnis virtus potest aliquid agere nec, cum agit aliquid, virtus non est. omnis porro action aut movetur aut movet. aut igitur non omne, quod movetur, aut certe non omne, quod movet, mutabile est. at omne, quod ab alio movetur nec movet ipsum, aliquid mortale est. neque mortale quicquam immutabile. quare de certo iam et sine ulla disiunctione concluditur non omne, quod movet, mutari.*

⁴⁸⁸ cf. Gerard Watson's commentary to the *imm. an.* in the *Soliloquies and the Immortality of the Soul* (Warminster 1990), 200-201.

the mutable soul. It may be confusing how the soul is then both mutable and immutable, but in my view this can be reconciled. For the soul is immutable with respect to the kind of mutability of the body. The soul does not move in place as the body does. Moreover, the soul is immortal, thus cannot undergo the ‘radical’ change as the body can. Yet, if we compare the soul with reason, it becomes clear that the soul is mutable. For reason, being closely connected with truth, is eternal and stable, whereas the soul is mutable as we have seen earlier, albeit that this mutability is only ‘minor’. According to this principle the soul is thus the *virtus* of the body, as reason is the *virtus* of the soul. This reasoning gives further insight into the relation between reason and soul in the young Augustine and sheds light on the development of his thought. In the *imm. an.* it is the stability of reason, and the truths which are pertaining to it, which ensure the immortality of the soul. If reason is thus taken as ‘fixed’ (*constans*) then reason has a power to move something, without itself being moved. Reason as truth then moves the soul, bringing insight to the mind through a ‘motion’, without moving or changing itself. The soul itself, however, is very capable of change, being now foolish, then wise. Reason as truth thus moves the soul, which movement then can be taken as individual reasoning of the individual mind, ‘looking’ at the truth that correct reasoning provides. On this interpretation, the soul is inseparably connected with the truths that reason as objective reason provides, as is certainly the gist of the argument of the *imm. an.* The individual human being, however, may have more or less movement in his mind, giving him more or less understanding. Yet the soul is in a way heteronomous, since it always has a connection with the truth. The suggestion is then that the soul is caused to move by reason. But it is at least clear that there is something more stable and eternal, on which the immortality of the soul is dependent. And in the young Augustine of the Cassiciacum period, this is stressed as the motion to the mind.

But the stress on reason as the motion of the mind proved not to be durable in Augustine’s thinking. As Augustine turned more to solving the problem of the presence of evil, he stressed the will as the origin of evil. Around the time of the composition of the *lib. arb.* (388-395), the primary location of action of the soul therefore changes from reason to the will. *Div. qu.* 2, 4 and 8 are clear examples of this intellectual movement: where *div. qu.* 2 asserts that the human being has received a will (*voluntas*), 4 takes the will to be the cause of moral deterioration. In 8 then the question is posed whether the soul moves by itself. The answer is positive: ‘He feels that the soul moves by its own, who feels that he has a will in himself.’⁴⁸⁹ In the context of the fall of the angels in the *vera rel.*: ‘But what touches as affects the soul, that influences the

⁴⁸⁹ *div. qu.* 8: *Moveri per se animam sentit, qui sentit in se esse voluntatem.*

bodies as place: for it is moved by the will, the body by space.’⁴⁹⁰ The stress on will over reason as the motion of the mind is made clear in the *lib. arb.* 1.25.12. The will is taken as a necessary condition for knowledge: the desire for knowledge serves as the starting point for the investigation.⁴⁹¹ If we recall the two models of explanation of change, then the survival of the Plotinian model of change fits well with the emphasis on the will as the movement of the soul. For the will in this model has the opportunity to affect the core being of the soul, while in the Aristotelian model the separate volitions are just accidental qualities of the soul that come and go. The result of the stress on will as the motion of the soul thereby results in loosening the ties the soul has with eternal truth. For the will has a starting point which is entirely in the soul itself, whereas reason in the individual soul has to rely on the even more stable reason or truths that pertain to it. In the young Augustine the immortality of the soul was more important than its mutability, but with the change of stress from reason to will as the action of the soul, its mutability was shown to be of greater importance.

⁴⁹⁰ *vera rel.* 14.28: *Quod autem affectibus contingit animae, hoc locis corpori, nam illa movetur voluntate, corpus autem spatio.*

⁴⁹¹ Simon Harrison (1999), 201-202.

2. Cassiodorus' use of Tertullian

If Cassiodorus is working with different models of the soul, then he is working with different texts on the soul.⁴⁹² This is the place for a short gaze towards another text that Cassiodorus might have used. Di Marco relates the origin of Cassiodorus' Stoicism to a 'koine stoicizzante', which does not further direct us towards specific texts.⁴⁹³ However, he also remarks that Cassiodorus' *De anima* is the first well structured and 'organical' *De anima* since the one Tertullian wrote in the 3rd c.⁴⁹⁴ Especially given the fact that Tertullian, also under influence of Stoicism, held to a materialistic conception of the soul it is important to take a short look at this *De anima* as well. Moreover, Tertullian included extensive doxographies in his *De anima*, so that it is very likely that Cassiodorus consulted him for more than Tertullian's own opinions. Cassiodorus could have gained much information on the Stoics from these doxographies.⁴⁹⁵ There are some strong oppositions (Tertullian believes the soul as material has some properties that other bodies have too, such as a three dimensional shape. *De anima* 9). But some similarities between the two *De anima*'s are so striking that the use of Tertullian by Cassiodorus seems likely. Here I will shortly indicate three similarities: Tertullian's use of the word 'spirit', the main features of his conception of the human soul and the effects of the will.

Tertullian has breath (*spiritus*) as the principle of life, since there is no life without breathing (this also goes for small animals without respiratory organs), which leads to the conclusion that *spiritus* and soul *anima* are one, the difference being that the first word relates to the function of life and the second to the substance (10). This *spiritus* thus thoroughly pervades all life on earth, and is invisible (at least for the human eye) (8).⁴⁹⁶ The substance of soul is simple and has a nature peculiar to itself.⁴⁹⁷ The soul of the human being thus also is made from this

⁴⁹² As is the topic of Di Marco (1985), who looks beyond Augustine as well.

⁴⁹³ Di Marco (1985), 98.

⁴⁹⁴ *ibid.* 96.

⁴⁹⁵ as indeed modern scholars do as well. E. g. according to Annas (1992) 38 n. 4 Tertullian's discussion of the Stoic materialistic conception of the soul ('physicality of the soul') one of the 'most interesting and ancient discussions'.

⁴⁹⁶ Tertullian does not, however, connect the words *substantia* and *spiritus* in a set term, such as *substantia spiritalis* as Cassiodorus does.

⁴⁹⁷ *De an.* 9, *Cum animae corpus adserimus propriae qualitatis et sui generis, iam haec condicio proprietatis de ceteris accidentibus corpulentiae praeiudicabit aut haec adesse, quam corpus ostendimus, sed et ipsa sui generis pro corporis proprietate, aut etsi non adsint, hoc esse proprietatis, non adesse corpori animae quae corporibus ceteris adsint. Et tamen non inconstanter profitebimur sollemniora quaeque et omnimodo debita corpulentiae adesse animae quoque, ut habitum, ut terminum, ut illud trifariam distantium, longitudinem*

spiritus. But the soul of the human being is also special, since the Bible tells us it has been made by the breath (*flatus*) of God (3). But God's breath (*flatus*) has to be distinguished from his Spirit –taken in a biblical sense–, even though 'to blow' (*flare*) is the same as 'to breathe' (*respire*). But God's Spirit cannot be identified with the *spiritus* on earth (11). Thus we see here, although spread out over several chapters in Tertullian, nearly the same three species of the word 'spirit' as we came across in the definition of Cassiodorus: an invisible substance which pervades all souls (although I have not seen Tertullian report that it pervades all the cosmos), the soul of the human being and the Spirit of God.

Tertullian's conception of the soul of the human being shares many elements with Cassiodorus. The soul of the human being is totally rational (19). It is the soul that judges, thus there is no question of judging ('forming opinions', '*opinari*') by the senses (17). The soul is undivided and has no different parts (14, 16) and serves as the ruling principle of the body (15). Even though animals and human beings share in *spiritus*, the human soul is really something else. Transmigration of the human soul into an animal in a following life is absurd, since they have a different substance (32).

A last similarity between Cassiodorus and Tertullian is to the effect of the free will. Tertullian is arguing in 21 for the fact that the choices of the human being drive a human character towards good or evil. But in principle the nature of the human being is morally neutral (Tertullian is arguing against the Gnostics to the effect that Adam was born morally neutral, without an adverse material element in his nature). In Tertullian's words:

'This will be the power of the grace of God, more potent indeed than nature, exercising its sway over the faculty that underlies itself within us-even the freedom of our will, which is described as 'autecousion' (of independent authority); and inasmuch as this faculty is itself also

dico et latitudinem et sublimitatem, quibus metantur corpora philosophi. 'When we aver that the soul has a body of a quality and kind peculiar to itself, in this special condition of it we shall be already supplied with a decision respecting all the other accidents of its corporeity; how that they belong to it, because we have shown it to be a body, but that even they have a quality peculiar to themselves, proportioned to the special nature of the body (to which they belong); or else, if any accidents (of a body) are remarkable in this instance for their absence, then this, too, results from the peculiarity of the condition of the soul's corporeity, from which are absent sundry qualities which are present to all other corporeal beings. And yet, notwithstanding all this, we shall not be at all inconsistent if we declare that the more usual characteristics of a body, such as invariably accrue to the corporeal condition, belong also to the soul-such as form and limitation; and that triad of dimensions -I mean length, and breadth and height-by which philosophers gauge all bodies'; 10, *Pertinet ad statum fidei simplicem animam determinare secundum Platonem, id est uniformem, dumtaxat substantiae nomine.* 'It is essential to a firm faith to declare with Plato that the soul is simple; in other words uniform and uncompounded; simply that is to say in respect of its substance' (trans. Holmes).

*natural and mutable, in whatsoever direction it turns, it inclines of its own nature.*⁴⁹⁸ (trans. Holmes)

Cassiodorus could thus have read from this that the free will (*liberam arbitriam potestas*) provides for the human soul to be mutable (*mutabilis*) towards evil. It is specifically here that Tertullian speaks of ‘the power of free choice’, which later would be converted by Augustine into ‘the free choice of the will’ in his *lib. arb.*, substituting *voluntas* for *potestas* in his title. When reading Tertullian, Cassiodorus would have been thinking of *voluntas*, and not so much of reasonable judgment. As indicated, Tertullian uses ‘to opine’ (*opinari*) for ‘judging’. Cassiodorus therefore could have taken his differentiation between reasonable judgement and the will from Tertullian as well. It therefore seems likely, even if this judgement is derived from a rather superficial glance, that Cassiodorus read and used Tertullian’s *De anima* as well.

⁴⁹⁸ 21, *Haec erit uis diuinæ gratiae, potentior utique natura, habens in nobis subiacentem sibi liberam arbitrii potestatem quod αὐτεξούσιον dicitur, quae cum sit et ipsa naturalis atque mutabilis, quoquo uertitur, natura conuertitur.*

3. Eugippius

3.1 Table 1. contents of the *Excerpta*

In the following table on the basis of Knöll's edition, the parts and chapters of the *Excerpta* are my abstractions, the only 'real' things are the paragraphs.⁴⁹⁹ In the capitula at the beginning of the *Excerpta* Eugippius shortly names, summarizes or introduces every excerpt, but certainly does not divide the whole of his *Excerpta* in larger partitions.

Parts	‘Chapters’	Paragraphs (Knöll)	Topics	
A	1	1-24	Love; Human virtues and pitfalls; the true and the false mediator of sin	
	(Salvation History)	2	25-44	The Fall and the origin of evil (The Origenist heresy); divine providence
		3	45-203	Questions concerning Biblical history, chronologically ordered
			45-130	Old Testament
			131-174	Laws, transgressions, the end of time and the resurrection
			175-203	New Testament
B	4	204-241	Instruction of the laity and baptism, the state of darkness of	

⁴⁹⁹ In the CSEL-edition, the *Excerpta* has two systems of numbering excerpts, one using Roman numerals and one using Arabic numerals. The first system is given by Eugippius, and the way that he numbers his excerpts may indicate something about the coherence he perceives in the paragraphs. The second system is given by the editor Knöll. This system breaks many of Eugippius' larger paragraphs up into smaller ones. In order to make his *Excerpta* as useful as possible, Eugippius is careful in indicating the source, both at the beginning of a paragraph and also in the middle when the source changes. Whenever Eugippius changed the source in the middle of an excerpt, Knöll was prompted to give a new number. Knöll therefore recognizes some 40 more paragraphs than Eugippius himself, on a total of 384 by Knöll's counting. In this chapter Knöll's numbering is used by default and Eugippius' numbering only if it is relevant evidence for his perception of coherence of the excerpts.

			the unbaptized
(Contemporary Christianity)	5	242-269	The Trinity
	6	270-304	Signs and rules of exegesis
	7	305-323	The Pelagian heresy, predestination, grace and <i>concupiscentia</i>
	8	324-276	Contemporary Christianity
		323-327	Martyrs and treating the dead
		328-341	God in 'daily life'; praying; intentions; sinning; the body)
		342-346	The Saints
		347-349	The Septuagint
		350-376	Body; soul; varia
	9	377-384	Love

3.2 Table 2. Excerpts relating to the soul, relevant topics and related interests.

In this table, on the basis of Knöll's edition, I have made an entry for every passage of Augustine, so that if an excerpt contains more passages of Augustine this excerpt will be mentioned more often. The passages have been selected as a first tool of analysis of Eugippius' *Excerpta*. They have therefore been chosen with a broad focus: excerpts directly related to anthropology (soul, body, spirit) has been inserted. They have further been grouped to gain an understanding of the 'weight' of Eugippius' interest in Augustine's normal topics on the soul (such as 'origin of the soul' or 'trinitarian structures in the soul'). In the group belonging to the origin of the soul excerpt 50-2 have been inserted, even though they do not bear a direct relationship to the origin of the soul. However, their insertion should make clear how Eugippius' solution of the transmission of original sin through *rationes seminales* shapes up throughout the excerpts. This then leads up to Eugippius' stress of Augustine's agnosticism concerning the question of the origin of the soul in 372, a question largely devoid of polemical content if one followed the line of the excerpts. This table should also show the care with which

Eugippius composed excerpt 372. It is the only excerpt on the soul which consists of several source texts.

Origin of the soul

Excerpt nr. Eugippius (after Knöll)	Title	Work of Augustine	Passage	Topic
31	Contra eos qui dicunt ob hoc factum esse mundum, ut animae quae prius peccaverant in eo includerentur; ubi et Origenem errasse probat contra libros ipsius, qui appellantur.	<i>civ.</i>	11.23	About Origin's error to state that the world was created for the punishment of fallen souls
39	Contra eos qui dicunt, cur creaverit deus hominem, quem peccaturem esse praesciebat.	<i>Gn. Litt.</i>	11.4.6-15/20	Why first sin? Good and evil in the world and how they work in the plan of God.
40	De decimatione Levi in lumbis Abrahae.	<i>Gn. litt.</i>	10.20.3 5-21.37	Transmission of original sin through the <i>rationes seminales</i> .
50	De locutione serpentis et Evam et de incantationibus Marsorum.	<i>Gn.litt.</i>	11.27.4 3-30,38	Story of evil pt 1: devil
51	Qualiter intellegendum sit: <i>Ecce Adam factus est tamquam unus ex nobis.</i>	<i>Gn.litt.</i>	11.39.5 3-41.56	Story of evil pt 2: adam
52	Quomodo Adam non sit seductus, ut dicit apostolus, cum idem dicat eum	<i>Gn.litt</i>	11.42.5 8-42.60	Story of evil pt 3: cast from paradise.

	praevaricationem			
53	De creatione primi hominis et de causalibus rationibus vel quomodo dicantur additi anni XV Ezechiae regi ad vitam, quem praedixerat non victurum.	<i>Gn litt:</i>	6.9.16-18.29	Causal reasons and the creation of Adam.
82	Quid est: <i>de manu fratris exquiram animam hominis.</i>	<i>qu.</i>	1.16	<i>Gen.</i> 9.5. understanding the human being through his kinship with Adam.
103	Quomodo intellegendum sit tot animas exisse de femoribus Iacob.	<i>qu.</i>	1.151	Souls from liam/thighs of Iacob. No argument for traducianism, since 'soul' is a pars pro toto for 'human being'
372	De animae quaestione.	<i>ep.</i>	190.16-19	Agnosticism concerning creationism and traducianism supported.
372	De animae quaestione.	<i>ep.</i>	202a.6.1 5; 18.23-25	Agnosticism concerning creationism and traducianism supported.
372	De animae quaestione.	<i>ep.</i>	205.19	Agnosticism concerning creationism and traducianism supported.
372	De animae quaestione.	<i>retr.</i>	1.1.3	Agnosticism concerning creationism and traducianism supported.

Trinity

265	De interrogatione haeretici contra eos qui unigentum dei non paternae substantiae, sed voluntatis filium esse dixerunt.	<i>trin.</i>	15.38-9	How the trinity in the soul of memory, will and understanding only imperfectly mirrors the Trinity of the persons of God.
266	Tria quae sunt in imagine dei, id	<i>trin.</i>	15.42	How the trinity in the soul of memory, will and

	est memoria, intellectus et amor, unius esse persona, quia non hoc est ei esse quod haec habere.			understanding only imperfectly mirrors the Trinity of the persons of God.
267	Quam vera in dei trinitate unitas et quam vera in eiusdem unitate sit trinitas.	<i>trin.</i>	15.43	How the trinity in the soul of memory, will and understanding only imperfectly mirrors the Trinity of the persons of God.

Inner man

12	De simplo salvatoris nostri, quod ad duplum nostrum concurrit et congruit.	<i>trin.</i>	4.3.5-4.7	How the single death of Christ offsets the double death of the human being. Renewing of inner man.
262	Quibus progressibus mens corporalium rerum sus et imagine delectata ab aeternorum contemplatione deficiat.	<i>trin.</i>	12.8.13	Progression of the soul towards reason which is the inner man. This gets bogged down by the temptations of external world.

Variae

360	De hominem facto ad imaginem et similitudinem dei.	<i>div. qu.</i>	51	Different ways of being able to say that the human being was made in the image and likeness of God (soul, spirit, body)
203	Utrum aliud sit anima, aliud spiritus, an utroque nomine res una vocetur.	<i>an. et or.</i>	4.22.36-24.38	With 'spirit' one refers either to the rational human soul (<i>animus</i>) or to the whole of the soul (<i>anima</i>).

171 (up to 173)	Quomodo Porphyrii definitio, qua beatis animis putat corpus omne fugiendum, ipsius Platonis sententia destruatur, qui dicit summum deum dis promisisse ut numquam corporibus exverentur.			On the resurrection of the flesh.
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3.3 table 3. Comparison edition Eugippius' Excerpta in PL and Knöll

The *PL* reprinted the *editio princeps* of the *Excerpta* published in Basle by Iohannes Herold (1542) (Gorman, 'The manuscript tradition of Eug. *Excerpta* I', 9)

checked per incipit and ending of each excerpt.

with Knöll: 'litterae *p. in., m., s.f.* quas addidi, *post initium, medium, sub finem* significant.'

PL edition (‘prout auctor ipse digessit.’)	text of Augustine	Knöll edition in Eug.’s counting	Knöll in Knöll’s counting	text of Augustine	topic
xxvi	<i>conf.</i> xii.25, 34 et 35 <i>conf.</i> xii. 27,37- 32,43	x	25	<i>conf.</i> XII.25, 34 et 35	
		xi	26	<i>conf.</i> XII.27,37- 32, 43 m.	
xxvii	idem	xii	27	<i>Gn. litt.</i> I 1,1-9,15	
xxviii	idem	xiii	28	<i>civ.</i> .XI 4,1- 4,2m.	
xxix	idem	xiiii	29	<i>civ.</i> XI 5m-	

				8s.f.	
xxx	idem	xv	30	<i>civ.</i> XI 9 in.-10	
xxxi	idem	xvi	31	<i>civ.</i> XI.23 s.f.	origin's error
xxxii	idem	xvii	32	<i>resp. ad or.</i> 3,3 p. in. -, 7 s.f.	
xxxiii	idem	xviii	33	<i>resp. ad or.</i> 8,11-11,14 s.f.	
xxxiv	idem	xviii	34	<i>de haeres.</i> 42 s.f. et 43	origin's error
xxxv	idem	xx	35	<i>civ.</i> XII 12 s.f.-15	
xxxvi	idem	xxi	36	<i>civ.</i> XII 5x.f.-9 s.f.	
xxxvii	idem	xxii	37	<i>Gn. litt.</i> XI 16,21	
xxxviii	idem	xxiii	38	<i>Gn. litt.</i> XI 23,30-25.32 s.f.	
xxxix	idem	xxiii	39	<i>Gn. litt.</i> XI.4, 6-15, 20 s.f.	good and evil in the plan of God
NOT		xxv	40	<i>Gn. litt.</i> X. 20, 35-22, 38	Transmissio n of original sin through the <i>rationes seminales</i> .
xl	idem	xxvi	41	<i>Gn. litt.</i> VIII 6,12	
xli	idem	xxvii	42	<i>Gn. litt.</i> viii 13,28 p. in. - 16,35 s.f.	
xlii	idem	xxviii	43	<i>Gn. litt.</i> viii 9,17-10,19	
xliii	idem	xxviii	44	<i>Gn. litt.</i> viii 19.38 m. - 24.45 s.f.	
xliv	idem	xxx	45	<i>Gn. litt.</i> viii 25.47 s.f.- 27.50 s.f.	
xlv	idem	xxxi	46	<i>qu.</i> i 2	
xlvi	idem	xxxii	47	<i>qu.</i> i 3	
xlvi	idem	xxxiii	48	<i>qu.</i> i 4	
xlvi	idem	xxxiii	49	<i>civ.</i> xv 24 s.f. -27	
NOT		xxxv	50	<i>Gn. litt.</i> XI 27, 34-30,	story of evil pt 1: devil

				38	
xlix	idem	xxxvi	51	<i>Gn.litt.</i> XI 39, 53-41, 56	story of evil pt 2: adam
l	idem	xxxvii	52	<i>Gn. litt.</i> XI 42, 58- 42, 60 s.f.	story of evil pt 3: cast from paradise
li	idem	xxxviii	53	<i>Gn.litt.</i> VI 9,16 s.f.- 19,30	causal reasons and the creation of Adam.
lxxx	idem	lxvii	82	<i>qu.</i> 1.16	Gen. 9.5 understandi ng the human being through kinship with adam
ci	idem	lxxxviii	103	<i>qu.</i> 1.151	thighs of iacob, no argument for traducianis m since 'soul' is a pars pro toto for 'human being'
ccccli	idem	cccxxxi	365	<i>div. qu.</i> 45	
ccccli	idem		366	<i>div. qu.</i> 63	
NOT			367	<i>div. qu.</i> 43	
ccccli b	idem	cccxxxii	368	<i>nat. b.</i> 24 s.f.-30	
ccccli	idem	cccxxxiii	369	<i>ep.</i> 205.2-4; 9-9m.	
ccccxlv	idem	cccxxxiiii	370	<i>ep.</i> 205.14m.-16	
ccccxlv	idem + 372	cccxxxv	371	<i>ep.</i> 205.17	
		cccxxxvi	372	<i>ep.</i> 205.19 retr. 1.1.3 s.f. (not seen by Knöll)	de animae quaestione
			372a	<i>ep.</i> 190. 16 p. in.-19	de animae quaestione
			372b	<i>ep.</i> 202a	de animae

				6.15; 18.23-25	quaestione
cccxlvi	idem	cccxxxvii	373	<i>pecc. mer.</i> ii 34.54m.- 36.59 s.f.	
cccxlvii	idem	cccxxxviii	374	<i>qu.</i> iii 24	
NOT		cccxxxviii	375	<i>qu.</i> iii 25	
cccxlvi	idem	cccxl	376	<i>qu.</i> v 42	
NOT			376a	<i>c. inl. imp.</i> iii 84 s.f.	
cccxlvi	idem	cccxi	377	<i>ep.</i> 140.9.24 m. -10.26	
cccl	idem	cccxi	378	<i>div. qu.</i> 35	
NOT		cccxi	379	<i>trin.</i> viii 6.9 s.f. - 8.12	
NOT		cccxlvi	380	<i>trin.</i> viii 8.12-12 s.f.	
NOT		cccxlvi	381	<i>trin.</i> viii 8.12 s.f.-10.14	
NOT		cccxlvi	382	<i>trin.</i> viii 10,14-14 m.	
cccli	idem	cccxlvi	383	<i>div. qu.</i> 36	
cccli	idem	cccxlvi	384	<i>s.</i> 150	

The excerpts checked are from 25 to 53 (Knöll counting) since that is where the ‘storyline’ of salvation history and the ‘story of evil’ takes place. Further excerpts 82 and 103 have been checked (even though they do not figure in the main argument of chapter 2) for their ties between the soul and the human body. Finally from 365 up until the end at 348, comprising of the crucial excerpt 372 (*de animae quaestione*) in order to show the many differences between the editions at the end of the *Excerpta*. A quick view, but not taken in in this table, confirms that the beginning of the editions manifest differences too.

Overall the structure of Knöll is equal to that of the *PL*, with Knöll taking in more excerpts than the *PL*. This is especially clear at the end of the *Excerpta* where Knöll 379-82 adds excerpts from the *trin.* envelopped in excerpts from the n between *div. qu.* Excerpt 372 is not recognised as a proper excerpt in the *PL* but merged with excerpt 371 (= *PL* cccxlvi), with the titles combined (*Utrum singillatim a Deo creatore corporum lineamenta formentur, et de animae quaestione. Ex eadem epistola, vel ex duabus epistolis ad Optatum.*). Relevant for the argument of the chapter are two observations.

The argument is strengthened by the equal structure in early part of the history of salvation (1), but weakened by the absence of excerpt 40 (2), which is to set up the causal reasons as an alternate explanation for the transmission of original sin. The easy explanation of its absence in the *PL* is that it is an interpolation, in which case Eugippius himself cannot be held responsible for this excerpt.

However the manuscript evidence, insofar as it can be surmised from secondary literature (see literature below and Knöll's introduction to his edition), seems inconclusive as to excerpt 40 being an interpolation. According to Knöll's apparatus criticus, for the reading of excerpt 40 he used mss. P, G, T, and M, so that excerpt 40 is included in at least those mss. With the help of Gorman, this can be refined to P1(δ), G(δ), T(β), and M(γ), with the greek letters indicating the mss. families the mss. are part of. The mss. are as follows:

T Codex Parisinus, numero 2109 signatus, olim Tellerianus Remensis 259. Reg. 4015.2....hic liber saeculo VIII...dimidiam partem Excerptorum, capita CLXV, usque ad caput CLVIII h. ed., neque umquam plura continebat.. (Knöll, XXI-XXII)

= Paris *BN* lat. 2109, incomplete, saec, ix in. (ante A.D. 828)...The last chapter is numbered 165 (= Knöll 173a). (Gorman, 'The manuscript tradition I', 23)

P Codex Parisinus, 11,642, olim Sangermanensis, sicut in fronte libri adnotatum est...VIII saeculo exaratus...Excerpta integra complectitur. (Knöll XXII-XXIII)

= Paris *BN* lat. 11642, saec. IX med., Saint-Germain-des-Prés...Derives from two exemplars. The first part (f. 1-218v; *P1*) from a manuscript of the δ family; the second)f. 219-224; *P2*) from a manuscript of the α family..(Gorman I, 24). *P1*'s last excerpt is 173a, so that excerpt 40 falls into *P1* (Gorman II, 238).

G Codex Sangallensis, numero 176 notatus VIII saeculo...totum Eugippium continet Excerptorum capita 366.

= St. Gall *Stiftsbibliothek* 176, saec. IX med...Written under Grimand (A.D. 811-82) and presented by him, this manuscript appears in the ninth century catalogue of St. Gall...The exemplar of Vercelli XXX (94), saec. IX-X (*H*). Copied directly from Paris lat. 2110, saec. VIII in. (*O*). (Gorman I, 25).

M Codex Mediomontanus numero 12,263 signatus...saeculi VIII scriptus...integra Eugippii Excerpta continet, nisi quod Epistulae pars maxima (usque ad p. 3,25) desideratur (Knöll XVIII)

= Rome *Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale* Sessorianus 590, saec. VIII-IX...Although copied from Vat. lat. 3375 (V), the manuscript is of value for those passages missing or rewritten in Vat. lat. 3375 (V) [V which functioned as Knöll's *codex optimus* -SH] (Gorman I, 24).

The stemma codicum (Gorman II, 229) reveals there are four families. Excerpt 40 appears in P1, G, T, and M, which are members of resp. δ , δ , β , and γ . The alpha family, containing C (= Monte Cassino 13, written during Abbot Desiderius 1058-1087), is considered by Gorman to be the best witness to the original structure of the *Excerpta* and its text (Gorman II, 235). The beta family provides the highest quality of text (Gorman II 237). The gamma family contains the oldest ms. V (= Vat. lat. 3375 saec VI ex.) and was 'treated by Knöll as the archetype of the *Excerpta*.' However 'criticism of Knöll's edition and editorial technique easily became an attack on his innocent *codex optimus*, unjustly maligned.' (Gorman II, 241). In this family several interpolations have been identified, e.g. Knöll 8 and 9, and it lacks some excerpts contained in the other mss. families e.g. 10-24 (Gorman II, 241 n. 4). About the delta family, Gorman notes that 'It is an unfortunate irony of the history of the transmission of Eugippius' influential florilegium that the most numerous family of old manuscripts, designated here the δ family, is, from a textual point of view, by far the worst' and his hypothesis is that they share an Insular hyparchetype (Gorman II, 244.) Gorman therefore concludes (II, 263): 'Pius Knöll's edition of the *Excerpta*, in many ways a remarkable achievement in 1885, reveals neither the original structure of Eugippius' work nor the precise text of the archetype which is potentially so valuable for analyzing the manuscript traditions and establishing the texts of St Augustine's works.'

For excerpt 40 this means that it is contained in at least three out of four mss. families. Knöll does not seem to have known or used mss. from the alpha family, so that from Knöll's lack of use of a mss. of that family for excerpt 40 it cannot be concluded that excerpt 40 is not present in it. A hint in this direction is the lack of excerpt 40 in the *editio princeps* of Herold, but since it is unknown which mss. he used, this cannot be taken as a foregone conclusion. Gorman's adhortation that a scholar editing Augustine or studying the manuscript tradition of one of his works should have a microfilm of Monte Cassino 13 (C) and Munich Clm 6247 (F), seems applicable to this case as well (Gorman II, 264). As it is at present unavailable, I would like to point to the fact that the excerpt is contained in three out of four families. This increases

likelihood of inclusion of excerpt 40 in Eugippius' archetype considerably. Moreover, in either edition is Adam created in excerpt 53 as a complete human being through the causal reasons *right after* the 'story of evil' ends. The placement of this excerpt still seems to show how Adam could have been influenced by evil, and how he transmitted his evil to later generations. Excerpt 40 ties the causal reasons to the transmission of original sin in a far more explicit way, but the placement of excerpt 53 seems indicative of the same mode of thinking. However, the fact that excerpt 40 is not included in Migne still casts doubts.

3.4 Chapter titles for excerpt 40

XXIX *Quod anima hominis domino tolerabilius dicatur sine adfirmatione sententiae unde prima hominis quam de primo homine.*

It should be more tolerable to say that the soul of a human being was given to the Lord, without asserting a judgement about the question whence the first soul of the human being came rather than from the first human being.

XXX *Dicit sortis nomen huius singulari animae fuisse adiunctum ad auferendam suspicionem praecedentium meritorum.*

He says that the name 'lot' was connected to this single soul in order to remove suspicions of preceding merits.

XXXI *Argumentum pro secunda opinione.*

Argument for the second opinion.

XXXII *Hic medius prospectator utriusque partes suas agit.*

Here the neutral analyst of both opinions explains his own perspective.

XXXIII *Argumentum pro prima opinione.*

Argument for the first opinion.

XXXIV *Quod anima Christi non sit ex traduce Adae adversum opinionem secundam.*

That the soul of Christ does not come from Adam as propagator, against the second opinion.

XXXV *Huic respondet, qui medius inter utrosque disceptantes incedit.*

He, who steps in the middle between the two disputing sides, answers him.

It is remarkable that Eugippius correctly identifies two opinions (traducianism, creationism), but chooses to name the first one he sees – traducianism – 'second opinion' and

the second one – creationism – ‘first opinion’. The reason for this may be found in the following. From the chapter onwards in which Augustine identifies himself as a neutral observer of the discussion⁵⁰⁰, he presents the reader first with the argument for creationism containing the *rationes seminales* (which I have discussed earlier) and an argument against the idea of a propagation of the soul of Christ.⁵⁰¹ The argument for traducianism thus becomes the second opinion by Eugippius’ counting. But he is forced to mention it first when Augustine shortly states the traducianist position before he even presents himself as neutral in these paragraphs.

chapter titles for excerpt 53

X *Hic quattuor veluti gradus ponit cognitionis rerum vel agnitionis causalibus in verbo Dei in elementis mundi, in rebus secundum originem suis iam temporibus factis in seminibus.*

XI *Docet perfectionem operis, quod Deus in origine mundi creavit omnia simul, inchoationem non alterius sed eiusdem operis esse, quo in eiusdem mundi administratione usque nunc operatur.*

XII *Quaestio quomodo tunc inchoavit, quando consummavit.*

XIII *Hic docet hominem in tempore suo formatum visibiliter et invisibiliter, id est animam et corpus, et ante hanc formationem praedestinatum dicit in praesentia Dei.*

XIV *Hominem dicit non ideo ceteris in hoc mundo animalibus praelatum, quia ab ipso proprie dicitur factus, sed quia imago in eo et similitudo est Dei.*

XV *Manus Dei est non visibile membrum, sed efficiendi potentia.*

XVI *Instructio etiam non parva etiam statura corporis nostri ad caelestia requirenda.*

XVII *Quod voluntas Dei sit summa causa, a qua rerum causae ordinatissime, ut ei placuit, extiterunt.*

XVIII *Quaestio, utrum origo perfectas in se rerum formas gestarit an perper temporum temporum legales numeros et successus aetatum, et respondetur utrumque inditum primordialibus causis, quo creatura omnis ab origine conditionis suae serviat arbitrio creatoris.*

XIX *Hic voluntatem Dei omnipotentis, bonitate et nulla necessitate hominem fecisse subtili disputatione monstratur.*

XX *Et hic posse et necesse esse quam vim in verbis vel effectis obtineant subtilissime demonstratur.*

XXI *Hic Ezechias inducitur ad documentum possibilitatis et necessitatis.*

XXII *Quod Adam credibilis dicatur perfectae virilitatis factus a Deo.*

⁵⁰⁰ From ‘hoc ad me non multum adinet’ (10.20.35).

⁵⁰¹ Which is chapter XXXIV, starting with ‘quapropter quod anima Christi non sit ex traduce animae illius primae praevaricatricis’ (10.21.37).